-
897 F.2d 1329·
5th Cir.·
1990-03-29
·cited 26×
The court affirmed the conviction for conspiracy and endeavoring to obstruct justice but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.
-
810 F.2d 518·
5th Cir.·
1987-02-23
·cited 26×
The court held that reinstating dismissed indictment counts after a failed plea bargain does not violate double jeopardy, and conviction for a lesser included offense not explicitly indicted is permissible.
-
804 F.2d 920·
6th Cir.·
1986-10-30
·cited 26×
The court held that the admission of evidence regarding the beef hijacking did not constitute a constructive amendment or prejudicial variance of the indictment, nor did it violate the government's 'open file' policy. Furthermore, the court found no abuse of discretion in limitin
-
752 F.2d 749·
1st Cir.·
1985-01-16
·cited 26×
The court held that while the jury verdict of guilt for conspiracy to manufacture amphetamine stands, the concurrent sentences on multiple conspiracy counts were improper and require resentencing.
-
739 F.2d 385·
8th Cir.·
1984-07-24
·cited 26×
The court held that a jury instruction constructively amended the indictment by allowing conviction for acts not charged, thereby prejudicing the defendant.
-
728 F.2d 887·
7th Cir.·
1984-02-21
·cited 26×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the extortion conviction under the Hobbs Act, as the defendant exploited the victim's fear of economic harm, and that the trial court did not err in denying disclosure of grand jury materials.
-
576 F.2d 511·
3d Cir.·
1978-04-13
·cited 26×
The court held that the Speech or Debate Clause does not bar prosecution for agreeing to accept bribes in exchange for legislative acts, as the crime is the corrupt promise, not the performance of the act. It also found that the district court's evidentiary ruling did not constru
-
962 F.2d 894·
9th Cir.·
1992-04-23
·cited 24×
The court held that the defendant's conviction for assault on a federal officer and using a firearm during a crime of violence was affirmed, but his sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing due to an improper upward departure.
-
862 F.2d 92·
6th Cir.·
1988-11-25
·cited 24×
The court held that the admission of evidence of post-conspiracy cocaine possession was an abuse of discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it was not probative of any material issue other than character and thus was inadmissible 'other crimes' evidence.
-
858 F.2d 94·
2d Cir.·
1988-09-21
·cited 24×
The court held that admitting evidence of a loan not specified in the indictment, without a limiting instruction, impermissibly broadened the charges against the defendant, constituting a constructive amendment of the indictment.
-
758 F.2d 30·
1st Cir.·
1985-03-29
·cited 24×
The court held that the admission of evidence concerning a second extortion attempt did not constructively amend the indictment and was admissible under the co-conspirator exception to hearsay, and did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
-
705 F.2d 662·
2d Cir.·
1983-04-14
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court erred in finding a prejudicial variance between the indictment and the proof at trial, and that the government's evidence substantially conformed to the charges.
-
812 F.2d 920·
5th Cir.·
1986-12-15
·cited 23×
The court held that the appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel, as there was no actual conflict of interest, and that the government's theory of prosecution did not constructively amend the indictment.
-
951 So. 2d 784·
Fla.·
2006-12-14
·cited 22×
Paul Hildwin appeals the denial of a motion to vacate his first-degree murder conviction and death sentence based on newly discovered DNA evidence excluding him as the source of bodily fluids found at the crime scene. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial, h
-
945 F.2d 825·
5th Cir.·
1991-10-10
·cited 22×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence supported a single conspiracy and that the admission of evidence predating the indictment's timeframe was permissible.
-
899 F.2d 1111·
11th Cir.·
1990-04-30
·cited 22×
The court held that the trial judge's supplemental jury instruction constructively amended the indictment by allowing the jury to convict appellants on the basis of an enterprise different from the one specified in the indictment.
-
869 F.2d 1361·
10th Cir.·
1988-10-17
·cited 22×
The dissenting judge argues that the conviction should be reversed because the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment and because the jury was not instructed that it must unanimously agree on the specific criminal act committed.
-
770 F.2d 1447·
9th Cir.·
1985-09-10
·cited 22×
The court held that the defendant's prior non-immunized statements provided an independent source for evidence, and that the indictment was not fatally varied from the proof presented at trial.
-
592 F.2d 496·
9th Cir.·
1978-11-17
·cited 21×
The court held that the defendant's conviction for conspiracy was affirmed because any errors, including prosecutorial misconduct and issues with the indictment, were either abandoned, harmless, or did not prejudice the defendant's substantial rights.
-
934 F.2d 599·
5th Cir.·
1991-06-13
·cited 20×
The court affirmed Baytank's RCRA convictions, granted the government's mandamus petition for special assessments, and reversed/affirmed parts of the government's appeal regarding other defendants and counts.
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778 F.2d 1117·
5th Cir.·
1985-12-20
·cited 20×
The court held that allowing the jury to convict based on misrepresentations about residence, when the indictment only charged misrepresentations about name, constructively amended the indictment, violating the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to be tried only on charges present
-
931 F.3d 1245·
11th Cir.·
2019-07-30
·cited 19×
Isaac Feldman invested in Miami Beach nightclubs that defrauded customers through various schemes, and after an initial conviction was reversed, he was retried and convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed his convictions and
-
877 F.2d 762·
9th Cir.·
1989-06-08
·cited 19×
The court held that the district court did not constructively amend the indictment, properly allocated the burden of proof, had sufficient evidence for conviction, and did not err in refusing to produce agent's notes.
-
708 F.2d 209·
6th Cir.·
1983-05-20
·cited 18×
The court held that the Hobbs Act does not apply to an employer's use of wrongful means to achieve a legitimate management objective, such as reducing labor costs, even if it involves modifying a collective bargaining agreement.
-
704 F.2d 300·
6th Cir.·
1983-04-05
·cited 18×
The court held that cumulative punishments for conspiracy, bribery, and Travel Act violations do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, as each offense requires proof of distinct elements and Congress intended for separate punishments. The court also found no constructive amendm
-
955 F.2d 479·
7th Cir.·
1992-01-30
·cited 16×
The court affirmed convictions, but the concurring opinion expressed concerns about the circuit's rule on admitting other-crimes evidence when intent is not disputed.
-
952 F.2d 90·
5th Cir.·
1992-01-14
·cited 16×
The court held that the $1,000,000 fine was imposed in violation of the ex post facto clause because the offenses occurred in 1984, prior to the enactment of the statute under which the fine was calculated. The conviction and restitution were affirmed.
-
57 So. 3d 944·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2011-03-30
·cited 15×
The court held that the trial court did not err in its jury instructions, admitting 911 tapes and autopsy photographs, nor did the convictions violate double jeopardy.
-
971 F.2d 1302·
7th Cir.·
1992-08-06
·cited 14×
The court held that the admission of prior bad acts evidence under Rule 404(b) was not an abuse of discretion, and the district court properly considered the probative value against prejudice when deciding on redaction of offensive language. The court also found no abuse of discr
-
964 F.2d 899·
9th Cir.·
1992-05-15
·cited 14×
The court held that the wiretap evidence was admissible, the district court did not err in evidentiary rulings, the evidence was sufficient for conviction, and the jury instructions were adequate.
-
960 F.2d 426·
5th Cir.·
1992-04-29
·cited 14×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for conspiracy and attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, and that the admission of audio tapes and transcripts was not an abuse of discretion.
-
889 F.2d 1168·
1st Cir.·
1989-11-16
·cited 14×
The court held that the defendants' extortionate conduct had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to satisfy the Hobbs Act's jurisdictional requirement, and that the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment or in excluding certain medical te
-
823 F.2d 429·
11th Cir.·
1987-08-03
·cited 14×
-
783 F.2d 144·
8th Cir.·
1986-02-10
·cited 14×
The court held that the jury instructions did not constructively amend the indictment and any variance between the indictment and proof was not prejudicial.
-
741 F.2d 570·
3d Cir.·
1984-07-27
·cited 14×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants used telephones to facilitate a heroin conspiracy, but affirmed one defendant's conspiracy conviction.
-
563 F.2d 248·
6th Cir.·
1977-10-07
·cited 14×
The court held that the appellant was not denied due process because the common law indictment form used in Tennessee permitted evidence of underlying felonies to prove premeditation for first-degree murder, and thus he received fair notice of the charges.
-
960 F.2d 830·
9th Cir.·
1992-03-31
·cited 13×
The court held that evidence of foreign manufacture of a firearm is sufficient to prove it traveled in interstate commerce for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and that the inscription on the firearm was not hearsay. However, the court found that the district court erred in determ
-
872 F.2d 1231·
6th Cir.·
1989-04-10
·cited 12×
The court should require a new trial on Counts I and II due to the extreme prejudice caused by admitting evidence of six prior violent felonies.
-
870 F.2d 809·
2d Cir.·
1989-03-15
·cited 12×
The court held that the joinder of defendants and offenses was proper under Rule 8(b) and that the district court did not err in denying severance motions. The court also found no constructive amendment of the indictment and that the "two-inference" jury charge, while improper, w
-
849 F.2d 723·
2d Cir.·
1988-06-10
·cited 12×
The court held that the jury instructions and evidence presented constructively amended the indictment, potentially convicting the defendant of an offense other than that charged by the grand jury.
-
848 F.2d 1040·
10th Cir.·
1988-06-06
·cited 12×
The court held that a presumptively prejudicial juror contact was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt, and that the jury instructions did not impermissibly amend the indictment.
-
756 F.2d 353·
5th Cir.·
1985-03-20
·cited 12×
The court held that the conviction must be reversed because the government failed to prove the bank was a 'member bank' as alleged in the indictment, and the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment by allowing conviction based on the bank being an 'insured bank'.
-
462 F.2d 1080·
3d Cir.·
1972-06-05
·cited 12×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and willfully failed to report a change in his status to his draft board.
-
979 F.2d 1204·
7th Cir.·
1992-11-12
·cited 11×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the RICO conspiracy indictment was sufficiently specific, the admission of evidence regarding certain murders did not constitute a constructive amendment or violate Rule 403, and the evidence supported the extortion convictions and
-
978 F.2d 1520·
9th Cir.·
1992-10-28
·cited 10×
The court held that the district court's failure to adopt the presentence report or tie its sentence to the Guidelines requires vacating the sentence and remanding for resentencing. It also found certain evidentiary errors to be harmless.
-
947 F.2d 139·
5th Cir.·
1991-10-31
·cited 10×
The court held that the government can establish the "intent to defraud or mislead" requirement for a felony conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 333(b) by showing the defendant intended to defraud or mislead a government agency, not necessarily the purchaser of the drugs. The court also
-
945 F.2d 1214·
2d Cir.·
1991-09-23
·cited 10×
The court held that imposing a sentence exceeding six months did not violate due process, and that the district court erred by excluding a prior state conviction from the criminal history calculation under the Sentencing Guidelines.
-
934 F.2d 936·
8th Cir.·
1991-05-30
·cited 10×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of subsequent drug transactions under Rule 404(b) and testimony regarding Frank Noel as background information, and that these did not constructively amend the indictment.
-
916 F.2d 595·
10th Cir.·
1990-10-18
·cited 10×
A constructive amendment of the indictment occurred when the jury instruction allowed conviction for first-degree criminal sexual penetration based on digital penetration prior to the statutory change, which constituted a lesser offense, thus requiring reversal of that conviction
-
915 F.2d 326·
8th Cir.·
1990-09-12
·cited 10×
The court held that the admission of a co-conspirator's guilty plea as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt, despite a cautionary instruction, constituted reversible error due to its overwhelming prejudicial effect.