Involuntary Manslaughter

104 Florida cases classified under this topic · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort

• Taylor v. State
  444 So. 2d 931· Fla.· 1983-12-22 ·cited 142×
  The Florida Supreme Court addressed whether attempted manslaughter is a cognizable crime under Florida law. The Court held that attempted manslaughter exists as a crime, but only when the underlying conduct involves voluntary manslaughter (act or procurement) with requisite inten
• Smith v. State
  65 So. 2d 303· Fla.· 1953-05-19 ·cited 73×
  James E. Smith was convicted of manslaughter by culpable negligence in the death of two pedestrians struck by his vehicle. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the facts did not establish the required degree of culpable negligence—defined as gross, flagrant conduct ev
• United States v. Thompson
  492 F.2d 359· 8th Cir.· 1974-02-19 ·cited 71×
  The court should not have instructed the jury on involuntary manslaughter due to lack of evidence.
• United States v. Skinner
  667 F.2d 1306· 9th Cir.· 1982-02-18 ·cited 51×
  The court held that the defendant's confessions were admissible and that the trial court did not err in refusing to give an involuntary manslaughter instruction.
• United States v. Lincoln
  630 F.2d 1313· 8th Cir.· 1980-10-14 ·cited 51×
  The court held that the indictment was sufficient to charge second-degree murder, the evidence supported the jury's verdict of voluntary manslaughter, and the district court did not err in its jury instructions or in denying a new trial.
• United States v. Harlen Manuel
  706 F.2d 908· 9th Cir.· 1983-04-29 ·cited 48×
  The court held that the appellant's confession was admissible, his speedy trial rights were not violated, and the refusal to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter was harmless error.
• Root v. Gauper
  438 F.2d 361· 8th Cir.· 1971-02-25 ·cited 48×
  The court held that the warrantless entry into the home was not justified by the emergency doctrine, and thus the admission of evidence obtained was unconstitutional error.
• Buenoano v. State
  708 So. 2d 941· Fla.· 1998-03-26 ·cited 47×
  Judy Buenoano, sentenced to death for the 1971 arsenic murder of her husband James Goodyear, appeals the denial of her third postconviction relief motion. The Florida Supreme Court affirms the trial court's summary denial, finding no Brady violation, newly discovered evidence, or
• United States v. Dixon
  419 F.2d 288· D.C. Cir.· 1969-03-27 ·cited 42×
• United States v. Tresvant
  677 F.2d 1018· 4th Cir.· 1982-05-05 ·cited 40×
  The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict for involuntary manslaughter, even if evidence of specific unlawful acts was weak, as the circumstances constituted criminal negligence.
• United States v. ELK
  658 F.2d 644· 8th Cir.· 1981-09-15 ·cited 40×
  The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support a second-degree murder conviction and that the trial court did not err in refusing jury instructions for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
• United States v. Keith
  605 F.2d 462· 9th Cir.· 1979-09-26 ·cited 38×
  The dissenting judge believes the majority incorrectly added a new element to involuntary manslaughter by requiring gross negligence or foreseeability, rather than merely defining existing statutory language.
• Barton v. State
  507 So. 2d 638· Fla. 5th DCA· 1987-04-10 ·cited 36×
  Stanley Barton was convicted of attempted manslaughter, aggravated battery, and weapon use for cutting his victim with a knife. The Florida appellate court held that attempted manslaughter and aggravated battery are mutually exclusive crimes that cannot both be punished based on
• Petition of Lloyd Clifton for a Writ of Habeas Corpus v. COX
  549 F.2d 722· 9th Cir.· 1977-03-04 ·cited 33×
  The dissenting judge would reverse the lower court's decision, arguing that the federal agent's actions were not authorized by federal law due to explicit Bureau regulations.
• United States v. Amos Pino
  708 F.2d 523· 10th Cir.· 1983-05-26 ·cited 32×
  The court held that the defendant's Fifth Amendment due process rights were not violated by the pre-indictment delay, as he failed to show actual prejudice or that the delay was purposeful. The court also found no reversible error in the prosecutorial conduct before the grand jur
• United States v. Killer
  534 F.2d 1253· 8th Cir.· 1976-04-16 ·cited 32×
  The court held that while a jury instruction stating a confession was voluntary was erroneous, it was harmless error in this case. It also held that evidence of the defendant's ownership of other firearms was relevant and admissible.
• United States v. Pardee
  368 F.2d 368· 4th Cir.· 1966-09-14 ·cited 31×
  The court held that the district judge did not err in taking a verdict and passing sentence on a lesser included offense (wrong-way driving) to run concurrently with a conviction for a greater offense (involuntary manslaughter), and that such a sentence was not void.
• Barker v. Morris
  761 F.2d 1396· 9th Cir.· 1985-05-24 ·cited 28×
  The admission of sworn, videotaped testimony from a deceased eyewitness did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the testimony was necessary and possessed particular guarantees of trustworthiness.
• Davis v. Greer
  675 F.2d 141· 7th Cir.· 1982-04-08 ·cited 28×
  The court held that the trial court's refusal to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction was not a due process violation because there was insufficient evidence to support such a charge, and the jury's question about involuntary manslaughter was adequately answered by directing
• United States v. Springfield
  829 F.2d 860· 9th Cir.· 1987-10-06 ·cited 27×
  The court held that involuntary manslaughter can qualify as a 'crime of violence' under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) if it inherently involves a substantial risk of physical force, and that cumulative punishments under § 924(c) and § 1202(a) are permissible.
• United States v. Collins
  690 F.2d 431· 5th Cir.· 1982-10-15 ·cited 26×
  The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings of sanity and premeditation, and that the trial court did not err in refusing a manslaughter instruction or excluding certain testimony.
• Hallowell v. Keve
  555 F.2d 103· 3d Cir.· 1977-04-22 ·cited 26×
  The dissenting judge believes the jury charge improperly placed the burden of persuasion regarding provocation on the defendant, violating Mullaney v. Wilbur.
• United States v. Celestine
  510 F.2d 457· 9th Cir.· 1975-01-02 ·cited 26×
  The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of causation and malice aforethought, and that the jury instructions given were not reversible error.
• Brewer v. Overberg
  624 F.2d 51· 6th Cir.· 1980-06-30 ·cited 24×
  The failure of a state court to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses is cognizable on habeas corpus, but procedural noncompliance can bar review if not plain error. The evidence was sufficient to support the murder conviction.
• United States v. Plenty
  466 F.2d 240· 8th Cir.· 1972-09-13 ·cited 24×
  The prosecution for involuntary manslaughter was not barred by collateral estoppel because the tribal court acquittal for driving while intoxicated did not involve an essential factual issue identical to that in the federal manslaughter charge.
• United States v. Browner
  889 F.2d 549· 5th Cir.· 1989-11-16 ·cited 22×
  A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter if the evidence could rationally support a finding of guilt for the lesser offense and acquittal for the greater.
• United States v. Fesler
  781 F.2d 384· 5th Cir.· 1986-01-21 ·cited 22×
  The court held that the district court erred in its jury instructions for involuntary manslaughter by failing to define 'due caution and circumspection,' requiring vacation of those convictions. However, other convictions and sentences were affirmed.
• United States v. Schmidt
  626 F.2d 616· 8th Cir.· 1980-07-31 ·cited 20×
  The court held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction for involuntary manslaughter, as the jury could reasonably conclude the defendant acted with gross negligence.
• Arwood v. United States
  134 F.2d 1007· 6th Cir.· 1943-04-13 ·cited 20×
  The court should have allowed the jury to consider whether the deceased officer's actions were illegal, which could reduce the homicide charge.
• Bolin v. State
  8 So. 3d 428· Fla. 2d DCA· 2009-03-20 ·cited 18×
  Oscar Ray Bolin, Jr. appeals his second-degree murder conviction, challenging the trial court's jury instruction on manslaughter. The court affirms the denial of Bolin's motion to inspect grand jury testimony but reverses and remands for a new trial because the court failed to pr
• United States v. McMILLAN
  820 F.2d 251· 8th Cir.· 1987-05-28 ·cited 18×
  The court held that South Dakota traffic laws can be assimilated into federal law under the Assimilative Crimes Act for purposes of an involuntary manslaughter charge, and that objections to the administration of an intoxilyzer test go to the weight, not admissibility, of the evi
• United States v. Fleming
  739 F.2d 945· 4th Cir.· 1984-07-17 ·cited 18×
  A non-purposeful vehicular homicide can amount to second-degree murder if the defendant's conduct demonstrates malice aforethought, defined as a reckless and wanton disregard for human life.
• United States v. Harvey
  701 F.2d 800· 9th Cir.· 1983-03-15 ·cited 18×
  The Fourth Amendment requires a formal arrest prior to a blood sample seizure, unless the suspect is unconscious or too incapacitated to appreciate the significance of an arrest. A prior arrest is not required if the suspect is incapacitated.
• United States v. Martine
  442 F.2d 1022· 10th Cir.· 1971-05-17 ·cited 18×
  The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict and that the accident site qualified as "Indian country" for jurisdictional purposes.
• United States v. Lesina
  833 F.2d 156· 9th Cir.· 1987-11-27 ·cited 16×
  The court held that the jury instructions were erroneous because they failed to adequately distinguish the mens rea requirements for second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, and failed to instruct the jury on the defense of accidental killing and the government's burden
• United States v. COX
  509 F.2d 390· D.C. Cir.· 1974-12-18 ·cited 16×
  The court found that while the jury instructions on recklessness were not perfectly clear, they were not plain error warranting reversal as the case did not hinge on the defendant's state of mind.
• Jones v. United States
  308 F.2d 307· D.C. Cir.· 1962-08-09 ·cited 16×
  The court held that the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that they must first find a legal duty to provide care before convicting the appellant of manslaughter.
• Reed v. State
  531 So. 2d 358· Fla. 5th DCA· 1988-09-01 ·cited 15×
  A 16-year-old defendant was convicted of second degree murder in the shooting death of a 13-year-old friend, but the appellate court reversed for a new trial because the jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter was incomplete, failing to define culpable neg
• United States v. Dubray
  727 F.2d 771· 8th Cir.· 1984-02-17 ·cited 14×
  The court held that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally not addressed on direct appeal when the record is undeveloped.
• The United States v. Yazzie
  660 F.2d 422· 10th Cir.· 1981-09-18 ·cited 14×
  The court held that the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection, and that the jury instructions regarding deadly weapons and intoxication were proper.
• Bishop v. Mazurkiewicz
  634 F.2d 724· 3d Cir.· 1980-12-02 ·cited 14×
  The court held that a state trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter was not a due process violation, even if state appellate court decisions on the issue were inconsistent.
• United States v. DeMARRIAS
  441 F.2d 1304· 8th Cir.· 1971-05-04 ·cited 14×
  The court held that the offenses of involuntary manslaughter under federal law and the tribal offenses of driving under the influence and open container violation are not the same for double jeopardy purposes.
• Thomas v. United States
  419 F.2d 1203· D.C. Cir.· 1969-11-17 ·cited 14×
  The court held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter, when accidental death was the sole contested issue, constituted reversible error.
• Screws v. United States
  140 F.2d 662· 5th Cir.· 1944-01-14 ·cited 13×
• United States v. Cree
  915 F.2d 352· 8th Cir.· 1990-09-25 ·cited 12×
  The court held that enhancing a sentence for victim vulnerability under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 requires the defendant to have targeted or exploited the victim's specific vulnerability, which was not shown here.
• United States v. MacArthur Martin Bryant
  892 F.2d 1466· 10th Cir.· 1989-12-27 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the jury instructions adequately defined the elements of involuntary manslaughter and that the trial judge's sentencing comments did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judge's remarks indicated disagreement with the jury's verdict but did not lead to
• United States v. Andino
  831 F.2d 1164· 1st Cir.· 1987-10-28 ·cited 12×
  The court held that Puerto Rico's territorial status prevents the application of the 'dual sovereignty' doctrine for double jeopardy purposes, as it derives its authority from Congress, not a separate sovereign.
• United States v. Chauncey Wesley Long ELK
  805 F.2d 826· 8th Cir.· 1986-11-21 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Code of Justice § 11-106(a) applies to conduct occurring off public roadways and that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict of involuntary manslaughter.
• Hoffer v. Morrow
  797 F.2d 348· 7th Cir.· 1986-07-15 ·cited 12×
  An inconsistent jury verdict, where a defendant is convicted of multiple counts that contain mutually exclusive elements, does not constitute an implied acquittal for double jeopardy purposes and does not bar retrial.
• United States v. Comosona
  614 F.2d 695· 10th Cir.· 1980-01-30 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice from pre-indictment delay, and the district court's findings were sufficient.