-
770 F.2d 984·
11th Cir.·
1985-09-10
·cited 133×
A party cannot avoid summary judgment based solely on an expert's conclusory opinion lacking specific supporting facts.
-
865 F.2d 1331·
1st Cir.·
1988-11-22
·cited 132×
The court held that the defendant waived its challenge to the admissibility of statistical evidence by failing to make a contemporaneous objection at trial, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
-
852 F.2d 1259·
10th Cir.·
1988-07-28
·cited 84×
The court held that Edison's discretion to invoke section 3.01 of the coal contract was subject to an implied covenant of good faith, making evidence of Edison's oversupply situation relevant to whether it acted in good faith.
-
862 F.2d 1282·
7th Cir.·
1988-11-21
·cited 75×
The court affirmed both defendants' convictions but remanded Slaughter's case for reconsideration of his sentence.
-
946 So. 2d 1032·
Fla.·
2006-11-02
·cited 73×
The Florida Supreme Court held that expert witnesses cannot testify on direct examination that they relied on consultations with colleagues or other experts in forming their opinions, as such testimony impermissibly bolsters the expert's credibility and serves as a conduit for in
-
704 F.2d 963·
7th Cir.·
1983-04-05
·cited 73×
The court held that the jury's verdict was excessive because it lacked a rational connection to the evidence presented, particularly regarding lost earnings and future pain and suffering, and thus remanded for a new trial or remittitur.
-
529 F.2d 259·
8th Cir.·
1976-01-09
·cited 72×
The Eighth Circuit held that Missouri law would recognize the "second collision" or "enhanced injury" doctrine in products liability cases, and that sufficient evidence existed to submit the case to the jury on this theory.
-
866 F.2d 587·
3d Cir.·
1989-01-17
·cited 68×
The court held that expert testimony on coded conversations and defendants' roles was admissible, and that sufficient evidence supported the drug and firearm convictions.
-
523 F.2d 1331·
2d Cir.·
1975-07-09
·cited 59×
The court held that Grotrian intentionally infringed upon Steinway's trademarks and engaged in unfair competition, affirming the dismissal of Grotrian's complaint but modifying the scope of relief granted to Steinway.
-
591 F.2d 352·
6th Cir.·
1978-12-19
·cited 58×
The court, in a dissenting opinion, argues that the majority erred in its disposition of future earnings, psychiatric treatment, and punitive damages, asserting that the evidence supported the trial court's original awards.
-
830 F.2d 1190·
1st Cir.·
1987-09-30
·cited 54×
The court held that the plaintiffs' expert testimony on causation was inadmissible due to a lack of scientific foundation, and therefore summary judgment for the defendant was appropriate.
-
826 F.2d 420·
5th Cir.·
1987-09-11
·cited 54×
The court held that a district court did not err in excluding expert testimony and granting summary judgment when the expert's opinion lacked sufficient reliability and foundation.
-
857 F.2d 823·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-09-27
·cited 52×
The court held that the trial court properly granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the plaintiff's expert testimony lacked an adequate scientific basis to establish causation by a preponderance of the evidence.
-
727 F.2d 888·
10th Cir.·
1984-01-27
·cited 52×
The court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting or excluding evidence, nor in his jury instructions, and affirmed the trial court's decision.
-
738 F.2d 1092·
10th Cir.·
1984-07-05
·cited 51×
The court held that the trial court did not err in submitting the statute of limitations issue to the jury, admitting evidence of the defendant's financial condition, allowing rebuttal argument on punitive damages, or admitting expert testimony, and affirmed the judgment.
-
582 F.2d 292·
3d Cir.·
1978-08-29
·cited 51×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court did not err in admitting the IRS agent's testimony or in refusing to suppress evidence obtained via administrative summonses.
-
655 F.2d 512·
3d Cir.·
1981-07-23
·cited 50×
The court held that the trial judge did not err in excluding expert psychological testimony due to a lack of foundation and the defendant's failure to comply with Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.2(b) notice requirements for mental condition defenses.
-
939 F.2d 1106·
5th Cir.·
1991-08-15
·cited 48×
The court's majority opinion, by reinterpreting Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, effectively shifts the determination of scientific methodology disputes from juries to district judges, thereby terminating cases before trial if the methodology lacks general acceptance.
-
846 F.2d 135·
2d Cir.·
1988-05-04
·cited 47×
Expert testimony that embodies legal conclusions and is based on the expert's assessment of the credibility of other witnesses is inadmissible.
-
740 F.2d 556·
7th Cir.·
1984-07-26
·cited 46×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by quashing the subpoena entirely, as the defendant was entitled to some discovery of the Registry's data to prepare its defense, despite the need to protect confidentiality.
-
762 F.2d 1569·
11th Cir.·
1985-06-12
·cited 45×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its discovery rulings and did not err in determining there was no genuine issue of material fact, affirming the summary judgments.
-
638 F.2d 1171·
9th Cir.·
1980-08-14
·cited 45×
-
714 F.2d 498·
5th Cir.·
1983-09-12
·cited 44×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding statistical and opinion evidence from Freightliner's expert due to lack of a proper predicate and in admitting evidence of prior lawsuits against Freightliner with a limiting instruction to show notice.
-
825 F.2d 908·
5th Cir.·
1987-08-28
·cited 42×
The court held that federal law did not preempt the Osburns' state tort claims, the learned intermediary doctrine did not apply, and the jury's causation findings were supported by sufficient evidence. However, the court found the damages award excessive and ordered a remittitur.
-
570 F.2d 626·
6th Cir.·
1978-02-13
·cited 42×
The court held that the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony regarding future wage increases, inflation, and the economic value of household services, and in excluding an expert witness from sequestration.
-
742 F.2d 45·
2d Cir.·
1984-07-30
·cited 40×
The court held that using remittitur to recalculate damages from scratch deprives defendants of their right to a jury trial, and thus a new trial is required for pecuniary loss.
-
629 F.2d 523·
8th Cir.·
1980-08-12
·cited 40×
The court held that the trial court erred in refusing to give a contributory negligence instruction to the jury, as there was sufficient evidence to support such a defense. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the negligence issues.
-
804 F.2d 441·
8th Cir.·
1986-10-29
·cited 39×
The court held that the search warrant was valid, the evidence seized was admissible, and there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for mail fraud.
-
869 F.2d 348·
7th Cir.·
1989-02-21
·cited 38×
The court held that spectrographic voice identification expert testimony is admissible under the Frye standard if a proper foundation is laid, and that the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were not violated by the use of a substitute expert who relied on spectrograms prepa
-
620 F.2d 399·
3d Cir.·
1980-04-23
·cited 37×
The court held that the trial court erred in precluding a lay witness's testimony regarding lost profits solely because the witness was not identified as an expert, when the testimony was based on personal knowledge and admissible under Rule 701.
-
809 F.2d 392·
7th Cir.·
1987-01-12
·cited 36×
The court held that the district court did not err in admitting expert testimony regarding the cause of the fire and that sufficient evidence supported the jury's convictions for arson and mail fraud.
-
650 F.2d 846·
6th Cir.·
1981-06-09
·cited 36×
The court held that the trial court erred in excluding the plaintiff's expert testimony because the expert was qualified under Rule 702 and had an adequate basis for his opinion under Rule 703. The exclusion was prejudicial and requires reversal.
-
541 F.2d 196·
8th Cir.·
1976-08-30
·cited 36×
The court held that the evidence, including the gun and narcotics, was lawfully seized incident to a valid arrest for narcotics possession, and the expert testimony was admissible.
-
868 F.2d 1428·
5th Cir.·
1989-04-04
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony linking herbicide exposure to cancer and in denying motions for a new trial and venue transfer.
-
847 F.2d 1261·
7th Cir.·
1988-05-26
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of a prior similar accident and in redacting a portion of an incident report, as the evidence was not substantially similar or was unduly prejudicial.
-
840 F.2d 509·
7th Cir.·
1988-02-22
·cited 34×
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the indictment without prejudice under the Speedy Trial Act and that alleged errors in grand jury proceedings were harmless after a petit jury conviction.
-
647 F.2d 1048·
10th Cir.·
1981-04-30
·cited 34×
The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting expert testimony, admitting rebuttal evidence, instructing the jury on the factual determination of cocaine type, or in striking hearsay testimony and admonishing the jury.
-
842 F.2d 1380·
2d Cir.·
1988-03-28
·cited 33×
The court held that surveillance tapes were admissible against a defendant as co-conspirator statements and that expert testimony regarding organized crime was admissible for background, affirming convictions.
-
916 F.2d 829·
3d Cir.·
1990-09-20
·cited 32×
The court held that the district court erred in its evidentiary rulings by applying too stringent a standard for expert qualification and improperly applying the Downing test, leading to an improper grant of summary judgment.
-
849 F.2d 156·
5th Cir.·
1988-06-27
·cited 32×
The court held that the government's failure to produce a witness's statement did not violate the Jencks Act because the statement was not adopted by the witness, and the admission of prior convictions was proper for impeachment purposes.
-
745 F.2d 1254·
9th Cir.·
1984-10-24
·cited 32×
The court held that audit reports were admissible under Rule 703 as a basis for expert testimony and that the district court erred in remanding for reconsideration of an alternative holding already decided.
-
531 F.2d 1089·
1st Cir.·
1976-03-15
·cited 32×
The court held that the authorization of the special attorney was proper, the statute 18 U.S.C. § 1955 is constitutional, the indictment's state law citation was harmless error, the expert testimony was admissible, and there was sufficient evidence for conviction.
-
818 F.2d 187·
2d Cir.·
1987-04-21
·cited 30×
The court held that the military contractor defense shields contractors from liability for injuries caused by government-ordered military products if the government was informed of known hazards or possessed equal knowledge.
-
687 F.2d 1265·
8th Cir.·
1982-09-14
·cited 30×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence despite chain of custody questions, in allowing the government's case agent to remain in the courtroom, or in admitting expert testimony based on a manufacturer's sample, and that the defendant
-
641 F.2d 174·
4th Cir.·
1981-02-09
·cited 30×
A conviction for a multi-object conspiracy cannot stand if the jury returns a general verdict and it's impossible to determine whether the conviction was based on a legally valid or invalid object, especially when one object is time-barred.
-
847 F.2d 1417·
9th Cir.·
1988-06-02
·cited 29×
The exclusion of expert testimony regarding legitimate currency exchange practices, which was material to the defendant's defense, violated the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense and necessitates a new trial.
-
958 F.2d 1176·
2d Cir.·
1992-03-10
·cited 28×
The court affirmed the jury's verdict and the district court's judgment, finding that the jury instruction on mixed-motives was appropriate and that the evidence supported the age discrimination finding.
-
648 F.2d 833·
3d Cir.·
1981-04-27
·cited 28×
The court held that North Carolina law does not recognize strict liability in tort for product defects, but does allow recovery for enhanced injuries under a crashworthiness theory. The exclusion of seat belt evidence was proper.
-
911 F.2d 941·
3d Cir.·
1990-08-17
·cited 27×
The court held that the district court misapplied Federal Rule of Evidence 703 by excluding expert testimony solely based on the lack of statistical significance in epidemiological studies, when the expert's methodology using confidence intervals was reasonably relied upon by exp
-
864 F.2d 1454·
9th Cir.·
1988-12-28
·cited 27×
The court affirmed the denial of the JNOV motion, the denial of summary judgment, and the jury verdict, finding that the defendants waived sufficiency of evidence arguments by failing to move for a directed verdict. The court also affirmed the attorneys' fees award, finding no ab