-
374 F.2d 241·
6th Cir.·
1967-02-17
·cited 100×
The court held that the defendants' convictions for conspiracy and aiding and abetting fraud were supported by substantial evidence, and that the trial court did not err in denying their motions regarding grand jury testimony, inspection of minutes, preliminary examination, or a
-
297 F.2d 330·
9th Cir.·
1961-12-04
·cited 96×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction for aiding and abetting the willful misapplication of bank funds, and that there was no reversible error in the trial court's rulings.
-
253 F.2d 12·
6th Cir.·
1958-03-05
·cited 72×
The court held that the trial court's jury instructions were inadequate to apprise the jury of the principles of aiding and abetting.
-
605 F.2d 101·
3d Cir.·
1979-08-24
·cited 60×
A bank officer violates 18 U.S.C. § 656 by willfully misapplying bank funds to obtain a loan for himself through an intermediary, even if the intermediary is capable of repayment and aware of their obligation.
-
468 F.2d 989·
2d Cir.·
1972-10-31
·cited 58×
The court held that the defendant's conviction for conspiracy and aiding/abetting violations of federal banking statutes was supported by sufficient evidence.
-
318 F.2d 357·
1st Cir.·
1963-06-18
·cited 58×
The court held that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the funds in the escrow account belonged to the bank, and in failing to submit the crucial factual issue of the capacity in which the defendant received the funds to the jury.
-
577 F.2d 1079·
6th Cir.·
1978-06-08
·cited 56×
The court held that while the jury instruction on intent to defraud could have been more precise, it was not so prejudicial as to require reversal, and the admission of evidence of prior bad acts without a limiting instruction was not plain error.
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750 F.2d 844·
11th Cir.·
1985-01-15
·cited 54×
-
700 F.2d 953·
5th Cir.·
1983-03-10
·cited 53×
The court held that a jury instruction stating 'reckless disregard of the interest of the bank is the equivalent of intent to injure or defraud the bank' was not misleading when read as a whole, and that such reckless disregard can be sufficient to prove the requisite intent for
-
514 F.2d 597·
10th Cir.·
1975-04-24
·cited 52×
The court held that the appellant's conviction for aiding and abetting violations of 18 U.S.C. § 215 and § 656, and for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1014 and conspiracy, was supported by sufficient evidence and that the indictment was legally sufficient.
-
601 F.2d 203·
5th Cir.·
1979-08-23
·cited 50×
The court held that the indictment for 'willful misapplication' was sufficient, that there was sufficient evidence to support the charges, but that the jury instruction equating 'reckless disregard' with 'intent to injure or defraud' was erroneous for the false entry charge under
-
349 F.2d 166·
1st Cir.·
1965-07-15
·cited 42×
The evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict that the bank manager willfully misapplied bank funds, a necessary predicate for convicting the defendant of aiding and abetting.
-
544 F.2d 730·
4th Cir.·
1976-11-04
·cited 38×
The court held that the trial court's instructions on bribery and the intent to injure or defraud were erroneous, requiring reversal and a new trial.
-
489 F.2d 327·
2d Cir.·
1973-12-21
·cited 38×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant of willfully misapplying bank funds and falsely certifying checks, and that the jury charge adequately conveyed the necessary intent elements.
-
318 F.2d 155·
9th Cir.·
1963-05-21
·cited 36×
The court held that the indictment's allegations of willful misapplication, including distributing loan proceeds to unintended recipients, sufficiently stated an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 656, even without explicitly stating "intent to injure or defraud."
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763 F.2d 859·
7th Cir.·
1985-06-05
·cited 34×
A defendant's conviction for willful misapplication of bank funds under 18 U.S.C. § 656 will not be vacated if the conduct involved taking advantage of a confidential relationship, even without intent to injure the bank.
-
581 F.2d 664·
7th Cir.·
1978-08-02
·cited 30×
The court held that the superseding indictment alleged a prosecutable crime under 18 U.S.C. § 656 and that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of willful misapplication with intent to defraud.
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76 So. 2d 645·
Fla.·
1954-12-21
·cited 29×
Johnny Clendell Green was convicted of forgery for endorsing a check with a fictitious name ('Jimmy Smith') as part of a scheme to defraud merchants. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that forging a fictitious endorsement on a check constitutes forgery under Florida law
-
875 F.2d 1091·
5th Cir.·
1989-06-09
·cited 28×
The court held that a jury instruction stating 'intent to injure or defraud' exists if a defendant acts knowingly and the natural consequences of their conduct may injure the bank is imprecise but not reversible error if the charge as a whole does not mislead the jury.
-
741 F.2d 915·
7th Cir.·
1984-08-02
·cited 28×
The court held that the indictment was sufficient, the evidence supported the conviction for willful misapplication of bank funds, and the prosecutor's remarks and evidentiary rulings did not constitute reversible error.
-
471 F.2d 385·
3d Cir.·
1972-12-26
·cited 28×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction for willful misapplication of bank funds and that the district court did not err in denying the motion for a new trial.
-
916 F.2d 207·
5th Cir.·
1990-10-19
·cited 27×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendants' convictions for conspiracy, concealment, misapplication, and false entries, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance or admitting evidence of a prior bad act.
-
471 F.2d 1318·
5th Cir.·
1973-01-09
·cited 22×
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's offer of proof regarding unrelated transactions and in its jury instructions on circumstantial evidence.
-
456 F.2d 435·
3d Cir.·
1972-02-09
·cited 21×
The court held that the indictment sufficiently charged the elements of misapplication of bank funds and that the evidence supported the conviction for conspiracy and substantive misapplication charges.
-
891 F.2d 597·
6th Cir.·
1989-12-13
·cited 20×
The government failed to prove the defendants had the requisite intent to defraud the bank, an essential element for misapplication of bank funds.
-
855 F.2d 1363·
9th Cir.·
1987-09-03
·cited 20×
The court held that the jury instruction on intent to injure or defraud was potentially misleading, and that the failure to instruct on the defense of board consent or good faith constituted reversible error for certain counts, requiring remand.
-
520 F.2d 1355·
4th Cir.·
1975-08-14
·cited 19×
The court held that the jury instructions adequately conveyed the requirement of intent to injure or defraud, and that inconsistent verdicts are permissible.
-
666 F.2d 1116·
7th Cir.·
1981-12-28
·cited 18×
A jury instruction stating that reckless disregard for a bank's interest is sufficient to establish intent to defraud for a false entry offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1005 is erroneous.
-
214 So. 2d 515·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1968-09-24
·cited 18×
Samuel Lampley was convicted of uttering a forged check and receiving stolen property after presenting a forged check at a supermarket. The court reversed his convictions, finding that the state failed to prove essential elements of both offenses—specifically, that Lampley knew t
-
560 F.2d 812·
7th Cir.·
1977-08-18
·cited 17×
The court held that the jury instructions on specific intent were inadequate, requiring reversal of the conviction.
-
684 So. 2d 856·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1996-12-13
·cited 16×
Rushing was convicted of forgery for signing a friend's name to two traffic tickets. The court affirmed, holding that signing another's name on a traffic citation constitutes forgery because the signature functions as an appearance bond with legal efficacy.
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731 So. 2d 69·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1999-04-01
·cited 15×
Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of counts seeking equitable liens and declaring mortgages void, alleging they provided funds for real estate purchases but defendants fraudulently obtained mortgages in their names without authorization. The court reversed, holding that the compl
-
511 F.2d 179·
5th Cir.·
1975-04-11
·cited 14×
The court held that an entry on a bank's books is not false if it accurately reflects a transaction that actually occurred, even if the intent behind the transaction was to extort money.
-
383 F.2d 675·
4th Cir.·
1967-08-01
·cited 14×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find the defendant guilty of knowingly making false entries on bank books with intent to defraud, and that his statement to bank officials was admissible.
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877 F.2d 477·
6th Cir.·
1989-06-13
·cited 12×
The court held that a bank officer's willful misapplication of bank funds, even without actual loss to the bank, is a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 656 if the officer deprives the bank of possession, control, or use of its funds with intent to injure or defraud.
-
832 F.2d 1175·
9th Cir.·
1987-11-20
·cited 12×
The court held that a defendant has a constitutional right to rebut the prosecution's neutral explanation for excluding jurors of the defendant's race, and that the trial court's ex parte proceeding violated this right.
-
608 F.2d 241·
6th Cir.·
1979-09-06
·cited 12×
-
404 So. 2d 760·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1981-09-08
·cited 10×
The Florida Supreme Court held that forging a birth certificate with a fictitious public office name constitutes forgery under Florida Statutes § 831.01, reversing the trial court's dismissal. The court rejected the defendant's argument that forgery requires the use of a real, ex
-
503 F.2d 87·
9th Cir.·
1974-08-27
·cited 10×
The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1005 requires an "intent to injure or defraud" as an essential element, even if not explicitly stated in every paragraph. The convictions were reversed because the indictment and jury instructions failed to include this element.
-
26 So. 3d 706·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2010-02-05
·cited 9×
Billy Dwayne Ginn was convicted of uttering forged documents and grand theft after cashing two forged American Express traveler's checks. The Florida Second District Court of Appeal reversed his convictions, holding that the State failed to present evidence proving Ginn knew the
-
783 F.2d 891·
9th Cir.·
1986-02-25
·cited 8×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict both defendants of misapplication of bank funds, and the indictment was sufficient.
-
296 So. 2d 109·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1974-06-18
·cited 8×
The Flickers were charged with uttering and publishing forged mortgage satisfactions and forging a notarial attestation. The appellate court reversed their convictions, finding insufficient evidence that Elizabeth Flicker participated in any forgery and finding the evidence as to
-
398 F.2d 298·
7th Cir.·
1968-07-24
·cited 8×
The court held that the defendant's actions in causing a large prepayment of rent, despite warnings about the association's liquidity and his own financial difficulties, constituted willful misapplication of funds, and the trial court did not err in its instructions or rulings.
-
224 F.2d 367·
9th Cir.·
1955-06-27
·cited 8×
The court held that authorization by bank officials is not a defense to making a false entry to deceive a bank examiner, and the conviction on count four was valid.
-
13 So. 3d 163·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2009-06-12
·cited 6×
Ashley Grant appeals her conviction for uttering an altered check, arguing insufficient evidence that she knew the check had been altered and intended to defraud. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that direct evidence of cashing the check combined with circumst
-
926 F.2d 402·
5th Cir.·
1991-02-28
·cited 6×
The court held that sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for conspiracy and aiding and abetting, and that the prosecutor's comments did not constitute plain error.
-
333 F.2d 32·
5th Cir.·
1964-06-04
·cited 6×
The court held that the prosecutor's remarks, while improper, were not reversible error given the context, provocation by defense counsel, and the trial court's admonition to the jury. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the conviction under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1005, as
-
690 So. 2d 1381·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1997-04-09
·cited 4×
Horace Billups appealed his convictions for uttering a forged instrument and theft, arguing dual convictions violated double jeopardy protections. The court affirmed, holding that under the Blockburger test and Florida statutory law, the two offenses require proof of different el
-
833 F.2d 519·
5th Cir.·
1987-11-20
·cited 4×
The court affirmed the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 656, finding sufficient evidence of willful misapplication and intent to defraud, but vacated the convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1006 as conceded by the government.
-
658 So. 2d 1105·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1995-07-19
·cited 2×
John M. Parker, a Florida attorney, was convicted of uttering a forged instrument after sending fictitious court orders with forged judicial signatures to his client. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that forged public records constitute instruments of legal e