1,383 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,569 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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518 F.2d 97·
4th Cir.·
1975-06-17
·cited 65×
The court held that § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 supports a private damage claim and that the applicable statute of limitations is the two-year period from Virginia's blue sky law.
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955 F.2d 1545·
11th Cir.·
1992-03-25
·cited 64×
The district court erred by prohibiting the defendant from cross-examining a key prosecution witness about the arrest of his sons on marijuana charges, as this limitation violated the Confrontation Clause. However, the error was harmless because the jury was already aware of the
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604 F.2d 341·
5th Cir.·
1979-10-09
·cited 64×
The court held that the government was prohibited by collateral estoppel from presenting evidence and arguments related to a marijuana conspiracy of which the appellant had been acquitted in a prior trial, as this evidence was essential to convicting the appellant of tax evasion.
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The court held that the admission of a co-conspirator's statement was proper as it was made during the concealment phase of the conspiracy, and that other alleged errors, including prosecutorial misconduct and evidentiary rulings, did not warrant reversal.
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The court held that the defendant's conviction for harboring an escaped federal prisoner was supported by sufficient evidence and that the jury instructions, when viewed as a whole, did not constitute plain error. The admission of certain hearsay statements was deemed harmless er
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Carl Jefferson Birge was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny. The Florida Supreme Court reversed his conviction because the trial judge erroneously denied him the statutory right to closing argument before the jury after Birge testified in his o
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377 So. 2d 1163·
Fla.·
1979-12-13
·cited 63×
The Florida Supreme Court held that a trial court's complete omission of any instruction on the elements of robbery in a felony-murder prosecution constitutes fundamental error that is not waived by the defendant's failure to object. This decision resolved a conflict between dist
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The dissenting judge argues that prosecutorial comment on the defendant's silence was not harmless error and, combined with other trial errors, denied the defendant a fair trial.
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449 F.2d 1148·
D.C. Cir.·
1971-07-29
·cited 63×
Convictions based on eyewitness identification following impermissibly suggestive photographic procedures must be set aside if there is a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification and no independent source for the identification.
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The admission of DEA agents' testimony repeating an informer's out-of-court statements was erroneous hearsay, but the error was harmless because other properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supported the conviction.
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The court held that a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that she cannot be found guilty of conspiracy if she conspired only with a government agent, and failure to provide such an instruction is reversible error.
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The court held that a prosecutor's reference in closing argument to a co-conspirator's conviction on less evidence than that presented against the defendant deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
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The court held that the admission of incriminating statements obtained in violation of the defendant's Miranda rights, specifically the right to cut off questioning, was not harmless error and required reversal.
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396 F.2d 373·
9th Cir.·
1968-05-01
·cited 62×
The court held that the admission of Unsworth's written statement without a prior judicial determination of voluntariness, and the admission of his oral statements made while grossly intoxicated, constituted a denial of due process.
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The court's majority opinion is not fully detailed here, but the dissenting opinion argues against the front pay award and the jury instructions on willfulness.
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The court held that proof of the conspirators' belief that their illegal activity would yield more than $5,000 is sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for a conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2314, and that docket entries are admissible to prove a pending indictme
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The court held that the defendants knowingly and intelligently waived any conflict of interest arising from joint representation, and even without waiver, they failed to demonstrate an actual conflict. The court also found sufficient evidence to support one defendant's conviction
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Mark Anthony Poole was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, armed burglary, sexual battery, and armed robbery. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his convictions but vacated his death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase proceeding due to pros
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The court affirmed convictions, holding that prosecutorial comments did not constitute plain error, the evidence was sufficient for perjury and conspiracy convictions, the assault conviction was valid, and the denial of severance motions was not an abuse of discretion.
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435 So. 2d 318·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1983-07-13
·cited 60×
Romero appealed his burglary and robbery conviction, claiming error when the prosecutor commented during closing argument on his failure to call alibi witnesses he had testified about knowing. The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that a prosecutor may com
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The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the defendant's relationships with two women, nor in admitting certain hearsay testimony, and that prosecutorial remarks and jury selection were not grounds for reversal.
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The court held that the Wainwright v. Sykes 'cause and prejudice' standard applies to constitutional claims omitted from a direct appeal, and that the petitioner failed to demonstrate sufficient cause or prejudice.
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616 F.2d 590·
1st Cir.·
1980-02-28
·cited 60×
The court held that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on the weight to be given to post-arrest statements when no genuine issue of voluntariness was raised, nor by refusing an entrapment instruction when there was no evidence of the defendant's unreadine
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The court held that the trial court erred in excluding defendant's testimony regarding conversations about a stolen vehicle and in delivering a prejudicial supplemental jury charge on circumstantial evidence.
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291 So. 2d 241·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1974-03-01
·cited 60×
The court held that while the prosecution erred in admitting evidence of similar offenses in its case in chief, this error was harmless because the evidence was admissible in rebuttal to the defendant's impotence defense, which the defendant himself raised.
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The court held that while the indictment was not multiplicitous or duplicitous, and most of the defendant's claims lacked merit, the imposition of separate sentences on all three counts of the bank robbery indictment was improper under Prince v. United States. The case was remand
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415 F.2d 1113·
2d Cir.·
1969-09-09
·cited 60×
The court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Chimel v. California, which altered the rules for warrantless searches incident to arrest, should be applied prospectively only, not retroactively to cases decided before its issuance.
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The court denied the petition for rehearing, implicitly affirming the majority's prior disposition.
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The court held that the jury's awareness of the death penalty could have impaired the trial's fairness and that the lineup procedure was corrupt.
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151 F.2d 915·
2d Cir.·
1945-08-25
·cited 60×
Evidence of a subsequent fraudulent divorce was admissible to prove the intent and conspiracy to defraud immigration authorities, and a marriage entered into solely for immigration purposes without genuine intent to be married is invalid.
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127 F.2d 498·
8th Cir.·
1942-04-28
·cited 60×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence of mailing to support the conviction and that no prejudicial errors occurred during the trial.
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The court held that evidence obtained in violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act is not subject to suppression under the court's supervisory powers, and that ex parte communication with a deadlocked jury, while error, was harmless in this case.
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The court held that the exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness identification reliability was an error requiring a remand for a hearing. It also found that statements made during preliminary discussions about potential plea bargains, not with a government attorney, were admi
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The court should not extend United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir.1980) to the facts of this case because the government initiated the warrant process before securing the room, distinguishing it from Allard II.
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The court held that the district court erred in excluding the appellant's mother's testimony as inadmissible hearsay, as it was offered to prove the appellant's knowledge and as a prior consistent statement.
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402 So. 2d 377·
Fla.·
1981-06-11
·cited 58×
John Barfield was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy for arranging the killing of Forrest Harris in a murder-for-hire scheme. The trial judge imposed the death sentence despite the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed the
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The court held that the district court's findings on Jencks Act and Brady material were not clearly erroneous, affirming most of the conviction, but reversed the conviction on Count 10 for insufficiency of evidence.
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The court held that the trial court did not err in submitting the issue of descriptiveness to the jury, that reverse confusion is actionable under Colorado law, and that the jury's findings on liability and damages were supported by sufficient evidence.
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412 F.2d 374·
7th Cir.·
1969-06-13
·cited 58×
The court held that the use of Kel-set devices and the seizure of evidence were constitutional, and that the defendants' other claims of error lacked merit.
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368 F.2d 658·
5th Cir.·
1966-11-15
·cited 58×
The court held that restricting the cross-examination of an accomplice regarding potential promises of leniency was an abuse of discretion and not harmless error.
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86 So. 2d 773·
Fla.·
1956-04-11
·cited 58×
Ralph Mead appealed his grand larceny conviction, claiming trial errors including improper cross-examination regarding military convictions and an incomplete jury charge on the definition of grand larceny. The Florida Supreme Court found the cross-examination questioning improper
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The court held that the improper admission of certain coconspirator statements was harmless error, and the admission of grand jury testimony under the catch-all hearsay exception was proper. The court affirmed all convictions.
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The court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses, that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, and that the procedures for jury instructions, while unusual, did not result in prejudicial error.
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The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for an investigator, that the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated by the judge's comments regarding her decision to testify, and that the denial of a new trial based on newly
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611 F.2d 614·
5th Cir.·
1980-02-11
·cited 57×
The court held that the jury instructions, while potentially incomplete, were sufficient to present the core issues to the jury and that any error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence.
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The court held that admitting evidence of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes is error if an appeal from that conviction is pending, but such error is harmless if it did not substantially affect the jury's verdict.
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The court held that the district court did not err in denying motions for mistrial and in excluding evidence of a post-scheme settlement, as any misconduct or evidentiary issues were harmless.