-
405 F.2d 833·
8th Cir.·
1969-01-14
·cited 84×
The court held that the district court's inclusion of interest in its order was a mistake under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), not a judicial error, and thus could be corrected.
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717 F.2d 683·
2d Cir.·
1983-09-01
·cited 62×
A trial judge may legitimately consider the passage of time and the procedural history of a case when exercising discretion on a motion for a new trial.
-
708 F.2d 1225·
7th Cir.·
1983-05-23
·cited 62×
The court held that the defendants' conduct, including their counsel's repeated failures to appear, respond to discovery, and comply with court orders, constituted inexcusable neglect, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the de
-
542 F.2d 928·
5th Cir.·
1976-11-18
·cited 58×
A Rule 60(b)(1) motion based on a post-judgment change in controlling decisional law is timely if filed within a reasonable time, not necessarily within the period allowed for perfecting a timely appeal.
-
726 F.2d 333·
7th Cir.·
1984-01-19
·cited 48×
The court held that a Rule 60(b) motion cannot be used to correct alleged errors of law made by the district court in the underlying judgment, and that a change in the law after judgment does not, by itself, justify relief under Rule 60(b).
-
572 F.2d 976·
3d Cir.·
1978-03-08
·cited 40×
The court held that gross neglect by an attorney, amounting to abandonment of clients, constitutes an exceptional circumstance justifying relief from a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), even though the clients are generally bound by their attorney's actions
-
518 F.2d 488·
3d Cir.·
1975-06-05
·cited 40×
The district court lacked jurisdiction to grant a new trial under Rule 59 and abused its discretion under Rule 60(b)(6) because the plaintiff's motion was untimely and lacked extraordinary circumstances.
-
769 F.2d 281·
5th Cir.·
1985-08-26
·cited 38×
The court held that the appeal from the dismissal was untimely and that the denial of the motion to retain, treated as a Rule 60(b) motion, was not an abuse of discretion due to untimeliness and lack of extraordinary circumstances.
-
520 F.2d 358·
2d Cir.·
1975-07-31
·cited 36×
A motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal cannot substitute for the notice of appeal itself, even if the motion alleges excusable neglect.
-
479 F.2d 573·
4th Cir.·
1973-06-11
·cited 34×
The court held that a client is bound by the "grossly negligent" acts or omissions of their attorney, and such negligence does not constitute excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) to vacate a judgment.
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405 F.2d 245·
5th Cir.·
1968-12-05
·cited 33×
-
448 F.2d 729·
9th Cir.·
1971-09-13
·cited 29×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion to reinstate the case.
-
810 F.2d 243·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-01-27
·cited 26×
The court affirmed the denial of leave to amend the complaint, the award of holdover rent, and the final summary judgment on the monopolization claim, but vacated the order increasing post-judgment interest.
-
781 F.2d 935·
D.C. Cir.·
1986-01-21
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction without considering transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
-
767 F.2d 153·
5th Cir.·
1985-08-05
·cited 26×
The court held that the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief should have been dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction due to insufficient Article III standing, as past wrongs do not establish a real and immediate threat of future injury.
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728 F.2d 943·
7th Cir.·
1984-02-28
·cited 26×
The court held that a motion to correct pre-judgment interest under Rule 60(b)(1) was untimely due to lack of diligence, but post-judgment interest should be awarded at the rate of 9 percent per annum under Illinois law.
-
913 F.2d 824·
10th Cir.·
1990-09-05
·cited 20×
A sanction order against an attorney of record is not a final decision for appeal under § 1291, nor is it immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. However, Rule 11 sanctions were vacated for lack of due process, while Rule 16(f) sanctions were affirmed.
-
865 F.2d 498·
2d Cir.·
1989-01-10
·cited 20×
The court held that the refusal to restore the case to the calendar was an abuse of discretion because the conditions of the 60-day order were met, and the settlement was not binding on the plaintiff.
-
826 F.2d 983·
11th Cir.·
1987-09-08
·cited 20×
The court held that Dade County's breach of contract and warranty claims were barred by the statute of limitations, as the cause of action accrued before the applicable statute of limitations expired and the refiled complaint did not relate back.
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821 F.2d 19·
1st Cir.·
1987-06-11
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for relief from a default judgment because the motion was untimely under Rule 60(b)(1) and the circumstances did not justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6) or (4).
-
821 F.2d 1220·
6th Cir.·
1987-05-18
·cited 20×
The court amended its prior opinion to apply the reasonable relationship standard from Turner and O'Lone, holding that the plaintiff's complaint, when construed liberally, was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
-
555 F.2d 577·
6th Cir.·
1977-04-11
·cited 20×
A debtor's unexpired lease of real property remains an executory contract in a Chapter XI proceeding, and its liabilities are not discharged unless affirmatively rejected by the debtor.
-
785 F.2d 1447·
9th Cir.·
1986-04-03
·cited 16×
A plaintiff cannot appeal a voluntary dismissal of an action, even if it follows the denial of class certification, because such a dismissal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction.
-
786 F.2d 150·
3d Cir.·
1986-03-14
·cited 16×
The court should have reached the merits of the standing issue and concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the cross-program recoupment provision.
-
715 F.2d 1442·
10th Cir.·
1983-08-26
·cited 16×
The court held that a party's misunderstanding of legal liability and failure to consult counsel after repeated warnings does not constitute excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1).
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657 F.2d 1053·
9th Cir.·
1981-09-28
·cited 16×
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal of the order denying leave to file in forma pauperis, but had jurisdiction to consider the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
-
301 F.2d 114·
2d Cir.·
1962-03-29
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the default judgment.
-
746 F.2d 1041·
5th Cir.·
1984-11-06
·cited 15×
A district court is divested of jurisdiction to grant a Rule 60(b) motion once a notice of appeal has been filed, and requires leave from the appellate court to do so. The December 2, 1983 judgment was a nullity.
-
288 F.2d 466·
9th Cir.·
1961-03-29
·cited 15×
The court held that a motion to remand for reconsideration of prior orders should first be filed in the district court under Rule 60(b).
-
877 F.2d 1357·
7th Cir.·
1989-06-28
·cited 14×
A bankruptcy court can use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) to correct an omission in a prior judgment to reflect its original intent that the entire state court judgment, including pre-petition interest, was nondischargeable.
-
776 F.2d 1277·
5th Cir.·
1985-11-20
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the summary judgment and consider the appellant's untimely response.
-
766 F.2d 398·
9th Cir.·
1985-03-22
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Title VII claim, and removal cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed.
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743 F.2d 643·
9th Cir.·
1984-07-30
·cited 14×
A stipulated judgment bears postjudgment interest as a legal incident of the statute, and Rule 60(a) cannot be used to correct errors of law regarding its inclusion.
-
693 F.2d 581·
5th Cir.·
1982-12-17
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing J&K for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding sufficient contacts with Texas to satisfy due process. The court also affirmed the district court's determination that a motion for rehearing was timely filed under Rule 60(b
-
660 F.2d 845·
2d Cir.·
1981-09-28
·cited 14×
The court held that relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) was not available for the substantial relief sought by the appellant.
-
199 So. 2d 495·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1967-06-08
·cited 14×
This case concerns whether a court can amend its own order sua sponte after the time for appeal has passed. The appellate court held that a court can amend an order to correct a mistake or inadvertence, even on its own motion, to further the interest of justice.
-
327 F.2d 356·
2d Cir.·
1964-02-05
·cited 14×
The court held that the denial of the plaintiff's motions to vacate judgments, substitute parties, and for reargument was proper, and affirmed the lower court's decision.
-
938 F.2d 1417·
1st Cir.·
1991-07-16
·cited 12×
The court held that in a currency forfeiture case, the government's execution of the judgment does not extinguish appellate jurisdiction if a timely appeal is filed, and the filing of a timely appeal makes a stay or supersedeas bond unnecessary for jurisdictional purposes. The co
-
695 F.2d 922·
5th Cir.·
1983-01-20
·cited 12×
The court held that landowners could not use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to challenge the district courts' failure to award an interest rate higher than six percent on the difference between the government's deposit and the jury's award.
-
520 F.2d 451·
D.C. Cir.·
1975-10-06
·cited 12×
The court held that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to rule on a motion for reconsideration based on an intervening appellate decision.
-
915 F.2d 1414·
10th Cir.·
1990-10-01
·cited 11×
The court held that the jury instruction on the plaintiff's burden of proof regarding the motive for discharge was erroneous because it did not require the refusal to commit perjury to be a significant factor in the termination decision. The court reversed and remanded for a new
-
862 F.2d 1388·
9th Cir.·
1988-12-09
·cited 11×
The court held that a defendant's culpable conduct, including actual notice and intentional failure to answer, supports a default judgment, but a RICO claim within a default judgment requires specific pleading under Rule 9(b).
-
804 F.2d 1310·
D.C. Cir.·
1986-11-14
·cited 11×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(1) when counsel failed to demonstrate excusable neglect for failing to file an opposition to a motion to dismiss.
-
925 F.2d 1069·
8th Cir.·
1991-01-09
·cited 10×
The court held that the discharged employee had a property interest in his job under Iowa law and was denied procedural due process, but remanded for recalculation of prejudgment interest.
-
916 F.2d 358·
6th Cir.·
1990-10-12
·cited 10×
The court held that an order reinstating a case under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) is not an appealable final decision when the district court acted within its discretion. The court found the district court did not err in granting relief.
-
822 F.2d 1342·
3d Cir.·
1987-07-02
·cited 10×
A district court cannot reopen a final judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) based on an honest mistake or inequitable facts if no extraordinary circumstances are present and the motion is not made within a reasonable time.
-
660 F.2d 337·
7th Cir.·
1981-09-30
·cited 10×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by granting a writ of habeas corpus as a default judgment solely due to the state's short delay in filing transcripts.
-
910 F.2d 357·
6th Cir.·
1990-08-09
·cited 9×
The court held that the bankruptcy court's amended order was not a mere clerical correction under Rule 60(a) and that the district court correctly found it lacked jurisdiction to amend a substantive error after the one-year limit under Rule 60(b)(1). However, the court remanded f
-
857 F.2d 46·
1st Cir.·
1988-09-21
·cited 8×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment, as the appellant's reliance on local counsel's erroneous advice did not constitute excusable neglect.
-
828 F.2d 1253·
8th Cir.·
1987-09-08
·cited 8×
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar backpay during a stay pending appeal, but backpay must be reduced by interim earnings. Reinstatement to a comparable position is permissible if the former position no longer exists.