664 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 839 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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A defendant cannot be punished for exercising their right to trial, but a longer sentence than offered in a rejected plea bargain does not automatically constitute such punishment.
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The court held that the admission of a co-conspirator's statement was proper as it was made during the concealment phase of the conspiracy, and that other alleged errors, including prosecutorial misconduct and evidentiary rulings, did not warrant reversal.
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342 F.2d 408·
9th Cir.·
1965-02-25
·cited 64×
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92 So. 2d 819·
Fla.·
1957-02-20
·cited 64×
Carl Jefferson Birge was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny. The Florida Supreme Court reversed his conviction because the trial judge erroneously denied him the statutory right to closing argument before the jury after Birge testified in his o
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806 F.2d 1373·
9th Cir.·
1986-12-23
·cited 63×
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The dissenting judge argues that prosecutorial comment on the defendant's silence was not harmless error and, combined with other trial errors, denied the defendant a fair trial.
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The admission of DEA agents' testimony repeating an informer's out-of-court statements was erroneous hearsay, but the error was harmless because other properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supported the conviction.
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742 F.2d 1196·
9th Cir.·
1984-09-18
·cited 62×
The court held that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that she cannot be found guilty of conspiracy if she conspired only with a government agent, and failure to provide such an instruction is reversible error.
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593 F.2d 590·
5th Cir.·
1979-04-12
·cited 62×
The court held that a prosecutor's reference in closing argument to a co-conspirator's conviction on less evidence than that presented against the defendant deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
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574 F.2d 1362·
5th Cir.·
1978-06-16
·cited 62×
The court held that the admission of incriminating statements obtained in violation of the defendant's Miranda rights, specifically the right to cut off questioning, was not harmless error and required reversal.
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The court's majority opinion is not fully detailed here, but the dissenting opinion argues against the front pay award and the jury instructions on willfulness.
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The court held that proof of the conspirators' belief that their illegal activity would yield more than $5,000 is sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for a conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2314, and that docket entries are admissible to prove a pending indictme
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580 F.2d 317·
8th Cir.·
1978-07-14
·cited 61×
The court held that the defendants knowingly and intelligently waived any conflict of interest arising from joint representation, and even without waiver, they failed to demonstrate an actual conflict. The court also found sufficient evidence to support one defendant's conviction
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Mark Anthony Poole was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, armed burglary, sexual battery, and armed robbery. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his convictions but vacated his death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase proceeding due to pros
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The court affirmed convictions, holding that prosecutorial comments did not constitute plain error, the evidence was sufficient for perjury and conspiracy convictions, the assault conviction was valid, and the denial of severance motions was not an abuse of discretion.
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The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the defendant's relationships with two women, nor in admitting certain hearsay testimony, and that prosecutorial remarks and jury selection were not grounds for reversal.
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The court held that the Wainwright v. Sykes 'cause and prejudice' standard applies to constitutional claims omitted from a direct appeal, and that the petitioner failed to demonstrate sufficient cause or prejudice.
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491 F.2d 625·
5th Cir.·
1974-03-22
·cited 60×
The court held that the trial court erred in excluding defendant's testimony regarding conversations about a stolen vehicle and in delivering a prejudicial supplemental jury charge on circumstantial evidence.
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471 F.2d 55·
8th Cir.·
1973-01-10
·cited 60×
The court held that while the indictment was not multiplicitous or duplicitous, and most of the defendant's claims lacked merit, the imposition of separate sentences on all three counts of the bank robbery indictment was improper under Prince v. United States. The case was remand
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412 F.2d 428·
9th Cir.·
1969-05-06
·cited 60×
The court denied the petition for rehearing, implicitly affirming the majority's prior disposition.
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400 F.2d 248·
9th Cir.·
1968-08-16
·cited 60×
The court held that the jury's awareness of the death penalty could have impaired the trial's fairness and that the lineup procedure was corrupt.
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780 F.2d 1461·
9th Cir.·
1986-01-21
·cited 59×
The court held that evidence obtained in violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act is not subject to suppression under the court's supervisory powers, and that ex parte communication with a deadlocked jury, while error, was harmless in this case.
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The court should not extend United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir.1980) to the facts of this case because the government initiated the warrant process before securing the room, distinguishing it from Allard II.
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The court held that the district court's findings on Jencks Act and Brady material were not clearly erroneous, affirming most of the conviction, but reversed the conviction on Count 10 for insufficiency of evidence.
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The court held that the trial court did not err in submitting the issue of descriptiveness to the jury, that reverse confusion is actionable under Colorado law, and that the jury's findings on liability and damages were supported by sufficient evidence.
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The court held that the improper admission of certain coconspirator statements was harmless error, and the admission of grand jury testimony under the catch-all hearsay exception was proper. The court affirmed all convictions.
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The court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses, that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, and that the procedures for jury instructions, while unusual, did not result in prejudicial error.
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572 F.2d 1071·
5th Cir.·
1978-05-10
·cited 57×
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176 F.2d 45·
D.C. Cir.·
1949-06-06
·cited 57×
The court held that admitting evidence of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes is error if an appeal from that conviction is pending, but such error is harmless if it did not substantially affect the jury's verdict.
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In this wrongful death case arising from a two-vehicle accident, the court reversed a judgment for defendants and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting emergency medical services patient reports containing hearsay statements abo
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849 F.2d 1293·
10th Cir.·
1988-06-14
·cited 56×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying motions for mistrial and in excluding evidence of a post-scheme settlement, as any misconduct or evidentiary issues were harmless.
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The court held that the false employment letters were material statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and while the materiality issue should have been submitted to the jury, the error was harmless.
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502 F.2d 526·
3d Cir.·
1974-08-06
·cited 56×
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446 F.2d 681·
9th Cir.·
1971-07-07
·cited 56×
The admission of hearsay testimony implicating the defendant, even though falling under a recognized hearsay exception, did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the declarant's statement was not crucial or devastating, and any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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418 F.2d 1043·
8th Cir.·
1969-12-10
·cited 56×
The court affirmed the convictions, finding no prejudicial error in the jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, or Fifth Amendment and Jencks Act issues, and that the evidence supported the jury's findings on the defendants' competency and guilt.
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414 F.2d 407·
9th Cir.·
1969-06-17
·cited 56×
The court held that while the trial court erred in revoking bail and in failing to hold a proper suppression hearing, these errors did not warrant reversal because they did not prejudice the defendant.
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Leon Davis, Jr. was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, and arson arising from a planned robbery at an insurance agency where he set two employees on fire during the commission of the crime. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his convi
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A sentence must be set aside if the defendant shows that false information was part of the basis for the sentence and the sentencing court relied on that misinformation.
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627 F.2d 293·
D.C. Cir.·
1980-03-04
·cited 55×
The court held that while errors occurred, they did not contribute to the conviction, except for appellant Watson.
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The court held that improper questioning of the defendant regarding a prior conviction and his silence with the FBI, even with curative instructions, created cumulative prejudice denying him a fair trial.
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed Michael Jackson's conviction for first-degree murder and death sentence because the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a 37-minute videotaped custodial interrogation in which investigating officers repeatedly expressed their personal
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The court held that the defendant's false statements to IRS investigators, which did not impede the investigation and were recanted, did not constitute obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
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882 F.2d 1334·
8th Cir.·
1989-08-22
·cited 54×
The court held that the search of the vehicle was a lawful inventory search, joinder and severance were proper, jury instructions were appropriate, evidence was admissible, and the wiretap was lawful.
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731 F.2d 610·
9th Cir.·
1984-04-17
·cited 54×
The court held that the Miranda warnings given to the defendant were defective because they failed to inform him of his right to have counsel present during questioning, and the admission of his post-arrest statements was not harmless error.
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710 F.2d 431·
8th Cir.·
1983-06-20
·cited 54×
The court held that the trial judge's intervention, while active, was not so egregious as to justify reversal of convictions.
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The court held that there was no impermissible variance between the indictment and the proof, and that the trial court's evidentiary rulings did not constitute reversible error. Therefore, the conviction is affirmed.
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The court held that the admission of the petitioner's confession, obtained during a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation for competency, violated his due process rights and warranted habeas corpus relief.
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558 F.2d 330·
6th Cir.·
1977-06-14
·cited 54×
The court held that forcing a defendant to defend against a felony-murder charge, not included in the indictment, constitutes a constructive amendment that violates due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, even in a state court trial.
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The court affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding that while the admission of one witness's testimony was erroneous, it was harmless error, and other challenges lacked merit.
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The court held that the introduction of post-indictment incriminating statements made without counsel violated the Sixth Amendment, and this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.