-
335 F.2d 609·
5th Cir.·
1964-08-10
·cited 118×
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's various motions and that the jury instructions and verdict were proper.
-
279 F.2d 767·
8th Cir.·
1960-06-07
·cited 116×
The court held that while some trial court actions constituted technical errors, they were harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt and did not warrant reversal.
-
674 F.2d 647·
8th Cir.·
1982-03-12
·cited 115×
The court held that the evidence presented was sufficient to prove the existence of a RICO enterprise and that joinder of defendants was proper, or any misjoinder constituted harmless error.
-
618 F.2d 530·
9th Cir.·
1980-05-07
·cited 103×
The District Court for the District of Arizona lacked jurisdiction to enter judgments of conviction after transferring the indictment to the Southern District of California.
-
548 F.2d 1261·
6th Cir.·
1977-02-11
·cited 96×
The court held that the admission of extensive, irrelevant, and prejudicial expert testimony regarding the properties, street value, and potential for abuse of DMT, as well as the economic incentives for its manufacture, constituted a violation of the defendants' due process righ
-
885 F.2d 775·
11th Cir.·
1989-09-29
·cited 92×
The court affirmed the conspiracy conviction, finding the indictment adequately charged conspiracy to defraud the United States and the jury was properly instructed. The court also affirmed the conviction related to export violations, finding the Allen charge was not coercive and
-
730 F.2d 1292·
9th Cir.·
1984-04-12
·cited 86×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence related to the bank deposits method, summary charts, comparison of gross receipts, or extrinsic actions, nor in its jury instructions.
-
402 F.2d 314·
1st Cir.·
1968-10-14
·cited 84×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motions for continuance and change of venue due to pretrial publicity, and that the prosecutor's statement, while improper, was harmless error under the circumstances.
-
666 F.2d 498·
11th Cir.·
1982-01-22
·cited 81×
The court held that the trial court improperly admitted extrinsic act evidence because it was not sufficiently similar to the charged offense and its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial impact. The court also found insufficient evidence that the defendant committed
-
708 F.2d 429·
9th Cir.·
1983-05-25
·cited 75×
The court held that the defendants' convictions for drug offenses were supported by sufficient evidence and that no reversible errors occurred during the trial.
-
437 F.2d 1098·
9th Cir.·
1971-02-11
·cited 74×
A prematurely filed notice of appeal becomes effective when the appealable judgment becomes final, and the appellate court has jurisdiction. The denial of a cosmetology instructor's petition for professional classification was not an abuse of discretion.
-
383 F.2d 345·
9th Cir.·
1967-08-09
·cited 72×
The court held that evidence seized by Mexican officials is admissible in a U.S. court, and statements made to foreign officials are admissible if voluntary under Fifth Amendment standards, even if obtained during prolonged interrogation.
-
571 F.2d 376·
7th Cir.·
1978-02-22
·cited 64×
The court held that the admission of a co-conspirator's statement was proper as it was made during the concealment phase of the conspiracy, and that other alleged errors, including prosecutorial misconduct and evidentiary rulings, did not warrant reversal.
-
792 F.2d 1210·
1st Cir.·
1986-06-03
·cited 62×
The admission of DEA agents' testimony repeating an informer's out-of-court statements was erroneous hearsay, but the error was harmless because other properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supported the conviction.
-
666 F.2d 485·
11th Cir.·
1982-01-22
·cited 61×
The court held that proof of the conspirators' belief that their illegal activity would yield more than $5,000 is sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for a conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2314, and that docket entries are admissible to prove a pending indictme
-
679 F.2d 1240·
8th Cir.·
1982-06-09
·cited 60×
The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the defendant's relationships with two women, nor in admitting certain hearsay testimony, and that prosecutorial remarks and jury selection were not grounds for reversal.
-
491 F.2d 625·
5th Cir.·
1974-03-22
·cited 60×
The court held that the trial court erred in excluding defendant's testimony regarding conversations about a stolen vehicle and in delivering a prejudicial supplemental jury charge on circumstantial evidence.
-
471 F.2d 55·
8th Cir.·
1973-01-10
·cited 60×
The court held that while the indictment was not multiplicitous or duplicitous, and most of the defendant's claims lacked merit, the imposition of separate sentences on all three counts of the bank robbery indictment was improper under Prince v. United States. The case was remand
-
636 F.2d 792·
2d Cir.·
1980-12-18
·cited 54×
The court held that there was no impermissible variance between the indictment and the proof, and that the trial court's evidentiary rulings did not constitute reversible error. Therefore, the conviction is affirmed.
-
179 F.2d 905·
1st Cir.·
1950-01-25
·cited 54×
The court held that the indictments were sufficient, the denial of severance motions was proper, and the trial court did not commit reversible error in its rulings on evidence or jury instructions.
-
356 F.2d 709·
8th Cir.·
1966-02-28
·cited 53×
The court held that a proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board is pending from the moment a charge is filed, and that ex parte communication between the judge and jury during deliberations, without evidence of lack of prejudice, warrants reversal.
-
724 F.2d 1498·
11th Cir.·
1984-02-13
·cited 51×
The court affirmed all of appellant's convictions, finding no reversible error in the admission of evidence or the sufficiency of the indictment.
-
571 F.2d 980·
6th Cir.·
1978-02-07
·cited 49×
The court held that the district court did not commit reversible error by dismissing two jurors, as proper procedures were followed and no abuse of discretion occurred. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the convictions.
-
562 F.2d 1138·
9th Cir.·
1977-07-13
·cited 49×
The court held that the hearsay statement was improperly admitted under the coconspirator exception as to Dixon.
-
748 F.2d 1231·
8th Cir.·
1984-11-07
·cited 46×
The court held that there was insufficient evidence to convict Edwin Udey of harboring or conspiring to harbor a fugitive, as the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Udey knew of the federal warrant or affirmatively cooperated in the conspiracy.
-
250 F.2d 549·
5th Cir.·
1957-12-26
·cited 44×
The court held that the appellant waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence by failing to renew his motion for acquittal after presenting his own evidence, and that other alleged errors were either not properly preserved for appeal or lacked merit.
-
159 F.2d 599·
4th Cir.·
1946-12-31
·cited 44×
The court held that the trial judge's comments on the evidence were impermissibly argumentative and prejudiced the defendant, requiring reversal.
-
693 F.2d 183·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-11-09
·cited 43×
The court held that while the admission of certain claim forms into evidence was error, it was harmless error, and the defendant's other arguments regarding the indictment and jury instructions lacked merit.
-
718 F.2d 1484·
10th Cir.·
1983-09-30
·cited 42×
The court held that the mailings of invoices and warrants were sufficiently related to the scheme to defraud to support mail fraud convictions, and that the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes and the prosecutor's remarks did not constitute reversible error.
-
737 F.2d 864·
10th Cir.·
1984-06-21
·cited 40×
The court agrees that out-of-court statements made by co-conspirators after arrest should be admissible, questioning the continued vitality of the Krulewitch rule.
-
556 F.2d 371·
6th Cir.·
1977-05-20
·cited 40×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction and that various evidentiary and procedural rulings by the trial court were not grounds for reversal.
-
534 F.2d 31·
3d Cir.·
1976-03-29
·cited 40×
The mailing of vouchers to credit card companies by merchants who knew the credit card users were using stolen cards is sufficiently related to the fraudulent scheme to violate the mail fraud statute.
-
347 F.2d 33·
3d Cir.·
1965-06-21
·cited 40×
The court held that the indictment sufficiently stated a conspiracy charge and that the admission of certain co-conspirator statements, even if potentially hearsay, constituted harmless error given the overwhelming evidence.
-
348 F.2d 772·
D.C. Cir.·
1965-06-04
·cited 40×
The court held that the jury instruction on intent was erroneous and that the indictment was also deficient, requiring reversal of the conviction.
-
314 F.2d 293·
9th Cir.·
1963-02-18
·cited 40×
The court held that the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice from the unrecorded oral arguments, and therefore, a remand for further proceedings was not warranted.
-
716 F.2d 850·
11th Cir.·
1983-10-03
·cited 38×
The court held that the harmless error rule does not apply to the procedural requirements for imposing enhanced sentences under 21 U.S.C. § 851, and failure to comply with these requirements deprives the court of jurisdiction to impose such a sentence.
-
240 F.2d 270·
8th Cir.·
1957-01-22
·cited 38×
The court held that the joinder of offenses and defendants was proper, the evidence was sufficient, the supplemental jury charge was not coercive, the failure to re-admonish the jury was not error, and a juror's relative's employment did not demonstrate prejudice.
-
679 F.2d 770·
9th Cir.·
1982-04-05
·cited 36×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Hazeem of aiding and abetting bank fraud and conspiracy, and that his motion for a new trial was untimely.
-
949 F.2d 928·
7th Cir.·
1991-11-27
·cited 34×
The court affirmed the jury verdict, finding no reversible error in the prosecutorial misconduct claims, the severance of a co-defendant, or the prosecutor's closing argument remarks on double jeopardy.
-
221 F.2d 237·
1st Cir.·
1955-04-07
·cited 34×
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant's absence during the questioning of a juror was harmless error and that other alleged errors were insubstantial.
-
876 F.2d 734·
9th Cir.·
1989-05-25
·cited 32×
The court held that the government has the right to appeal the defendant's sentence and that remanding for resentencing under the guidelines does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
-
857 F.2d 50·
1st Cir.·
1988-09-26
·cited 32×
The court held that even if admitting evidence of the defendant's flight was an abuse of discretion, it did not prejudice the defendant's substantial rights, and therefore the conviction is affirmed.
-
615 F.2d 1093·
5th Cir.·
1980-04-23
·cited 32×
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing a juror, the search warrant affidavit was sufficient, and the insanity issue was not properly preserved for appeal.
-
434 F.2d 880·
5th Cir.·
1970-11-17
·cited 31×
A defendant's presence is not constitutionally required at an evidentiary hearing to determine if wiretap evidence tainted their conviction, especially when represented by competent counsel who deems their presence unnecessary.
-
735 F.2d 289·
8th Cir.·
1984-05-15
·cited 30×
The court held that the introduction of evidence related to drug activities, while sometimes improper, was either harmless error or admissible for context and impeachment, and did not prejudice the defendant's substantial rights.
-
586 F.2d 1117·
6th Cir.·
1978-11-06
·cited 30×
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 does not apply to state magistrates issuing state search warrants for state crimes, even if executed by federal officers.
-
169 F.2d 665·
D.C. Cir.·
1948-05-24
·cited 30×
The court held that the appellant's numerous asserted errors, when considered individually or in aggregate, did not constitute prejudicial error denying him a fair trial.
-
790 F.2d 1400·
9th Cir.·
1986-06-02
·cited 27×
The court held that the prosecutor's exploitation of the defendant's post-arrest silence regarding entrapment violated the Due Process Clause and constituted plain error.
-
713 F.2d 401·
8th Cir.·
1983-08-08
·cited 26×
The court held that while severance should have been granted due to mutually antagonistic defenses, the denial was harmless error because the overwhelming evidence of guilt would have led to the same guilty verdicts. The admission of testimony regarding the robbers' race based on
-
525 F.2d 337·
4th Cir.·
1975-07-25
·cited 26×
The court affirmed convictions for conspiracy to violate the Travel Act for some defendants, vacated others, and remanded for resentencing or new trial based on the specific facts and jury findings.