865 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 197 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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435 F.2d 1089·
4th Cir.·
1970-12-30
·cited 8×
A guilty plea is voluntary and intelligent if counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, even if the defendant pleaded guilty due to a prior coerced confession.
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The court held that the appellant's waiver of counsel was intelligent and that an evidentiary hearing was not required. The denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
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429 F.2d 340·
8th Cir.·
1970-07-27
·cited 8×
The court held that the defendant's confession was voluntary and admissible, and that the prosecution proved the voluntariness of the confession.
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Fred Cockerham appeals his burglary conviction, challenging the admission of evidence (paint scrapings and a chisel) obtained from his car trunk during a warrantless search. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant's voluntary consent to the search was valid
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423 F.2d 966·
8th Cir.·
1970-03-16
·cited 8×
The court held that the district court did not err in ruling that the petitioner's confession was voluntary and that his guilty plea was entered knowingly and intelligently, thus denying his motion for post-conviction relief.
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422 F.2d 1313·
9th Cir.·
1970-02-18
·cited 8×
The court held that the district court properly denied the petitioner's motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, as the record demonstrated a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea.
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The court held that the petitioner's contentions regarding his guilty plea being involuntary, unknowing, or impeached were without merit, affirming the denial of his habeas corpus petition.
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410 F.2d 1276·
2d Cir.·
1969-03-25
·cited 8×
The court held that the petitioner deliberately abandoned his right to challenge the validity of his prior conviction by failing to utilize available state procedures, despite being informed of his right to do so.
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The court held that the defendant did not intelligently and understandingly waive his right to counsel at critical stages of the proceedings, as the trial court failed to conduct a sufficiently penetrating inquiry.
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The court affirmed the district court's rejection of the defendant's motion for credit for pre-sentence jail time.
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Marvin Frazier Stanley appealed the denial of his petition to vacate his guilty plea conviction for breaking and entering. The court affirmed the summary denial, finding that the trial court record conclusively showed Stanley made an intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right
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382 F.2d 96·
10th Cir.·
1967-08-24
·cited 8×
A voluntary and unqualified guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects, precluding appeal of prior rulings.
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The court held that a motion to vacate a sentence based on claims of involuntary plea due to duress, where such claims are outside the record, requires a hearing.
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338 F.2d 333·
10th Cir.·
1964-11-05
·cited 8×
The court held that the appellant's motion to withdraw guilty pleas was properly denied because the consent forms conclusively showed receipt of the Informations and the pleas were intelligently made with counsel.
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325 F.2d 481·
8th Cir.·
1963-12-16
·cited 8×
A defendant's waiver of a jury trial is valid if voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, even if a related charge is dismissed thereafter, provided the waiver itself was not coerced.
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Federal habeas corpus relief is unavailable because the relator has not exhausted his state remedies by seeking a writ of error coram nobis.
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256 F.2d 363·
6th Cir.·
1958-06-04
·cited 8×
The dissent argues that the defendant was denied due process because he was not afforded counsel during a critical stage of the criminal proceedings, and his waiver of counsel was not intelligent or knowing.
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190 F.2d 252·
2d Cir.·
1951-07-03
·cited 8×
The court held that the relator was not entitled to habeas corpus relief because he failed to establish that an ingredient of unfairness actively operated in his Wisconsin conviction due to want of counsel.
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157 F.2d 807·
7th Cir.·
1946-11-14
·cited 8×
The court held that the petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and a jury trial, and thus his due process rights were not violated.
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The court held that the evidence did not sustain a finding that the waiver of counsel was intelligently made, and the appellant should be discharged.
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321 So. 3d 286·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2021-06-30
·cited 7×
Whatdly Petit appealed his first-degree murder conviction and life sentence, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress statements made during police interrogation and his motions for judgment of acquittal. The appellate court affirmed the conviction on all is
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248 So. 3d 1227·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2018-06-04
·cited 7×
A juvenile defendant's waiver of Miranda rights is valid where, under the totality of circumstances, the defendant had prior experience with the criminal justice system, was nearly eighteen years old, received a written waiver, and demonstrated understanding of his rights despite
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43 So. 3d 831·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2010-08-31
·cited 7×
The court held that a defendant's conviction after a bench trial must be reversed if there was no valid waiver of the right to a jury trial.
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983 So. 2d 1212·
Fla. 5th DCA·
2008-06-20
·cited 7×
The trial court committed fundamental error by failing to conduct a sufficient Faretta hearing before allowing the defendant to represent himself.
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644 So. 2d 181·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1994-10-28
·cited 7×
A defendant's waiver of the right to jury trial must affirmatively appear in the record as a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver by the defendant himself, and cannot be established solely by the attorney's written waiver without inquiry into the defendant's agreement and u
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968 F.2d 835·
9th Cir.·
1992-06-24
·cited 7×
The court held that the majority's distinction between de jure and de facto guilty pleas, focusing on labels rather than substance, is flawed and undermines constitutional protections.
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804 F.2d 261·
4th Cir.·
1986-10-20
·cited 7×
The court held that the Delgados were entitled to a new deportation hearing because their waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent due to lack of information about free legal aid.
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769 F.2d 314·
6th Cir.·
1985-07-23
·cited 7×
A guilty plea, voluntarily and intelligently made with competent counsel, is not rendered involuntary by the prosecution's prior failure to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence, even if that failure would have violated Brady v. Maryland at trial.
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429 So. 2d 1369·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1983-04-26
·cited 7×
Franklin Kimble appeals his robbery and burglary convictions, claiming the trial court erred in denying his request to represent himself. The court held that while defendants have a constitutional right to self-representation, trial courts must conduct a sufficient inquiry to ens
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The court held that a defendant's waiver of jury trial is presumed valid and does not require reconfirmation by the trial judge based on the judge's prior knowledge of facts related to the case, absent circumstances requiring disqualification.
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D.D.C.·
1970-10-16
·cited 7×
The court held that the Assistant United States Attorney's conduct did not significantly affect the appellant's decision to plead guilty, and therefore, withdrawal of the plea was not justified to prevent manifest injustice.
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262 So. 3d 1·
Fla.·
2018-12-13
·cited 6×
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction of LeShannon Jerome Shelly for first-degree murder, holding that detectives violated his Miranda rights by continuing to interrogate him after he unequivocally invoked his right to silence. The court established that the Welch sta
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247 So. 3d 698·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2018-05-25
·cited 6×
A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying an amended rule 3.850 motion filed outside the two-year postconviction relief window when the amendment raises new claims of ineffective assistance of counsel rather than merely enlarging or providing new information to suppo
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244 So. 3d 1098·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2018-04-18
·cited 6×
A defendant may not be convicted of a crime for which he was not charged, and a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense violates due process and must be corrected on remand. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct a competency heari
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243 So. 3d 880·
Fla.·
2018-03-15
·cited 6×
Jeffrey Glenn Hutchinson, convicted of four counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, appealed a summary denial of his successive postconviction motion seeking Hurst relief. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hutchinson's valid waiver of a penalty phase
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201 So. 3d 192·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2016-09-28
·cited 6×
The State appeals a trial court's suppression of a 16-year-old's confession to being an accessory after the fact to murder, arguing the juvenile validly waived his Miranda rights. The appellate court reverses, holding that under the totality of circumstances, the State proved the
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40 So. 3d 804·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2010-07-07
·cited 6×
Isaac Wilder appeals his murder and theft convictions on grounds that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police after invoking his right to counsel. The court reversed, holding that police violated Edwards v. Arizona by reintiating custo
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21 So. 3d 77·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2009-10-14
·cited 6×
A trial court commits fundamental error by failing to conduct a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver inquiry before permitting a defendant to proceed pro se at a restitution hearing, which is part of sentencing and a crucial stage requiring counsel.
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990 So. 2d 581·
Fla. 3d DCA·
2008-08-06
·cited 6×
Emmanuel Ridel appealed the denial of his post-conviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 27 of 30 charges against him. The court affirmed the denial, finding counsel's decision to focus investigation on the thre
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959 So. 2d 386·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2007-06-15
·cited 6×
Jeffery Dana Watkins appealed his conviction for habitual offender driving while licensed revoked, challenging the trial court's acceptance of his no contest plea after he discharged his attorney to represent himself. The court reversed because the trial court failed to conduct a
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956 So. 2d 548·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2007-05-23
·cited 6×
The trial court erred by denying the defendant's request for self-representation based on an incorrect standard of competence.
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383 F. Supp. 2d 1350·
M.D. Fla.·
2005-05-11
·cited 6×
The court held that the jury waiver provision in the Master Lease was rendered ambiguous by the subsequent Master Lease Amendment and, therefore, was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived.
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Angela Malone appeals her armed robbery conviction, arguing the trial court failed to properly inquire into her request to discharge her court-appointed attorney just before trial and then improperly allowed her to represent herself. The court reverses, holding that the trial cou
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851 So. 2d 805·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2003-07-30
·cited 6×
Bobby Staley challenges the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court failed to follow statutory and constitutional due process requirements. The Florida Second District Court of Appeal reversed the probation revocation order, holding that a probationer cannot pro
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842 So. 2d 868·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2003-01-17
·cited 6×
Joseph Ahedo appeals his armed burglary conviction, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress two confessions and raising competency concerns at sentencing. The appellate court affirmed the suppression ruling but remanded for resentencing because the trial co
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817 So. 2d 858·
Fla. 5th DCA·
2002-04-05
·cited 6×
Beck appeals from convictions for aggravated battery, felony DUI, and felony failure to appear after entering no contest pleas. The Fifth District affirmed the departure sentences despite the trial court's failure to timely file written reasons for departure, and affirmed the fai
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773 So. 2d 655·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2000-12-20
·cited 6×
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697 So. 2d 878·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1997-06-20
·cited 6×
A trial judge must either certify through proper inquiry that a defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to be present at the bench during jury challenges, or confirm that he acquiesced in the strikes after they were made.
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689 So. 2d 1179·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1997-03-10
·cited 6×
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700 So. 2d 3·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1997-02-10
·cited 6×
This case addresses whether a minor parent can validly surrender parental rights without counsel in a termination proceeding. The court held that while a minor may sign a surrender, the trial court must first determine that the right to counsel was knowingly and intelligently wai