-
879 F.2d 706·
10th Cir.·
1989-06-21
·cited 60×
The court held that Melton's trial testimony was not a motivating factor for his discharge, and that his disclosure of a recorded conversation did not create a protected liberty interest. However, the court agreed that his disclosure of the tape was a matter of public concern and
-
777 F.2d 825·
2d Cir.·
1985-11-21
·cited 40×
The court held that while the complaint adequately alleged a property interest, it did not sufficiently allege a request for a pretermination hearing, and thus remanded to allow amendment. The court also noted that Regan's actions were not random or unauthorized as per Parratt/Hu
-
804 F.2d 327·
5th Cir.·
1986-11-17
·cited 38×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to plead his procedural due process claim with sufficient particularity to overcome qualified immunity, but may replead a substantive due process claim for retaliation.
-
829 F.2d 255·
1st Cir.·
1987-09-22
·cited 37×
The court held that the plaintiff was in the midst of administrative proceedings when she filed her federal suit, and thus should have exhausted state remedies before proceeding in federal court.
-
891 F.2d 1454·
10th Cir.·
1989-12-15
·cited 36×
The court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff did not demonstrate that their actions violated clearly established constitutional rights regarding pretermination due process hearings.
-
777 F.2d 567·
10th Cir.·
1985-11-14
·cited 36×
The court held that the plaintiff's suspensions implicated a property interest protected by due process, and that the demotion hearing did not provide a meaningful opportunity to respond to charges. The court affirmed the dismissal of the liberty interest claim regarding suspensi
-
764 F.2d 1412·
11th Cir.·
1985-07-09
·cited 31×
The court held that while pre-termination procedures were sufficient, the post-termination procedures were not, and that the employee had a property interest in his continued employment.
-
928 F.2d 920·
10th Cir.·
1991-03-19
·cited 30×
The court held that the district court's instruction on stigmatization was erroneous, but found the error harmless. The dissent also addressed the falsity requirement and pre-termination hearing rights.
-
761 F.2d 657·
Fed. Cir.·
1985-05-02
·cited 26×
The court held that the agency did not violate due process by having the same official propose and decide on removal, and that the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence.
-
858 F.2d 40·
1st Cir.·
1988-09-30
·cited 24×
The court held that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity from damages for the procedural due process claim, but not for the First Amendment claims, as factual issues regarding motive remained.
-
849 F.2d 1004·
6th Cir.·
1988-06-20
·cited 24×
-
814 F.2d 1055·
5th Cir.·
1987-04-20
·cited 24×
The court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred suits against state entities DHHR and Charity, and that Dr. Darlak received sufficient due process regarding his suspension from hospital privileges.
-
863 F.2d 461·
6th Cir.·
1988-12-19
·cited 18×
The court held that the plaintiff did not waive her right to a jury trial on her section 1981 and 1983 claims, as the waiver was not clear, knowing, or voluntary.
-
826 F.2d 740·
8th Cir.·
1987-08-12
·cited 18×
The court held that the district court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the employee did not receive adequate procedural due process prior to termination. The court also held that the governing Supreme Court decision applied retroactively and that th
-
873 F.2d 774·
5th Cir.·
1989-05-15
·cited 16×
The court held that a foreclosing mortgagee acting under Louisiana's foreclosure procedures, which allow for the extinguishment of subordinate interests without actual notice to the holder of that interest, can be considered a state actor for Due Process Clause purposes, and that
-
832 F.2d 332·
5th Cir.·
1987-11-18
·cited 16×
The court held that a conspiracy claim does not extend the statute of limitations beyond the accrual of individual wrongful acts, and that alleged depression is insufficient to toll the statute unless it arises at the time of accrual and renders the plaintiff unable to manage aff
-
881 F.2d 1018·
11th Cir.·
1989-08-24
·cited 15×
The court held that the employee's claim that he was denied a right to notice of his appellate rights was deficient because he had actual notice of the rules and the due process clause does not require a state to advise an employee of appellate rights in a termination letter.
-
938 F.2d 860·
8th Cir.·
1991-07-10
·cited 14×
A plaintiff awarded back pay for a procedural due process violation must prove that the deprivation of property would not have occurred if proper procedures had been followed; otherwise, back pay is a windfall.
-
892 F.2d 653·
7th Cir.·
1990-01-04
·cited 14×
The court held that the Veteran's Administration (VA) cannot deny a pre-termination hearing to an employee based on its own subsequent determination that the appointment was in violation of VA regulations, as Congress mandated such determinations be made at a pre-termination hear
-
822 F.2d 364·
3d Cir.·
1987-06-24
·cited 12×
The court held that while the employee likely demonstrated a procedural due process violation under Loudermill, he failed to show irreparable harm, thus the preliminary injunction was improperly granted.
-
799 F.2d 976·
5th Cir.·
1986-09-12
·cited 11×
The court held that a constructive discharge claim under § 1983 requires proof that the employer intended to force the employee's resignation to avoid a pretermination hearing, and that damages for mental anguish and physical pain cannot be awarded separately in a procedural due
-
925 F.2d 1069·
8th Cir.·
1991-01-09
·cited 10×
The court held that the discharged employee had a property interest in his job under Iowa law and was denied procedural due process, but remanded for recalculation of prejudgment interest.
-
882 F.2d 200·
6th Cir.·
1989-05-05
·cited 10×
The court held that the plaintiff, as a city attorney serving at the pleasure of the council, did not possess a property interest in continued employment and that the name-clearing hearing provided was constitutionally adequate.
-
799 F.2d 825·
2d Cir.·
1986-08-21
·cited 9×
The court held that the plaintiff's property interest claim was barred by the law of the case doctrine and that he did not possess a liberty interest sufficient to warrant a formal name-clearing hearing, as he had already received adequate process. The judgment awarding damages f
-
918 F.2d 1336·
8th Cir.·
1990-11-15
·cited 8×
A public employee with a property interest in employment is entitled to a pre-termination hearing, and back pay can be awarded as equitable relief to vindicate this right without a finding that the employee would not have been terminated had a hearing been held.
-
901 F.2d 491·
6th Cir.·
1990-04-10
·cited 8×
The court held that the City afforded the employee minimal due process protections required by Loudermill, and therefore, the grant of summary judgment to the employee was reversed.
-
868 F.2d 74·
3d Cir.·
1989-02-17
·cited 8×
The court held that while officers had a reasonable suspicion for urinalysis, they were denied procedural due process by not being informed of the evidence against them and not being given an adequate opportunity to respond to dismissal charges. The court also found that the pres
-
819 F.2d 864·
8th Cir.·
1987-06-01
·cited 8×
As a matter of law, the plaintiff had no constitutionally protected property right to continued employment as a patrolman, and thus could be discharged without procedural due process.
-
810 F.2d 1030·
11th Cir.·
1987-02-19
·cited 8×
The court held that alleged procedural errors in an administrative hearing, where state remedies exist, do not constitute a federal due process violation. However, a conclusory equal protection claim may survive dismissal.
-
775 F.2d 250·
8th Cir.·
1985-10-17
·cited 8×
The court held that a student's academic dismissal was not a violation of due process, as there was a rational basis for the university's decision and the procedures afforded were adequate.
-
958 F.2d 1339·
6th Cir.·
1992-03-19
·cited 7×
The court held that the grievance procedure, even with an intermediate divided board, still constitutes a process leading to final and binding arbitration under Ohio law.
-
915 F.2d 424·
9th Cir.·
1990-09-25
·cited 6×
The court held that the City violated the officer's due process rights by removing his merit pay without a hearing, but that his claim for emotional distress damages was barred by a prior workers' compensation award.
-
909 F.2d 94·
4th Cir.·
1990-07-19
·cited 6×
The court held that the plaintiff received constitutionally adequate pre-deprivation process and had sufficient post-deprivation remedies available, thus failing to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
-
874 F.2d 736·
10th Cir.·
1989-05-10
·cited 6×
The court held that the district court's summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's property interest claim must be reversed because the Curry County Personnel Policies, combined with subsequent Supreme Court and circuit precedent, created a genuine issue of material fact regard
-
856 F.2d 203·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-08-23
·cited 6×
Excepted Service employees, like Garrow, who are not veterans, do not possess a property right in their continued federal employment and are not entitled to pre-termination notice and a hearing when discharged for insubordination.
-
823 F.2d 1429·
10th Cir.·
1987-07-20
·cited 6×
A public employee's expectation of continued employment, derived from a state statute requiring termination only 'for cause,' creates a constitutionally protected property interest, even if the stated reason for termination is lack of funds or work.
-
944 F.2d 483·
9th Cir.·
1991-09-06
·cited 5×
The court held that the plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office or credenza due to extreme workplace security measures, and his discharge from the Naval Reserve was not unconstitutional. The court affirmed the summary judgments.
-
899 F.2d 687·
7th Cir.·
1990-04-13
·cited 4×
The court held that the procedures provided by the city satisfied due process requirements, as the injured-on-duty pay was a property interest, but a full evidentiary hearing was not constitutionally mandated.
-
848 F.2d 5·
1st Cir.·
1988-05-27
·cited 4×
The court held that the plaintiff's discharge did not violate the Due Process Clause because he did not possess a property interest in his employment under Puerto Rico law.
-
835 F.2d 497·
3d Cir.·
1987-12-15
·cited 4×
The court held that the prison's administrative segregation rule created a state law expectation triggering federal procedural due process protections, and summary judgment was therefore error.
-
819 F.2d 889·
9th Cir.·
1987-06-11
·cited 4×
The court held that a probationary teacher dismissed mid-contract may have been deprived of property and liberty interests without due process, requiring reversal of summary judgment.
-
817 F.2d 999·
2d Cir.·
1987-05-04
·cited 4×
The dissenting judge argued that a statement in an employment letter specifying service 'at the pleasure of the supervisor for the first two years' constitutes an express limitation on the employer's right to terminate, thus precluding summary judgment.
-
812 F.2d 887·
4th Cir.·
1987-03-03
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court did not err in finding no discrimination, that procedural due process claims were either waived or without merit, and that reviewing the administrative record during a de novo trial was permissible.
-
806 F.2d 778·
8th Cir.·
1986-12-02
·cited 4×
The court held that the Arkansas legislature's amendment to the civil service law extinguished the property interest in continued employment for sheriffs' department majors, thus they were not entitled to pre-termination due process.
-
798 F.2d 722·
5th Cir.·
1986-08-27
·cited 4×
-
980 F.2d 399·
6th Cir.·
1992-11-25
·cited 2×
The court held that a district court is not required to search the entire record for genuine issues of material fact when the non-moving party fails to respond to a summary judgment motion, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment.
-
947 F.2d 903·
10th Cir.·
1991-10-29
·cited 2×
Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity when the plaintiff's alleged rights were not clearly established under the relevant state law at the time of the conduct.
-
890 F.2d 831·
6th Cir.·
1989-11-29
·cited 2×
The court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no direct evidence or reasonable inference of a conspiracy by the private citizen defendant.
-
763 F.2d 366·
8th Cir.·
1985-06-06
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the procedural due process claim, requiring reconsideration in light of Loudermill.
-
87 F. Supp. 2d 1308·
S.D. Fla.·
2000-03-02
·cited 1×
The court held that the plaintiff received adequate due process, including a meaningful opportunity to clear his name, and therefore his liberty interest was not violated.