-
5 F.4th 1235·
11th Cir.·
2021-07-20
·cited 15×
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings, upholding the jury's verdict and the denial of post-trial motions.
-
568 F.2d 1362·
5th Cir.·
1978-03-02
·cited 15×
The court holds that it has jurisdiction over the appeal because a timely Rule 59(e) motion tolled the time for appeal. The court affirms the district court's award of attorney's fees, finding no abuse of discretion.
-
922 F.2d 216·
5th Cir.·
1991-01-31
·cited 14×
A motion for costs does not toll the time to appeal, and a notice of appeal using "et al." is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over unnamed parties.
-
903 F.2d 978·
3d Cir.·
1990-05-29
·cited 14×
The court held that the jury's finding of willfulness supporting liquidated damages was supported by sufficient evidence, and the trial court did not err in denying the motion for JNOV.
-
805 F.2d 1165·
4th Cir.·
1986-12-01
·cited 14×
The district court retained jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees and costs after the appeal was concluded, and the amount awarded was not an abuse of discretion.
-
693 F.2d 581·
5th Cir.·
1982-12-17
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing J&K for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding sufficient contacts with Texas to satisfy due process. The court also affirmed the district court's determination that a motion for rehearing was timely filed under Rule 60(b
-
622 F.2d 937·
7th Cir.·
1980-04-25
·cited 14×
The court held that the taxpayers' promise to make monthly payments was not sufficient consideration for the government's alleged promise to allocate bankruptcy proceeds to their personal liability, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fe
-
322 F.2d 866·
3d Cir.·
1963-09-24
·cited 14×
The court held that a mortgagor remains liable for interest on the mortgage debt even after surrender of possession in a condemnation proceeding, and that the mortgagee's application for payment does not automatically stop the accrual of interest against the mortgagor.
-
883 F.2d 245·
3d Cir.·
1989-08-25
·cited 12×
The operation of a landfill by Lycoming County is not protected by the market participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause because it unduly burdens interstate commerce and is indistinguishable from prior cases limiting the exception.
-
851 F.2d 969·
7th Cir.·
1988-07-12
·cited 12×
A district court retains inherent jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions even after dismissing a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, the court affirmed the denial of sanctions because the plaintiff's claims for sanctions were ultimately without merit.
-
828 F.2d 325·
5th Cir.·
1987-10-02
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to set aside a dismissal for failure to prosecute, as the attorney's inadvertent mistake did not constitute sufficiently unique circumstances for relief.
-
721 F.2d 346·
11th Cir.·
1983-12-15
·cited 12×
The court held that a pro se litigant's motion, though labeled under Rule 60(b), should not be recharacterized as a Rule 59(e) motion to deny his appeal when the district court did not recharacterize it and the litigant complied with the rules.
-
532 F.2d 897·
3d Cir.·
1976-03-17
·cited 12×
The court held that the appeal was timely filed because the administratrix's Rule 59(e) motion tolled the time for appeal, and that the seaman's action for maintenance and cure survives his death and allows for substitution of his legal representative.
-
852 F.2d 1244·
10th Cir.·
1988-07-26
·cited 11×
The court held that an amendment adding a party relates back under Rule 15(c) if the party knew or should have known it would be sued but for a mistake concerning identity within the limitations period, regardless of subsequent delay in filing the amendment. The court also held t
-
938 F.2d 1510·
1st Cir.·
1991-07-29
·cited 10×
A post-judgment motion questioning the legal correctness of a judgment, even if labeled Rule 60(b), is treated as a Rule 59 motion, thus tolling the appeal period. The employer bears the burden to prove the applicability of the FLSA harvest exemption.
-
834 F.2d 31·
1st Cir.·
1987-12-03
·cited 10×
The court held that the appellant's notice of appeal was untimely, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motions to vacate or reconsider the dismissal.
-
410 F.2d 941·
8th Cir.·
1969-05-14
·cited 10×
The court held that a trial court has the discretion to vacate a consent judgment procured by fraud and enter judgment on a jury's true verdict, rather than requiring a new trial.
-
280 F.2d 64·
D.C. Cir.·
1960-05-26
·cited 10×
The court held that a second motion for reconsideration, filed after the denial of a timely initial motion, does not restart the time for filing an appeal from the original judgment. The appeal from the denial of the second motion is also dismissed as it would countenance dilator
-
2008 WL 4459085·
M.D. Fla.·
2025-07-23
·cited 9×
The court denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration because no grounds were presented to warrant it.
-
975 F.2d 321·
7th Cir.·
1992-09-11
·cited 9×
The court's holding is not explicitly stated as the author is concurring and discussing the difficulty of classifying causes of action.
-
905 F.2d 702·
3d Cir.·
1990-06-18
·cited 9×
The court held that defendants' failure to make a written settlement offer under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 238 makes them liable for delay damages, regardless of plaintiffs' settlement demands or alleged trial delays.
-
763 F.2d 1098·
9th Cir.·
1985-06-21
·cited 9×
The Guam Visitors Bureau, established as a public corporation under Public Law 17-32, is not an agency or instrumentality of the government, and its structure does not contravene the Organic Act of Guam.
-
594 F.2d 1078·
5th Cir.·
1979-05-14
·cited 9×
The court held that a release executed by a partnership did not satisfy a judgment entered in favor of individual partners, and the judgment debtors' attempt to have the judgment marked satisfied was untimely.
-
77 F.4th 1317·
11th Cir.·
2023-08-14
·cited 8×
The Court held that a motion to alter or amend a voluntary dismissal order under Rule 41(a)(2) is a proper Rule 59(e) motion, thus tolling the time to appeal, and that the district court erred in finding otherwise.
-
846 F.2d 11·
5th Cir.·
1988-05-26
·cited 8×
A motion to vacate a judgment, even if labeled under Rule 60(b), is treated as a Rule 59(e) motion if it challenges the judgment's correctness and is filed within 10 days. Such a motion, if timely, nullifies a previously filed notice of appeal, requiring a new notice after the mo
-
781 F.2d 324·
2d Cir.·
1986-01-15
·cited 8×
The court held that a motion to amend a judgment to include prejudgment interest, when not awarded in the original judgment, is not a 'clerical mistake' correctable under Rule 60(a) if there is no clear indication the court intended to award such interest.
-
764 F.2d 197·
7th Cir.·
1985-06-10
·cited 8×
The court held that the appeal was untimely because the motion for reconsideration was not filed within the time limit to toll the appeal period for the preliminary injunction order.
-
956 F.2d 560·
6th Cir.·
1992-02-10
·cited 6×
The dissent argues that the predicate acts were sufficiently related to meet the continuity requirement for a RICO claim.
-
933 F.2d 341·
5th Cir.·
1991-06-17
·cited 6×
The court held that the district court correctly denied the Teals' motions to set aside the settlement agreement because they were untimely and lacked a basis under Rule 60(b).
-
934 F.2d 383·
1st Cir.·
1991-06-05
·cited 6×
The court held that defendants waived their objections to prejudgment interest by failing to raise them properly in the district court and that the issue of interest on future damages was not properly before the appellate court due to procedural failures.
-
868 F.2d 1469·
5th Cir.·
1989-04-05
·cited 6×
The court affirmed the denial of the motion to vacate based on Rule 60(b) but remanded for the district court to consider the Rule 59(e) claims.
-
555 F.2d 1360·
8th Cir.·
1977-05-31
·cited 6×
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal from the denial of the § 2255 motion due to an untimely notice of appeal, and affirmed the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion.
-
526 F.2d 801·
8th Cir.·
1975-11-28
·cited 6×
The court held that a motion to reconsider tolls the time for appeal, but the appeal was premature due to the lack of a separate judgment document.
-
901 F.2d 1053·
11th Cir.·
1990-05-22
·cited 5×
The court held that the defendant's contacts with Florida were insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, and the denial of the motion to alter the judgment was not an abuse of discretion.
-
950 F.2d 343·
7th Cir.·
1991-10-15
·cited 4×
The court held that the ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the district court did not err in affirming the Secretary's decision denying disability benefits.
-
899 F.2d 766·
9th Cir.·
1990-03-07
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment due to an insufficiently developed record and that the plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies or show immediate injury were not fatal to his claim.
-
873 F.2d 626·
2d Cir.·
1989-04-25
·cited 4×
The court held that a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a Rule 59(e) motion is ineffective and requires a new notice of appeal to confer jurisdiction.
-
853 F.2d 623·
8th Cir.·
1988-08-10
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court properly dismissed the motion for reconsideration as untimely, regardless of whether it was treated as a Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) motion.
-
588 F.2d 708·
9th Cir.·
1978-11-13
·cited 4×
The court held that a "motion for reconsideration" coupled with supporting memoranda, when considered as a whole, can constitute a timely and sufficient motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a) if it presents grounds for relief, such as manifest error of law.
-
M.D. Fla.·
2020-12-14
·cited 3×
The court denied the motion for reconsideration because the petitioner failed to present newly discovered evidence or demonstrate manifest errors of law or fact, and his claim for transfer to home confinement is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
-
714 F.2d 97·
11th Cir.·
1983-09-06
·cited 3×
The appeal is dismissed because the notice of appeal was not timely filed within the sixty-day period required by Fed.R.App.P. 4(a), as no timely post-trial motion tolled the time for appeal.
-
883 F. Supp. 707·
S.D. Fla.·
1995-03-29
·cited 2×
The court held that it must give proper regard to a state court's interpretation of state law, even when removed to federal court, and denied the motion to vacate the judgment.
-
999 F.2d 326·
8th Cir.·
1993-07-14
·cited 2×
The court held that the plaintiff's asbestos abatement cost recovery action was barred by the statute of repose and was not revived by the asbestos revival statute because it was not timely begun. The court also held that class action tolling did not apply to the revival statute.
-
995 F.2d 274·
D.C. Cir.·
1993-06-15
·cited 2×
The court held that the District of Columbia waived the issue of Mr. Kattan's eligibility for attorney's fees by not raising it timely.
-
966 F.2d 1178·
7th Cir.·
1992-07-10
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to alter the judgment and amend its complaint.
-
962 F.2d 1177·
6th Cir.·
1992-04-28
·cited 2×
A notice of appeal filed during the pendency of a Rule 59(e) motion in one of two consolidated cases is a nullity as to that case, but not necessarily as to the other case if the parties and issues are not sufficiently merged.
-
901 F.2d 1439·
7th Cir.·
1990-05-14
·cited 2×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a Monell claim for deliberate indifference to training or inadequate investigation, and that his other claims were procedurally barred or without merit.
-
900 F.2d 168·
9th Cir.·
1990-03-27
·cited 2×
The court held that a district court must articulate its reasoning and findings when sealing a consent decree to allow for appellate review.
-
877 F.2d 453·
6th Cir.·
1989-06-07
·cited 2×
The court held that the Government was a third-party creditor beneficiary to the property settlement agreement and could enforce Ms. Wood's promise to pay her husband's tax liability. The court also reversed in part, ordering a credit against the judgment for funds held by a rece
-
779 F.2d 514·
9th Cir.·
1985-12-26
·cited 2×
The court held that the bankruptcy court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous, and therefore, its reformation of the trustee's deed was an abuse of discretion.