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467 So. 2d 277·
Fla.·
1985-03-07
·cited 338×
Florida recognizes intentional infliction of emotional distress as a tort, but an insurer's assertion of contractual legal rights regarding proof of Medicare ineligibility does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct qualifying for this tort. Additionally, a dependent spous
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647 So. 2d 1028·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1994-12-21
·cited 92×
Caretta Trucking appeals the dismissal of its third-party beneficiary breach of contract claim against U.S. Paint, alleging it was a third-party beneficiary of a paint supply contract between U.S. Paint and Cheoy Lee Shipyards. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claim but re
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556 F.2d 356·
5th Cir.·
1977-07-25
·cited 50×
The exercise of a private power of sale by a mortgagee under a Section 235 mortgage is not governmental action subject to the Fifth Amendment's due process clause, and a private cause of action cannot be implied under the HUD Handbook.
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400 F.2d 465·
5th Cir.·
1968-09-04
·cited 48×
The court held that the contract unambiguously showed Wilhoit had no duty to supply steel, and International was not a third-party beneficiary to Southern's contract. However, the condition for releasing retainage was remanded.
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439 F.2d 987·
10th Cir.·
1971-03-29
·cited 35×
The court held that the trial judge properly dismissed an unincorporated association to preserve diversity jurisdiction and that the plaintiff was an incidental beneficiary to a guarantee agreement, not entitled to recover on it.
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610 F.2d 49·
1st Cir.·
1979-12-11
·cited 26×
The court held that the State of Maine failed to demonstrate it met the requirements for intervention as of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a). Specifically, the state did not establish it was a third-party beneficiary to the contracts or that its potential interest in recovering fun
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668 So. 2d 1105·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1996-03-06
·cited 22×
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845 F.2d 1395·
6th Cir.·
1988-05-04
·cited 22×
The court held that J&A was an intended third-party beneficiary of the stock sale contract, reversing the district court's decision on this point, but remanded issues regarding failure of consideration defenses. The court also reversed the district court's factual finding on unpa
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209 F.2d 338·
10th Cir.·
1954-01-02
·cited 20×
A third party who has a beneficial interest in a contract, and upon whose reliance the contract was made, may sue for breach of that contract even if not a direct party.
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526 F.2d 679·
5th Cir.·
1976-01-30
·cited 18×
A real estate broker was found negligent for failing to disclose a municipal ordinance requiring sewer connection, despite the trial court finding no fraud, and the court amended the complaint to conform to the evidence of negligence.
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431 So. 2d 641·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1983-04-20
·cited 17×
The Association appealed a summary judgment that reformed the condominium declaration to allow the Thackers to pay only one monthly management fee for their two contiguous units and discharged the lien against their units. The court reversed, holding that reformation was invalid
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569 F.2d 87·
D.C. Cir.·
1977-11-30
·cited 16×
The court held that Joint Venture and Chevy Chase were not third-party beneficiaries of the construction contract, but that Limited Partnership was a successor-in-interest to Winthrop and could sue for breach of contract.
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512 F.2d 29·
6th Cir.·
1975-03-06
·cited 16×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that RIC was a third-party beneficiary to the 1966 agreement, and therefore, the 1970 settlement agreement did not constitute a voidable transfer of RIC's property under the Bankruptcy Act.
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441 F.2d 1179·
Ct. Cl.·
1971-05-14
·cited 16×
The court held that the plaintiffs had no actionable claim because the Treasury Department's regulation and subsequent acknowledgements did not constitute a contract, as there was no clear promise to sell silver and applications were subject to approval.
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386 F.2d 417·
5th Cir.·
1967-12-14
·cited 14×
The court held that the contract was to be construed under Florida law and that the appellants were incidental beneficiaries without standing to sue.
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204 F.2d 495·
3d Cir.·
1953-05-07
·cited 14×
A third party, too remote from a contract, cannot sue for breach of that contract, even if they suffer damages, as they are merely an incidental beneficiary.
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814 So. 2d 522·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2002-04-24
·cited 13×
The Sheriff of Broward County sought to recover damages for costs incurred due to delays in constructing a detention center, claiming he was an intended third-party beneficiary of the construction contract between the County and Church & Tower. The court held that the Sheriff was
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489 So. 2d 57·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1986-03-21
·cited 13×
Maryland Casualty Company appealed a trial court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration in a construction dispute involving the Sun Dome at the University of South Florida. The court affirmed, holding that Maryland Casualty, as an insurance provider, was merely an incidenta
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641 F.2d 1201·
6th Cir.·
1980-10-21
·cited 12×
The court held that a collapsed dock extending into a river constitutes an obstruction to navigable capacity under the Rivers and Harbors Act, and that a private right of action is implied for such violations. It also affirmed the dismissal of negligence claims based on a latent
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608 F.2d 1205·
9th Cir.·
1979-09-24
·cited 12×
The court held that the plaintiff was an incidental beneficiary to the contract and thus had no contractual rights, and that the trial court did not err in refusing to qualify a witness as an expert.
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230 F.2d 119·
8th Cir.·
1956-02-24
·cited 10×
The court held that the defendants, as attorneys for a client involved in litigation, were not third-party beneficiaries of an agreement between the plaintiff and an intervener, and thus could not claim its protections as a matter of law to avoid liability for conversion.
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45 So. 3d 554·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2010-10-20
·cited 8×
A construction subcontractor cannot enforce the primary contract between an owner and general contractor against the owner because the subcontractor is not an intended third-party beneficiary of that contract.
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136 F.2d 466·
7th Cir.·
1943-06-21
·cited 8×
A third party cannot recover under a contract unless the contract was made primarily for their benefit and the parties intended to secure that benefit to them.
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2010 WL 1510848·
S.D. Fla.·
2010-04-16
·cited 6×
The court held that a real estate company, as a third-party beneficiary, could not sue for breach of contract when the sale was to an LLC, not the individual named in the option, but could pursue claims for conspiracy to deprive a broker of commission and violation of FDUTPA.
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572 So. 2d 14·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1990-12-26
·cited 6×
Marie Davids, a 14-year employee at an airport newsstand operated by ARA Services under contract with Dade County, sought declaratory relief claiming she was a third-party beneficiary of the management agreement and thus entitled to county employee protections. The court affirmed
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425 So. 2d 1205·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1983-02-01
·cited 6×
Hialeah Hospital sued Raventos and Hernandez to collect a debt for services rendered to their clinic. The trial court dismissed the action, but the appellate court reversed, holding that a non-signatory third party may enforce a contract if it was made for that party's benefit, a
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Del. C.P.·
2017-06-30
·cited 4×
The court denied the plaintiff's motion for re-argument, affirming its prior dismissal of the case. The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish itself as an intended third-party beneficiary to the insurance contract between the homeowner and Liberty Mutual, nor did a d
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508 F.2d 583·
2d Cir.·
1974-12-09
·cited 4×
A bond provision for a fixed sum, disproportionate to any foreseeable damages and intended to spur performance rather than compensate for loss, constitutes an unenforceable penalty, not liquidated damages.
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490 F.2d 285·
7th Cir.·
1974-01-03
·cited 4×
The court held that the plaintiff, having paid the increased cost for replacement dockboards due to the defendant's breach, could sue as a subrogee of the general contractor's breach of contract claim.
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166 So. 3d 959·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2015-06-24
·cited 3×
The court reversed a summary judgment dismissing a ward's professional negligence claim against his guardian's attorney, holding that even without privity of contract, the attorney owed a duty of care to the ward as an intended third-party beneficiary under Florida's guardianship
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711 F. Supp. 605·
S.D. Fla.·
1989-03-02
·cited 2×
A customer of a securities firm that is a member of the NASD can compel arbitration based on the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, even without a direct written arbitration agreement, if the customer is an intended third-party beneficiary of the NASD rules.
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296 F.2d 441·
D.C. Cir.·
1961-11-30
·cited 2×
An oral promise to guarantee payment for printing work, where the original debtor remains primarily liable, is barred by the Statute of Frauds.
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260 So. 3d 363·
Fla. 3d DCA·
2018-10-31
·cited 1×
An attorney may not be liable for negligence to non-clients unless the plaintiff qualifies as an intended third-party beneficiary, which requires that both contracting parties clearly express intent to primarily and directly benefit the plaintiff.
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716 F. Supp. 2d 1237·
S.D. Fla.·
2010-05-28
·cited 1×
The court held that the plaintiffs, as term lenders, lacked standing to assert claims for breach of the Credit Agreement based on the revolving lenders' alleged failure to fund, as they were not intended beneficiaries of the revolving loan provisions under New York law.
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54 F. Supp. 2d 1289·
M.D. Fla.·
1999-06-08
·cited 1×
The court held that plaintiffs stated a claim under § 1983 for violations of the USHA and LPPPA, but lacked standing as third-party beneficiaries to sue under the ACC.
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520 So. 2d 619·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1988-01-22
·cited 1×
The court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for the defendant, holding that the plaintiff's personal injury suit against Plastering was barred by the statute of limitations.
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S.D. Fla.·
2025-10-16
The court held that the Donor Plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to prove they made donations, and the Beneficiary Plaintiff lacked standing because he failed to establish he was an intended third-party beneficiary of the USAID agreement.
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883 F.2d 379·
5th Cir.·
1989-09-15
The court held that Harkins, as a voluntary marketing agent, did not owe a fiduciary duty to royalty owners like Bos regarding the cancellation of the gas contract, and Transco could not be liable for interference.
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882 F.2d 119·
4th Cir.·
1989-08-15
The court held that the plaintiff had standing to sue under the E.H.A. because she was a creditor beneficiary of the insurance policy, and her claim was not time-barred due to tolling provisions for minority and incompetency.
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672 F.2d 1220·
3d Cir.·
1982-03-02
The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict for the plaintiff on claims of breach of contract regarding electrical service to rental units, as the plaintiff failed to establish valid contracts, prove breach, or demonstrate damages.
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282 So. 2d 652·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1973-09-12
The court held that the construction contract provisions did not primarily and directly benefit the injured employee, making him at most an incidental beneficiary, and thus he could not sue as a third-party beneficiary.
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336 F.2d 465·
6th Cir.·
1964-09-21
The court held that the plaintiff was an incidental beneficiary of the agreement to guarantee a loan for debenture redemption, and thus had no enforceable right to compel redemption.