-
278 F.2d 169·
3d Cir.·
1960-05-06
·cited 11×
The court held that the trial judge applied an erroneous legal standard regarding the defendant's burden of proof for an epileptic seizure defense, requiring reversal and a new trial.
-
443 So. 2d 286·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1983-12-22
·cited 10×
Rodriguez was charged with attempted first-degree murder but convicted of attempted second-degree murder. He appealed, contending the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on attempted manslaughter, a lesser-included offense. The Florida appellate court reversed, hol
-
682 F.2d 168·
8th Cir.·
1982-06-30
·cited 10×
-
670 F.2d 126·
9th Cir.·
1982-02-24
·cited 10×
The court held that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of the apartment and that the disclosure of grand jury materials to an expert witness was permissible.
-
659 F.2d 848·
8th Cir.·
1981-09-15
·cited 10×
An indictment for involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112 is fatally defective if it fails to allege the essential elements of gross negligence and actual knowledge of danger, as required by circuit precedent, and this defect cannot be cured by evidence presented at trial
-
516 F.2d 16·
8th Cir.·
1975-05-14
·cited 10×
The court held that the jury instructions adequately conveyed the concept of proximate cause and that neither collateral estoppel nor double jeopardy barred the prosecution.
-
212 F.2d 767·
9th Cir.·
1954-03-30
·cited 10×
The court held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial for the offenses charged in Guam, but reversed the conviction for involuntary manslaughter due to prosecution by information instead of indictment.
-
697 F.2d 845·
8th Cir.·
1983-01-21
·cited 9×
The court held that it was not error to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense, even when self-defense was raised, because the defendant's actions could be construed as criminally negligent.
-
711 F.2d 104·
8th Cir.·
1983-07-07
·cited 8×
The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant voluntarily consented to the taking of his blood sample.
-
670 F.2d 800·
8th Cir.·
1982-02-18
·cited 8×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of involuntary manslaughter and that the admission of certain evidence was within the trial court's discretion.
-
594 F.2d 1085·
6th Cir.·
1979-02-27
·cited 8×
The court affirmed convictions for unlawful distribution of Demerol due to overwhelming evidence but vacated the involuntary manslaughter conviction due to prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct.
-
513 F.2d 5·
10th Cir.·
1975-03-17
·cited 8×
The court held that while the failure to provide written notice to the parents of the juvenile's right to counsel was a constitutional error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the circumstances.
-
177 So. 3d 631·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2015-09-09
·cited 6×
Tracy Pethtel was convicted of aggravated manslaughter of a child following a jury verdict finding him guilty of manslaughter (without specifying the type) and making special findings that the victim was under 18 and Pethtel was the caregiver. The court reversed, holding that the
-
923 F.2d 725·
9th Cir.·
1991-01-16
·cited 6×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and that evidence of his prior convictions was properly admitted.
-
915 F.2d 320·
8th Cir.·
1990-09-12
·cited 6×
A juvenile's sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1)(B) cannot exceed the maximum term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult under the sentencing guidelines.
-
836 F.2d 1086·
8th Cir.·
1987-12-31
·cited 6×
The court denied the petition for rehearing, finding that the government's arguments regarding remanding for judgment on lesser included assault charges or retrying defendants for assault were not ripe for appellate adjudication.
-
756 F.2d 773·
10th Cir.·
1985-03-05
·cited 6×
The court held that the trial court erred by summarily denying a motion to suppress statements without a voluntariness hearing and by giving an erroneous jury instruction regarding stipulated facts.
-
481 F.2d 1106·
D.C. Cir.·
1973-06-29
·cited 6×
The court held that the trial court erred in failing to give an appropriate instruction on involuntary manslaughter, as the jury could have found the defendant's actions constituted a gross deviation from reasonable care without malice.
-
467 F.2d 341·
4th Cir.·
1972-08-17
·cited 6×
The court held that the district court erred in its jury instructions regarding the necessary elements of involuntary manslaughter and in unduly limiting the defendant's presentation of character witnesses.
-
424 F.2d 796·
D.C. Cir.·
1970-01-02
·cited 6×
The court held that the trial court was not required to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter because the evidence did not warrant it. The court also found no prejudicial error in the prosecutor's remarks regarding a missing witness.
-
228 F.2d 283·
9th Cir.·
1955-12-19
·cited 6×
The court held that the appellant was entitled to an indictment and jury trial, and the retroactive application of the Saylor Act to deny these rights was an unconstitutional ex post facto law.
-
703 So. 2d 1069·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1997-07-25
·cited 4×
Marcus Duncan appealed his second degree murder conviction, challenging a jury instruction that improperly merged voluntary and involuntary manslaughter instructions. The court affirmed the conviction as the instructional error was not fundamental without trial objection, but rem
-
833 F.2d 900·
10th Cir.·
1987-11-23
·cited 4×
The court held that an involuntary manslaughter instruction is permissible even when self-defense is raised, and that the prosecutor's questions about prior legal issues were not prejudicial enough to warrant a mistrial.
-
814 F.2d 200·
5th Cir.·
1987-04-10
·cited 4×
The dissenting judge believes double jeopardy attaches to the bail revocation hearing, barring subsequent prosecution. Alternatively, collateral estoppel should bar the prosecution because the issue of fact was already decided.
-
776 F.2d 892·
10th Cir.·
1985-11-06
·cited 4×
The court held that the cumulative effect of the district court's erroneous evidentiary rulings denied the defendant a fair trial.
-
719 F.2d 518·
1st Cir.·
1983-10-25
·cited 4×
-
716 F.2d 515·
8th Cir.·
1983-08-31
·cited 4×
The court held that the indictment was valid, the defendant's statement to FBI agents was admissible, and evidence of his chronic alcoholism was irrelevant.
-
712 F.2d 1283·
8th Cir.·
1983-08-02
·cited 4×
A confession obtained after an unreasonable delay in presentment before a magistrate is not per se inadmissible if voluntarily given, and the delay is only one factor in determining voluntariness.
-
279 F.2d 304·
9th Cir.·
1960-05-21
·cited 4×
The court held that a criminal conviction for voluntary manslaughter is not conclusive proof in a civil action that the killing was intentional, and the beneficiary is entitled to an opportunity to present evidence that the killing was accidental.
-
979 F.2d 1319·
8th Cir.·
1992-11-18
·cited 2×
The court held that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter, as there was sufficient evidence to support such a finding. The court also found the admission of Noah One Star's grand jury testimony permissible, but urged redaction.
-
928 F.2d 818·
8th Cir.·
1991-03-29
·cited 2×
The court held that the District Court did not err in denying a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
-
836 F.2d 1113·
8th Cir.·
1988-01-07
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court did not err in rejecting the defense of involuntary intoxication because the defendants were capable of appreciating the wrongfulness of their acts, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the involuntary manslaughter convictions.
-
711 F.2d 80·
8th Cir.·
1983-06-20
·cited 2×
The court held that the defendant voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly relinquished his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel during post-polygraph interrogation, making his inculpatory statement admissible.
-
691 F.2d 412·
8th Cir.·
1982-10-22
·cited 2×
The court held that sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the jury's finding of intoxication and that the trial court properly admitted evidence of withdrawal symptoms and excluded evidence of a passenger's prior conduct.
-
690 F.2d 147·
8th Cir.·
1982-10-14
·cited 2×
The court held that incriminating statements made by the appellant after a polygraph examination, without a fresh reading of Miranda rights, were not voluntarily made and should have been suppressed.
-
645 F.2d 642·
8th Cir.·
1981-04-09
·cited 2×
The court held that the government failed to prove by competent evidence that the defendant was intoxicated while driving, an essential element of involuntary manslaughter.
-
580 F.2d 335·
8th Cir.·
1978-07-26
·cited 2×
The court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter because the defendant's actions constituted a felony under North Dakota law. The admission of a post-arrest threat was harmless error.
-
496 F.2d 507·
8th Cir.·
1974-05-07
·cited 2×
The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the investigating officer's testimony regarding the defendant's admissions, the doctor's testimony regarding intoxication, or testimony about the decedent's injuries, and that there was sufficient evidence to sustain th
-
461 F.2d 1092·
5th Cir.·
1972-06-23
·cited 2×
The court held that the trial court erred in excluding specific acts of prior beatings offered to support a self-defense claim.
-
161 So. 3d 477·
Fla. 5th DCA·
2014-06-26
·cited 1×
The appellate court held that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in denying the petition to shelter the child, as probable cause was established by the mother's history of child abuse and neglect.
-
Fla. 4th DCA·
2019-12-11
An incarcerated father appealed the termination of his parental rights, challenging the trial court's reliance on an incorrect criminal designation (HVFO instead of VCC) as grounds for termination. The appellate court affirmed the termination but on an alternative statutory basis
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999 F.2d 1298·
8th Cir.·
1993-08-03
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for involuntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt, as it did not overcome the reasonable doubt that either the defendant or his wife was the perpetrator.
-
974 F.2d 1135·
9th Cir.·
1992-09-08
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the marital communications privilege does not apply to threats against a spouse or child, and that any instructional errors were harmless.
-
884 F.2d 252·
6th Cir.·
1989-08-28
The admission of a nontestifying co-defendant's confession in a bench trial does not violate the Confrontation Clause if the judge is capable of compartmentalizing the evidence and not using it against the defendant.
-
878 F.2d 159·
5th Cir.·
1989-06-15
The court held that serving a sentence on a prior conviction used for enhancement does not violate double jeopardy and does not entitle the defendant to credit for that time on the enhanced sentence.
-
849 F.2d 361·
8th Cir.·
1988-06-20
The court held that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to involuntary manslaughter and that the supplemental jury instruction was adequate.
-
848 F.2d 917·
8th Cir.·
1988-06-09
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a continuance, and that federal courts do not recognize the physician-patient privilege in federal criminal proceedings.
-
602 F.2d 650·
4th Cir.·
1979-07-12
The court held that a prior conviction for involuntary manslaughter does not collaterally bar a subsequent prosecution for malicious wounding arising from the same incident.
-
583 F.2d 697·
4th Cir.·
1978-09-28
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a finding that the mother violated the statute by knowingly withholding medical assistance, leading to her child's death.
-
444 F.2d 402·
3d Cir.·
1971-06-28
The court held that the petitioner's contentions regarding conviction on an uncharged offense, insufficient evidence, unconstitutional criminalization, and denial of equal protection were without merit.