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784 F.2d 665·
5th Cir.·
1986-03-12
·cited 137×
A post-judgment motion to alter or amend the judgment served within ten days of entry, other than for purely clerical errors, must be treated as a Rule 59(e) motion for purposes of appellate timing rules.
-
600 F.2d 60·
6th Cir.·
1979-06-21
·cited 113×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment without considering all properly filed discovery materials, even without a timely response from the non-moving party. The court also found the notice of appeal was timely filed.
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651 F.2d 574·
8th Cir.·
1981-06-11
·cited 111×
A motion for attorney's fees is a collateral and independent claim, not governed by the ten-day limit of Rule 59(e), and district courts retain jurisdiction to award fees after judgment on the merits.
-
657 F.2d 844·
7th Cir.·
1981-04-17
·cited 70×
The court held that the appeal of the default judgment order was untimely, but affirmed the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion because the district court had jurisdiction and did not abuse its discretion.
-
708 F.2d 1225·
7th Cir.·
1983-05-23
·cited 62×
The court held that the defendants' conduct, including their counsel's repeated failures to appear, respond to discovery, and comply with court orders, constituted inexcusable neglect, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the de
-
569 F.2d 807·
4th Cir.·
1978-01-18
·cited 51×
The court held that dismissal of a case for an attorney's failure to attend a pretrial conference, without a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff, is an abuse of discretion and that lesser sanctions should be imposed.
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189 F.R.D. 480·
M.D. Fla.·
1999-10-07
·cited 50×
The 1990 ordinances were void ab initio because the city made a substantial change to the proposed ordinance by dividing it into two separate ordinances after the first public hearing without restarting the notice process required by Florida law. The 1997 ordinance violated the s
-
724 F.2d 1552·
11th Cir.·
1984-02-16
·cited 47×
The Eleventh Circuit held that the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a final order if the court's order does not explicitly state that no amendment is possible, and thus the appeal of the denial of leave to amend is timely. The court also hel
-
691 F.2d 438·
9th Cir.·
1982-10-26
·cited 44×
The court held that a Rule 60 motion was the proper procedural vehicle to challenge a costs award based on an alleged error of law or the law of the case, and that Rule 68 mandated costs for the state.
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621 F.2d 1062·
10th Cir.·
1980-05-12
·cited 44×
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268 F.2d 16·
9th Cir.·
1959-05-22
·cited 42×
The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction, and that the denial of the motion to alter the dismissal order was not an abuse of discretion because the proposed amended complaint was barred by the statute of limitations.
-
807 F.2d 345·
3d Cir.·
1986-12-11
·cited 41×
The court held that injured parties have independent standing in a declaratory judgment action brought by an insurer, and their rights are not merely derivative of the insured's rights, especially when the insurer initiated the action.
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704 F.2d 347·
7th Cir.·
1983-03-31
·cited 41×
The court held that the district court correctly determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the defendant did not meet the statutory definition of an "employer" under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as it did not have twenty or more employees for each work
-
714 F.2d 234·
2d Cir.·
1983-08-09
·cited 40×
The court held that the state waived its right to raise the speedy trial exhaustion issue by failing to object to the magistrate's recommendation and consenting to the entry of judgment.
-
545 F.2d 758·
1st Cir.·
1976-12-08
·cited 40×
The court held that Morgan's motion to amend the interest order was untimely under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(a), 59(e), and 60(b).
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922 F.3d 1257·
11th Cir.·
2019-04-29
·cited 38×
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the employee's motions for relief, finding no abuse of discretion in denying a new trial or amendment of judgment based on newly discovered evidence or strategic litigation choices.
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853 F.2d 155·
3d Cir.·
1988-07-21
·cited 38×
An untimely Rule 59(e) motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal, and the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
-
862 F.2d 161·
8th Cir.·
1988-11-30
·cited 36×
The court held that the appeal of the summary judgment was untimely because the motion for reconsideration did not toll the appeal period, but the appeal of the denial of that motion was timely. The court affirmed the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
-
831 F.2d 22·
1st Cir.·
1987-10-16
·cited 35×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration, as the appellant failed to present a timely or substantiated claim for judicial review of the agency's decision.
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819 F.2d 201·
8th Cir.·
1987-05-26
·cited 34×
The district court had jurisdiction to impose sanctions under Rule 11 even after a voluntary dismissal, and the sanctions were appropriate given the frivolous nature of the repeated lawsuits.
-
308 F.2d 94·
9th Cir.·
1962-09-11
·cited 34×
A trial court may dismiss an action under Rule 41(b) on its own motion after a defendant moves for a directed verdict, but such dismissal must be based on judicial discretion, not arbitrary choice, and the record must support the decision to dismiss without prejudice.
-
739 F.2d 1464·
9th Cir.·
1984-08-14
·cited 31×
The district court properly denied motions to vacate and reconsider because it lacked jurisdiction due to untimeliness and the pending appeal, and the appeal itself is frivolous.
-
675 F.2d 119·
6th Cir.·
1982-04-13
·cited 29×
The court held that the 1966 amendments to the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLI) abolished the 'manifest intent' test for determining beneficiaries, and that a motion for reconsideration based on inconsistent or non-newly discovered evidence was properly denied.
-
756 F.2d 1467·
10th Cir.·
1985-03-04
·cited 28×
The court held that a vertical conspiracy to maintain resale prices is illegal per se, and that sufficient evidence existed to send the Sherman Act claim against La-Z-Boy to the jury. However, insufficient evidence existed to support the claim against Montgomery Ward and Mauldin.
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709 F.2d 1174·
7th Cir.·
1983-06-09
·cited 26×
An order that modifies a final judgment, even if labeled as clarification, is an appealable final order, and the district court did not err in correcting its prior judgment to reflect its intent that the dismissal of the pendent state law claim was without prejudice.
-
705 F.2d 249·
7th Cir.·
1983-04-15
·cited 26×
A post-judgment motion filed within 10 days, even if captioned as a motion to reconsider, can be treated as a Rule 59(e) motion if its substance seeks to alter or amend the judgment.
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315 F.2d 403·
2d Cir.·
1963-04-02
·cited 26×
An amendment to a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) for clerical mistakes does not restart the time for appeal, but a district court may grant an extension for excusable neglect under Rule 73(a) in unique circumstances where a party reasonably misunderstands th
-
715 F.2d 531·
11th Cir.·
1983-09-19
·cited 25×
The court held that motions for attorneys' fees are not governed by the ten-day time limit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and should be considered timely if filed within a reasonable period after judgment.
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952 F.2d 1241·
10th Cir.·
1991-12-30
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, as it did not present grounds for relief under Rule 60(b).
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664 F.2d 652·
7th Cir.·
1981-11-20
·cited 24×
A postjudgment motion for attorneys' fees under the Lanham Act's "exceptional cases" provision is a motion to alter or amend the judgment governed by Rule 59(e), not a motion for costs under Rule 54(d).
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653 F.2d 1378·
10th Cir.·
1981-07-14
·cited 24×
The court held that the appeal was timely and that the district court properly dismissed the employer to preserve diversity jurisdiction, affirming the jury's allocation of fault.
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302 F.2d 321·
7th Cir.·
1962-04-24
·cited 24×
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for relief under Rule 60(b) from a final judgment dismissing the action.
-
D.D.C.·
1952-07-17
·cited 24×
The court held that the appellant's motion to vacate an order denying a prior motion to alter judgment did not toll the time for appeal under Rule 73(a).
-
887 F.2d 362·
2d Cir.·
1989-09-20
·cited 23×
A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their actions did not violate the plaintiff's rights, and the warrant application was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
-
806 F.2d 1290·
5th Cir.·
1987-01-07
·cited 23×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration because the issues raised should have been addressed in a timely direct appeal from the original dismissal order.
-
592 F.2d 39·
2d Cir.·
1979-01-03
·cited 22×
The district court erred in using Rule 60(a) to amend a judgment to add prejudgment interest, as this rule applies only to clerical mistakes, not substantive legal errors.
-
904 F.2d 627·
11th Cir.·
1990-06-28
·cited 21×
The court held that the district court did not err in awarding relief beyond the jury's back pay award, in awarding liquidated damages for a willful violation of the ADEA, or in awarding attorneys' fees, as the Bank failed to properly preserve these issues for appeal.
-
918 F.2d 1524·
11th Cir.·
1990-12-14
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court did not err in granting a directed verdict, awarding costs and attorney's fees, or correcting the judgment, and that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 does not preempt Florida Statute § 45.061.
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840 F.2d 173·
3d Cir.·
1988-02-11
·cited 20×
The court affirmed the district court's grant of specific performance for the stock sale agreement but vacated the dismissal of the RICO counterclaim due to procedural error.
-
188 F.2d 306·
2d Cir.·
1951-03-30
·cited 20×
The court held that the appeal from the order conditionally directing payment of the special master's fee was timely, but must be dismissed for lack of finality under Rule 54(b) without a proper certificate.
-
948 F.2d 1037·
6th Cir.·
1991-11-07
·cited 19×
The court held that statements made by a corporation and its officers are not actionable under securities fraud laws if they are accompanied by sufficient cautionary language and are made in good faith, even if subsequent events prove them wrong.
-
899 F.2d 1350·
3d Cir.·
1990-04-03
·cited 18×
The court held that the attorney's recusal motion was properly denied, but the sanctions order against him must be vacated and remanded due to insufficient notice and failure to differentiate between Rule 11 and § 1927 standards.
-
709 F.2d 16·
7th Cir.·
1983-06-13
·cited 18×
A timely filed Rule 59(e) motion divests the appellate court of jurisdiction over an appeal, even if filed after the notice of appeal.
-
681 F.2d 1183·
9th Cir.·
1982-07-22
·cited 18×
A postjudgment request for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is not subject to the ten-day time limit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or local rules governing routine costs.
-
978 F.2d 10·
1st Cir.·
1992-10-22
·cited 17×
The FDIC, as a holder in due course of a facially valid bearer note, is entitled to enforce payment against the maker, Santa Barbara Corporation, despite claims of prior payment or defenses.
-
900 F.2d 882·
6th Cir.·
1990-03-28
·cited 16×
The court held that Dana sufficiently alleged mail fraud and a pattern of racketeering activity to withstand a motion to dismiss, and that leave to amend the complaint should have been granted. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction a
-
851 F.2d 1152·
9th Cir.·
1988-03-15
·cited 16×
The court held that while the district court had the power to amend its judgment, it abused its discretion by failing to expressly consider the public interest and by not ordering the Secretary to comply with his own regulations regarding tribal consultation and lease planning. T
-
786 F.2d 150·
3d Cir.·
1986-03-14
·cited 16×
The court should have reached the merits of the standing issue and concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the cross-program recoupment provision.
-
717 F.2d 1016·
6th Cir.·
1983-09-28
·cited 16×
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the underlying judgment because the notice of appeal was untimely filed. The court affirmed the denial of the motion for reconsideration, finding no abuse of discretion.
-
634 F.2d 180·
5th Cir.·
1981-01-12
·cited 16×
The court held that a motion for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is not subject to the ten-day time limit for amending judgments under F.R.Civ.P. 59(e).