4,117 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 4,089 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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981 F.2d 949·
7th Cir.·
1992-12-11
·cited 2×
Joint representation of co-defendants does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel unless the defendant demonstrates an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel's performance. A voluntary and intelligent guilty plea waives prior
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979 F.2d 636·
8th Cir.·
1992-11-10
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court did not err in finding Fairchild's confessions voluntary and reliable, and that his Brady claims constituted an abuse of the writ as he failed to demonstrate prejudice.
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978 F.2d 1195·
10th Cir.·
1992-11-03
·cited 2×
The district court erred in relying on the presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to uphold the state court's competency finding, as material facts were not adequately developed in state court.
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979 F.2d 109·
8th Cir.·
1992-10-16
·cited 2×
The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to Missouri's persistent offender sentencing proceedings, barring a second enhancement hearing after the state failed to prove prior convictions in the first instance.
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977 F.2d 475·
9th Cir.·
1992-10-07
·cited 2×
The court held that the prisoner waived his right to be present at sentencing by impeding efforts to procure his presence and failing to exhaust remedies under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD).
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975 F.2d 931·
1st Cir.·
1992-09-23
·cited 2×
The court affirmed the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition, holding that the petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges.
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The Eighth Circuit held that prosecuting McIntyre for stealing a car after he had already been prosecuted for tampering with the same car violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, as the conduct constituting the tampering offense was used to prove essential elements of the stealing ch
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974 F.2d 1099·
9th Cir.·
1992-09-02
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but otherwise affirmed the denial of the petition.
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973 F.2d 655·
8th Cir.·
1992-08-25
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing or in denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as the issues could be resolved on the state court record and petitioner failed to demonstrate ineffective assista
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The court held that the defendants did not violate the Constitution by continuing to detain the plaintiff because there was no evidence they knew of the writ of habeas corpus or intended to violate his rights, and state law violations are not actionable under § 1983.
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973 F.2d 630·
8th Cir.·
1992-08-21
·cited 2×
The court held that substantial evidence supported the conviction, and a rational fact-finder could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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968 F.2d 1404·
1st Cir.·
1992-07-08
·cited 2×
The court held that the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and right to a fair trial were not violated by a juror's nondisclosure of a past trauma or by prosecutorial remarks.
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603 So. 2d 490·
Fla.·
1992-06-25
·cited 2×
Chester Levon Maxwell appeals his death sentence, claiming the trial court committed a Hitchcock error by failing to properly consider and weigh nonstatutory mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. The Florida Supreme Court vacates the death sentence and remands for a new p
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966 F.2d 1563·
9th Cir.·
1992-06-12
·cited 2×
The court held that the use of dual juries in a non-capital case does not violate the Constitution unless prejudice is shown, and that Beam's death sentence was unconstitutional due to reliance on a vague aggravating factor and impermissible use of sexual history.
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963 F.2d 767·
5th Cir.·
1992-06-11
·cited 2×
The court held that the major thrust of the petitioner's mitigating evidence was not substantially beyond the scope of the special questions posed to the jury, and therefore, his death sentence was not imposed in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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962 F.2d 417·
5th Cir.·
1992-05-22
·cited 2×
The court denied the application for a certificate of probable cause and vacated the stay of execution, finding no substantial showing of a federal right denial.
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963 F.2d 44·
5th Cir.·
1992-05-22
·cited 2×
The court held that Moss was not denied effective assistance of appellate counsel because he had no nonfrivolous issues to raise on appeal, and therefore, the district court erred in granting habeas relief.
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963 F.2d 1002·
7th Cir.·
1992-05-13
·cited 2×
The court held that a prisoner is not entitled to a lay advocate unless illiterate or the case is complex, and that denying a request to call witnesses is permissible if it poses a security risk.
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961 F.2d 514·
5th Cir.·
1992-05-12
·cited 2×
The court denied the motion for appointment of counsel, finding that the issues, while complex, were sufficiently addressed by existing circuit precedent and legal scholarship to not require additional attorney assistance.
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The court held that the application of Nev.Rev.Stat. § 484.381(1) as a mandatory conclusive presumption violated the petitioner's due process right to have the state prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Larry Bland petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the sufficiency of the burglary information under which he was convicted, arguing it failed to allege the essential element of intent to commit an offense. The Florida appellate court denied the petition, holding that
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963 F.2d 1111·
8th Cir.·
1992-05-08
·cited 2×
The court held that excluding individuals over sixty-five from jury duty does not violate the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement, and that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose the exact timing of a witness's immunity grant.
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Nollie Martin, a death row inmate, petitioned for habeas corpus relief and appealed the denial of his postconviction motion, seeking to stay his execution based on the U.S. Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in a related case. The Florida Supreme Court denied all relief, finding
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The court affirmed the result because Pennsylvania law presumes state sentences are consecutive to prior sentences from different sovereigns unless expressly made concurrent.
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963 F.2d 20·
2d Cir.·
1992-05-01
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court erred in summarily denying the habeas petition without a hearing, as petitioner may be entitled to relief on his Brady and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
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962 F.2d 1455·
10th Cir.·
1992-04-28
·cited 2×
The court held that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' interpretation of the first-degree felony murder statute to include attempted robbery was not an unforeseeable judicial enlargement violating due process, nor was the jury instruction failure a due process violation.
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The court held that the petitioner should have an opportunity to present new claims of constitutional error due to potential ineffective assistance of counsel.
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961 F.2d 771·
8th Cir.·
1992-04-10
·cited 2×
The court held that a double jeopardy challenge to a second conviction based on sufficiency of admissible evidence is affirmed, but a challenge to a third trial based on prosecutorial misconduct in admitting evidence requires further consideration.
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959 F.2d 1385·
7th Cir.·
1992-04-06
·cited 2×
The court held that prosecutorial misconduct and the admission of victim impact evidence did not deny the defendant due process, and that federal habeas corpus relief was unavailable for Fourth Amendment claims due to the state's opportunity for full and fair litigation. The cour
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The court held that the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of a black potential juror, Ms. Brodie, was unconstitutional because the stated reason was a pretext for racial discrimination.
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The court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel or that newly discovered evidence warranted a new trial, thus denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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978 F.2d 1502·
9th Cir.·
1992-04-01
·cited 2×
A defendant's right to be present at all stages of a criminal trial, including jury selection, can be knowingly and voluntarily waived, even in a capital case, as long as it does not implicate Confrontation Clause issues.
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960 F.2d 72·
8th Cir.·
1992-03-26
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court's order lacked finality and remanded the case for a decision on all claims, staying the prior order pending further direction.
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959 F.2d 88·
8th Cir.·
1992-03-13
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing the habeas petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing, and that the petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.
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The court held that counsel's failure to secure a stipulation for polygraph results was not ineffective assistance because Arkansas law requires written stipulations and an objection would have been futile.
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958 F.2d 318·
10th Cir.·
1992-03-06
·cited 2×
A petitioner seeking collateral relief via habeas corpus must demonstrate a non-frivolous claim before being entitled to a free trial transcript.
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957 F.2d 418·
7th Cir.·
1992-03-03
·cited 2×
The court held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on self-defense and defense of others did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights because the defendant did not present evidence of an imminent threat as required by Indiana law.
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962 F.2d 70·
1st Cir.·
1992-02-26
·cited 2×
The court held that the petitioner's guilty plea was not rendered involuntary by the state's retraction of pretrial detention credit, as he failed to demonstrate prejudice from the alleged misinformation or omission.
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957 F.2d 363·
7th Cir.·
1992-02-25
·cited 2×
A federal court must dismiss a habeas corpus petition if any claim within it is unexhausted in state court, even if other claims are exhausted.
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957 F.2d 537·
8th Cir.·
1992-02-21
·cited 2×
The court held that trial counsel's strategic decision to focus on justification rather than diminished capacity was reasonable, and the evidence was sufficient to support a first-degree murder conviction.
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954 F.2d 760·
D.C. Cir.·
1992-01-31
·cited 2×
Persons convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment under D.C. Code § 22-2404(b) are not eligible for good time credits under the D.C. Good Time Credit Act of 1986.
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The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, affirming the conviction.
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954 F.2d 910·
3d Cir.·
1992-01-23
·cited 2×
The Parole Commission violated its regulations by failing to disclose material relied upon in making a parole determination, even if that material was a co-conspirator's file. However, the Commission did not err in determining the appellant's role in the conspiracy.
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953 F.2d 49·
3d Cir.·
1992-01-07
·cited 2×
The Parole Commission erred in basing the petitioner's offense severity rating on the total amount of drugs distributed by co-conspirators when there was no evidence that the petitioner controlled or could have foreseen their actions, violating its own regulations.
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A district court has jurisdiction to stay the execution of a state prisoner to appoint counsel to assist in preparing a federal habeas corpus petition.
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948 F.2d 935·
5th Cir.·
1991-12-13
·cited 2×
A state statute criminalizing telephone harassment, which requires intent to terrify, intimidate, or harass and a threat of injury, is constitutional on its face and as applied, as it targets true threats rather than protected political speech.
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951 F.2d 559·
3d Cir.·
1991-12-13
·cited 2×
The court held that a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his habeas petition alleging his guilty plea was involuntary due to counsel's threat to withdraw, and that extreme delays in state court adjudication may violate due process.
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943 F.2d 930·
9th Cir.·
1991-11-15
·cited 2×
The court affirmed the district court's denial of the habeas corpus petition, finding no constitutional error in the prior proceedings.
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The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) does not repeal or preempt the requirement that a prisoner serve one-third of their sentence before being eligible for parole under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a).
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The court held that the appellant's federal habeas claims were procedurally defaulted because they were not presented to the state courts in a timely or procedurally correct manner, and the appellant failed to demonstrate cause for the default or actual innocence.