-
752 F.2d 891·
3d Cir.·
1985-01-15
·cited 27×
The trial court erred in striking expert testimony regarding business valuation and marketing, requiring a new trial for Indian Coffee. The summary judgment against Penn-Western is affirmed.
-
819 F.2d 996·
11th Cir.·
1987-06-19
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court did not err in excluding hearsay testimony regarding the defendant's alleged cash hoard and in limiting the scope of the expert witness's testimony.
-
882 F.2d 306·
8th Cir.·
1989-08-09
·cited 24×
The court held that the Corps' failure to issue a prohibitory order when aware of permit violations constituted a breach of a nondiscretionary duty under its own regulations, thus waiving sovereign immunity under the FTCA. The court also held that the admission of expert and lay
-
802 F.2d 115·
5th Cir.·
1986-10-09
·cited 24×
The court held that the defendant's arguments on appeal lacked merit, affirming his conviction for firearm offenses.
-
739 F.2d 1028·
5th Cir.·
1984-08-24
·cited 24×
Expert testimony based solely on the results of a psychological stress evaluation (PSE) is inadmissible because it lacks sufficient scientific acceptance and reliability, similar to polygraph evidence.
-
757 F.2d 66·
3d Cir.·
1985-03-15
·cited 22×
The court held that the jury instruction on product misuse was erroneous and prejudicial, and that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony about a withdrawn expert opinion, requiring reversal and remand for a new trial.
-
732 F.2d 1419·
9th Cir.·
1984-05-08
·cited 22×
The dissenting judge argues that the trial court erred in admitting a prior conviction under Rule 609 and that this error was not harmless, as the majority found.
-
685 F.2d 94·
3d Cir.·
1982-08-06
·cited 22×
The court held that the district court erred in applying the crashworthiness doctrine and should have applied the strict products liability standard of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.
-
630 F.2d 550·
7th Cir.·
1980-09-22
·cited 22×
The court held that a geologist with general expertise was qualified to testify about blasting damage, a survey, though hearsay, was admissible under FRE 703, and the jury instruction on damages was proper.
-
520 F.2d 1346·
8th Cir.·
1975-07-11
·cited 22×
The majority erred in holding the affidavit sufficient to justify the search warrant.
-
751 F.2d 1484·
5th Cir.·
1985-02-07
·cited 21×
The court held that SEPA's decision not to allocate electric power to Greenwood and the contract with Mississippi Power did not violate antitrust laws, affirming the grant of summary judgment.
-
566 F.2d 541·
5th Cir.·
1978-01-20
·cited 21×
The court held that admitting the opinions of non-testifying experts, even as impeachment evidence or under Rule 705, was error because they lacked necessity and trustworthiness and were used substantively. The court affirmed the judgment against the designer based on a design de
-
787 F.2d 763·
1st Cir.·
1986-04-02
·cited 20×
The court held that the plaintiff forfeited her right to object to jury instructions due to procedural failures and that the admission of certain testimony was harmless error.
-
902 F.2d 362·
5th Cir.·
1990-06-04
·cited 19×
The court held that the district court erred in excluding the plaintiffs' expert witness's opinion on causation, as the challenges to the expert's methodology and data go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
-
845 F.2d 356·
1st Cir.·
1988-04-21
·cited 19×
The court affirmed the jury's determination of liability and damages in a wrongful death action, and affirmed the dismissal of the cross-claim for contribution.
-
893 F.2d 1149·
3d Cir.·
1990-01-08
·cited 18×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give a missing witness instruction, admitting sales charts as the basis for expert testimony, or denying motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.
-
729 F.2d 943·
3d Cir.·
1984-03-16
·cited 18×
The court held that the district court properly granted a new trial because the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a relevant product market and causation in fact for its antitrust claims.
-
728 F.2d 572·
1st Cir.·
1984-03-06
·cited 18×
The court held that the trial court did not err in awarding lost commissions based on expert testimony, even without historical earnings data, especially when the defendant failed to produce relevant financial records.
-
716 F.2d 344·
5th Cir.·
1983-10-03
·cited 18×
The court held that the trial judge's exclusion of industry custom evidence was harmless error and that the plaintiff's expert witness testimony was admissible.
-
926 F.2d 262·
3d Cir.·
1991-02-13
·cited 17×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment without providing the plaintiff adequate opportunity to present evidence and contest the defendant's expert testimony, especially under the more lenient FELA causation standard.
-
879 F.2d 1518·
7th Cir.·
1989-07-18
·cited 17×
The court agrees with the judgment but notes the contract is ambiguous, requiring further proceedings.
-
848 F.2d 303·
1st Cir.·
1988-06-03
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court did not err in admitting expert testimony or in its jury instructions, and that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of negligence to support the jury's verdict.
-
811 F.2d 18·
1st Cir.·
1987-02-06
·cited 16×
The court held that a medical chart note, lacking personal knowledge from the entrant and with an unknown source, was inadmissible hearsay and could not be the basis for an expert witness's opinion.
-
754 F.2d 63·
2d Cir.·
1985-01-24
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court's failure to instruct the jury to reduce future damages to present value constituted plain error, requiring reversal and a new trial.
-
644 F.2d 65·
1st Cir.·
1981-03-25
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court's evidentiary ruling, jury instruction, and handling of a mistrial motion were proper.
-
889 F.2d 580·
5th Cir.·
1989-11-22
·cited 15×
The court held that the seizure of the firearm was constitutional, the statute under which the defendant was convicted is constitutional, and the sentence enhancement was properly applied.
-
932 F.2d 1563·
8th Cir.·
1991-05-17
·cited 14×
The court held that the exclusion of Professor Howard Stettler's expert testimony was an abuse of discretion, requiring reversal of summary judgment on earlier claims, but affirmed the exclusion of other expert testimony and the dismissal of a contract counterclaim.
-
919 F.2d 304·
5th Cir.·
1990-12-14
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court did not err in granting partial summary judgment because the expert testimony relied on unreliable sources and the court properly refused to consider untimely affidavits.
-
897 F.2d 1159·
D.C. Cir.·
1990-03-09
·cited 14×
An expert opinion that Bendectin caused birth defects is inadmissible if it lacks scientific foundation in the face of a wealth of published epidemiological data to the contrary.
-
883 F.2d 1382·
8th Cir.·
1989-08-17
·cited 14×
The court held that the jury instructions regarding the merger of assault and homicide charges, the limitations on cross-examination of a witness, and prosecutorial arguments during closing did not constitute plain error. The court also rejected various other claims of error.
-
866 F.2d 319·
10th Cir.·
1989-01-10
·cited 14×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence and making discovery rulings, and therefore affirmed the judgment.
-
820 F.2d 1395·
5th Cir.·
1987-06-26
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress statements made during an IRS interview, nor in refusing to exclude testimony regarding corporate earnings and profits.
-
600 F.2d 498·
5th Cir.·
1979-08-08
·cited 14×
The court held that the expert witness's opinion was permissible and that the prosecutor's question about a privileged letter was proper cross-examination, thus affirming the convictions.
-
890 F.2d 1056·
9th Cir.·
1989-03-16
·cited 13×
The government's failure to disclose a letter from an expert witness did not violate the defendant's due process rights because the letter was inadmissible hearsay and its potential impeachment value was negligible.
-
834 F.2d 1553·
10th Cir.·
1987-12-10
·cited 13×
The court held that the trial court erred in limiting expert testimony regarding the cause of the accident and the existence of alternative safer designs for the product.
-
884 F.2d 167·
5th Cir.·
1989-09-08
·cited 12×
-
882 F.2d 916·
5th Cir.·
1989-08-25
·cited 12×
The court affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentence, finding no error in the indictment's validity, the classification of prior convictions, the admission of evidence, or the denial of speedy trial and suppression motions.
-
823 F.2d 1014·
7th Cir.·
1987-06-10
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court did not err in altering the judgment to enter judgment for the defendants on the claim that the plaintiff was not informed of the reasons for his arrest, as no constitutional right requires such notification.
-
820 F.2d 851·
7th Cir.·
1987-05-13
·cited 12×
The court held that the government met its burden to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the admission of evidence of prior uncharged offenses and expert testimony based on hospital staff observations was proper.
-
776 F.2d 1451·
10th Cir.·
1985-11-07
·cited 12×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony based on hearsay, denying a change of venue, or excluding the testimony of a 'memory expert,' and that the appellant received a fair trial.
-
659 F.2d 721·
6th Cir.·
1981-07-08
·cited 12×
The court held that the trooper's opinion and accident report were inadmissible hearsay, as they relied on biased eyewitness accounts without independent corroboration.
-
514 F.2d 147·
9th Cir.·
1975-04-02
·cited 12×
The court held that an expert witness's testimony, even if based on hearsay, is admissible if the information is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, and the jury is properly instructed on its limited use.
-
940 F.2d 455·
9th Cir.·
1991-07-29
·cited 11×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions for conspiracy and possession, and that the prosecutor's and judge's actions did not violate the defendants' rights.
-
913 F.2d 1269·
7th Cir.·
1990-09-24
·cited 11×
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding a letter under evidentiary rules and in denying a motion to bar expert testimony.
-
865 F.2d 761·
6th Cir.·
1989-01-13
·cited 11×
The court held that the majority erred in excluding expert testimony as speculative, as the expert's reliance on data was reasonable under Fed. R. Evid. 703, and credibility is for the jury.
-
727 F.2d 202·
2d Cir.·
1984-01-26
·cited 11×
The court held that the award for pre-impact pain and suffering must be reversed due to insufficient evidence that the decedent was aware of the impending disaster, but affirmed the awards for loss of services and financial support.
-
132 So. 3d 1128·
Fla. 3d DCA·
2013-11-27
·cited 10×
The estate of a murder victim brought a wrongful death action against a security company that failed to maintain adequate patrols in a gated community. The court affirmed denial of the security company's motion for new trial, holding that competent substantial evidence, including
-
919 F.2d 1189·
6th Cir.·
1990-12-03
·cited 10×
The court held that while the expert affidavit should have been admitted, it was harmless error because the plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
-
836 F.2d 1055·
7th Cir.·
1987-12-29
·cited 10×
The court held that Illinois tort law should apply to the claim against Allied Chemical, Indiana law to the claim against U.S. Steel, and Indiana law to the claim against Ever-Tite. New trials were ordered for Allied Chemical and U.S. Steel, while the judgment for Ever-Tite was a
-
797 F.2d 619·
8th Cir.·
1986-08-28
·cited 10×
The court held that the district court erred in instructing the jury on comparative fault in a strict liability case and in admitting the accident report and expert testimony based on unreliable information.