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413 F.2d 1061·
D.C. Cir.·
1969-04-08
·cited 213×
The court held that while the indictment procedure used was defective because the grand jury as a body did not approve the final indictment, it did not prejudice the defendants, and therefore their convictions are affirmed.
-
916 F.2d 628·
11th Cir.·
1990-11-02
·cited 128×
The court held that jury instructions constructively amended the indictment on Count Three, violating the Fifth Amendment, but found sufficient evidence for the conspiracy charge. The court also held that a district court's informed decision not to depart downward from Sentencing
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269 F.3d 1250·
11th Cir.·
2001-10-17
·cited 114×
The court affirmed the convictions and sentences of the Sanchezes. The concurring judges argued that no Apprendi error occurred because the sentences did not exceed the statutory maximum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). They also contended that the "Rogers error" did not apply bec
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754 F.2d 1153·
5th Cir.·
1985-02-15
·cited 102×
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying motions for change of venue, recusal, or in admitting testimony, as the jury selection process and judicial conduct were proper.
-
679 F.2d 845·
11th Cir.·
1982-06-28
·cited 94×
The court held that the Speedy Trial Act was not violated, the indictment did not suffer a constructive amendment, and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
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583 F.2d 748·
5th Cir.·
1978-11-08
·cited 94×
The Fifth Circuit, in a concurring opinion, argues that the "slight evidence" standard for appellate review of conspiracy convictions is incorrect and should be replaced by the "substantial evidence" standard. This standard, consistent with Supreme Court precedent and sound polic
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713 F.2d 633·
11th Cir.·
1983-08-29
·cited 88×
The court affirmed the convictions, finding no abuse of discretion in denying severance motions and sufficient evidence to support the convictions for conspiracy, aiding and abetting a stowaway, and wire fraud.
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808 F.2d 184·
2d Cir.·
1986-12-04
·cited 86×
The court held that the "pattern requirement" for RICO does not necessitate multiple schemes, and that federal mail fraud prosecutions are permissible even when conduct also violates state liquor laws.
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654 F.2d 319·
5th Cir.·
1981-08-24
·cited 85×
The court held that a conviction on count one must be reversed because the trial judge constructively amended the indictment by allowing the jury to convict based on aiding and abetting a misapplication by any bank officer, not just the one named in the indictment. Convictions on
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798 F.2d 1024·
7th Cir.·
1986-08-15
·cited 72×
The court reversed Debbie Williams' conspiracy conviction due to insufficient evidence but affirmed convictions for David Williams and Wayne Russell.
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740 F.2d 862·
11th Cir.·
1984-08-30
·cited 72×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress electronic surveillance evidence, admitting evidence of personal cocaine use, instructing the jury on the definition of an enterprise, or in limiting closing arguments. It also held that a RICO c
-
798 F.2d 902·
6th Cir.·
1986-08-20
·cited 64×
The court held that out-of-court statements offered to prove falsity or neither truth nor falsity are not hearsay, business records are admissible under Rule 803(6) even if foundation is laid by an agent, and evidence of personal use of corporate funds is relevant to a scheme to
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752 F.2d 777·
2d Cir.·
1985-01-07
·cited 64×
The court held that the RICO and mail fraud convictions were unconstitutional due to a constructive amendment of the indictment, where the defendant was convicted of a scheme to create a corporate cash fund, not the scheme to extract bribes and convert corporate funds as charged.
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587 F.2d 340·
6th Cir.·
1978-11-30
·cited 62×
The court held that a fatal variance existed between the indictment and the proof presented at trial, requiring reversal of the conviction.
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850 F.2d 1557·
11th Cir.·
1988-08-04
·cited 61×
The court held that the jury instructions did not constructively amend the indictment and that inconsistent verdicts in a conspiracy case are permissible.
-
807 F.2d 719·
8th Cir.·
1986-12-16
·cited 60×
The court affirmed the convictions, finding no error in the denial of the motion to suppress evidence, the trial judge's conduct, or the refusal to sever tax charges from drug charges.
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568 F.2d 1049·
3d Cir.·
1977-11-29
·cited 56×
The court held that the admission of evidence of other crimes, not charged in the indictment and not discussed in the grand jury testimony, amounted to a constructive amendment of the indictment, requiring a new trial.
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502 F.2d 526·
3d Cir.·
1974-08-06
·cited 56×
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661 F.2d 488·
5th Cir.·
1981-11-16
·cited 54×
The court held that the admission of diazapam evidence was not a prejudicial variance or a violation of Rule 404(b), and the denial of a new trial based on newly discovered evidence was proper.
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601 F.2d 1279·
5th Cir.·
1979-09-04
·cited 54×
The court held that the district judge's violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30, by requiring objections to jury instructions to be made in the jury's presence, constituted reversible error when it led to a constructive amendment of the indictment regarding an essenti
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558 F.2d 330·
6th Cir.·
1977-06-14
·cited 54×
The court held that forcing a defendant to defend against a felony-murder charge, not included in the indictment, constitutes a constructive amendment that violates due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, even in a state court trial.
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860 F.2d 1370·
7th Cir.·
1988-10-17
·cited 50×
The court held that the indictment sufficiently stated an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and that the jury instructions did not constructively amend the indictment. The court also affirmed that 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) is a sentence-enhancement provision, not a substantive offense.
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666 F.2d 1375·
11th Cir.·
1982-02-01
·cited 47×
The court held that the defendant's conviction for attempted aircraft piracy was constructively amended from the indictment because the government proved threats and intimidation, not the charged force and violence, and that the conviction should be reduced to the lesser included
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483 F.2d 88·
3d Cir.·
1973-06-20
·cited 46×
The court held that a defendant convicted as an aider and abettor cannot be convicted if the named principal in the indictment has been acquitted of the substantive offense.
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843 F.2d 421·
10th Cir.·
1988-04-01
·cited 45×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant organized, supervised, or managed five or more persons for the Continuing Criminal Enterprise conviction. The court also held that admitting evidence of unindicted offenses did not co
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742 F.2d 1215·
9th Cir.·
1984-09-18
·cited 44×
The court held that the district court erred in granting a judgment of acquittal for Stearns on the conspiracy charge, and that the jury's verdict of conviction on the lesser included offense should be reinstated. The court affirmed all other convictions.
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874 F.2d 1402·
11th Cir.·
1989-06-07
·cited 43×
The court held that while an indictment must provide notice of specific acts for a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) conviction, the defendant's actual notice of the acts used to prove the continuing series element satisfied due process.
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913 F.2d 407·
7th Cir.·
1990-09-17
·cited 42×
The court held that Auerbach's involvement in the drug conspiracy made him liable under the Travel Act for co-conspirators' interstate travel, and that Helish's convictions for conspiracy and possession were supported by sufficient evidence despite minor variances in the indictme
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904 F.2d 365·
6th Cir.·
1990-06-01
·cited 42×
The court affirmed Smoot's conviction but vacated the sentences of both defendants, remanding for resentencing.
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726 F.2d 584·
9th Cir.·
1984-02-24
·cited 41×
A variance between the indictment and proof regarding the identity of the victim does not constitute a constructive amendment of the indictment if it does not affect the defendant's substantial rights. A confession requires corroboration, but the corroborating evidence need not i
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816 F.2d 94·
2d Cir.·
1987-04-09
·cited 40×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove the defendants intended to defraud their customers, a necessary element for mail and wire fraud convictions.
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700 F.2d 196·
5th Cir.·
1983-02-28
·cited 39×
The court held that the jury instructions were proper, the exclusion of the wife's testimony was harmless error, the co-conspirator's statement was admissible, the evidence was sufficient for conviction, and the judge's questioning did not deny a fair trial.
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659 F.2d 714·
6th Cir.·
1981-09-17
·cited 39×
The dissenting judge would hold that permitting the jury to convict based on threats of physical harm did not constitute a constructive amendment to the indictment, as it did not change the basic theory of the alleged conspiratorial agreement.
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790 F.2d 1290·
6th Cir.·
1986-05-12
·cited 38×
The court held that the dismissal of mail-fraud counts was improper because the indictment sufficiently alleged the two essential elements of the offense, even if proof of the second element (use of mails to execute scheme) might be challenging for legally-compelled mailings.
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760 F.2d 813·
7th Cir.·
1985-04-25
·cited 36×
The court held that the trial court did not constructively amend the indictment, and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. However, the restitution condition imposed on probation for the false statement count was vacated.
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837 F.2d 975·
11th Cir.·
1988-02-17
·cited 35×
A jury instruction that allows conviction based on elements of an uncharged crime constructively amends the indictment, violating the Fifth Amendment, and such an error cannot be harmless.
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742 F.2d 1286·
11th Cir.·
1984-09-27
·cited 35×
A reasonable trier of fact could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for conspiracy to transport stolen paintings.
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948 F.2d 370·
7th Cir.·
1991-11-21
·cited 34×
The court held that the police's forced entry complied with the knock-and-announce statute, and that the defendant's argument regarding constructive amendment of the indictment was not preserved for appeal.
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914 F.2d 934·
7th Cir.·
1990-09-28
·cited 34×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the jury selection and composition did not violate the defendants' Sixth Amendment rights, and that evidence of prior bad acts was properly admitted.
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730 F.2d 221·
5th Cir.·
1984-04-05
·cited 34×
A discrepancy between the indictment and the proof presented at trial constitutes a variance, not a constructive amendment, if it does not effectively modify an essential element of the offense and does not prejudice the defendant's substantial rights.
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786 F.2d 1330·
7th Cir.·
1986-03-26
·cited 32×
The court affirmed the defendant's conviction, finding the indictment sufficient and no fatal variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial.
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744 F.2d 701·
9th Cir.·
1984-10-04
·cited 32×
The court held that the indictment sufficiently alleged mail fraud and that the denial of a continuance and a bill of particulars did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
-
744 F.2d 647·
8th Cir.·
1984-09-28
·cited 30×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove an extension of credit, the variance between the indictment and evidence was not prejudicial, the government did not withhold material exculpatory evidence, the juror's voir dire answers were honest, and the sentence was no
-
739 F.2d 1175·
7th Cir.·
1984-07-02
·cited 30×
The court held that the jury instructions did not constructively amend the indictment and that the limitations on cross-examination did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
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932 F.2d 868·
10th Cir.·
1991-05-03
·cited 28×
The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the jury instructions adequately addressed the variance between the indictment and the evidence of multiple conspiracies, and that the joinder of defendants and offenses, as well as the denial of suppression motions,
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758 F.2d 774·
1st Cir.·
1985-03-29
·cited 28×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that the appellant was guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, at least as an aider and abetter.
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718 F.2d 1511·
10th Cir.·
1983-09-30
·cited 28×
The court held that the indictment was not constructively amended by jury instructions on a depletion of assets theory for Hobbs Act violations, and that the mailings of county warrants were sufficient to support mail fraud convictions.
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549 F.2d 1088·
6th Cir.·
1977-02-22
·cited 28×
The court held that the trial court did not err in issuing an Allen charge, in its jury instructions regarding the presumption of truthfulness, or in limiting cross-examination of a key witness. Appellant Cisternino's claims of constructive amendment of the indictment, ineffectiv
-
887 F.2d 267·
D.C. Cir.·
1989-10-10
·cited 27×
The court held that admitting privileged attorney-client communications was not harmless error, requiring reversal of White's conviction, and that venue for Finotti's bribery conviction was improper in the District of Columbia.
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874 F.2d 1136·
7th Cir.·
1989-04-21
·cited 27×
The court held that a law enforcement agent can be a qualified witness to authenticate business records under Rule 803(6) if they understand the record-keeping system, and that supplemental jury instructions were proper.