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657 F.2d 909·
7th Cir.·
1981-08-14
·cited 24×
Federal courts must conduct a trial de novo for Title VII claims, and prior state administrative or judicial proceedings do not have preclusive effect, even if the plaintiff sought state judicial review. Attorneys' fees are recoverable for work done in state proceedings that are
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591 F.2d 615·
10th Cir.·
1979-02-12
·cited 24×
An order dismissing a complaint for lack of prosecution, when intended by the district court to dismiss the entire action, is an appealable order.
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582 F.2d 45·
9th Cir.·
1978-09-13
·cited 24×
A claim for sex discrimination requires either facial discrimination or discriminatory effects; allegations of discriminatory intent alone are insufficient if the conduct is otherwise gender-neutral.
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710 So. 2d 618·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1998-03-27
·cited 23×
George Scholz appealed a judgment in favor of the Orlando Magic on his Title VII discrimination claims. The court affirmed summary judgment dismissing his retaliation claim but reversed directed verdicts on his wrongful discharge, failure to contract, and defamation claims, findi
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763 F.2d 851·
7th Cir.·
1985-06-04
·cited 23×
An action for back pay under Title VII is not barred by res judicata when the plaintiff previously obtained administrative relief affirmed by a state court, if state law did not permit back pay awards at the time of the administrative decision. A motion for attorneys' fees for st
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731 F.2d 698·
10th Cir.·
1984-04-09
·cited 22×
The court held that the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence of discriminatory intent to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, and thus the district court properly granted summary judgment.
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609 F.2d 1200·
6th Cir.·
1979-12-03
·cited 22×
The court held that the plaintiff's Title VII claim was time-barred because neither the Michigan Civil Rights Commission nor the EEOC received a charge within the applicable statutory periods.
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839 F.2d 1132·
5th Cir.·
1988-03-18
·cited 21×
The court held that a Title VII claimant's duty to mitigate damages does not require them to remain in a non-comparable position, and that the magistrate erred in tolling back pay based on resignations from such positions.
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839 F.2d 18·
2d Cir.·
1988-02-04
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court erred in finding a procedural bar to the plaintiffs' disparate impact claim, and that the claim deserved a full evaluation.
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805 F.2d 203·
6th Cir.·
1986-11-17
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court did not err in finding that plaintiffs failed to establish their claim of racial discrimination under the disparate treatment theory and did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider the disparate impact theory.
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787 F.2d 943·
4th Cir.·
1986-04-10
·cited 20×
The court held that a Title VII charge is untimely if not filed with the EEOC within 180 days, unless the claimant initially instituted proceedings with a state agency, which did not occur here.
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735 F.2d 991·
6th Cir.·
1984-06-01
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court's finding that the plaintiff was not qualified for the Engineer II position was clearly erroneous, establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in failure to promote. The court affirmed the district court's findings on all other claims.
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698 F.2d 1019·
9th Cir.·
1983-02-09
·cited 20×
The court held that the plaintiff had standing to sue under Title VII and sections 1981 and 1985(3) for discrimination in contract rejection, even if he was an independent contractor or the corporation was the primary applicant.
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633 F.2d 1232·
6th Cir.·
1980-10-24
·cited 20×
The court held that summary judgment was improperly granted because the EEOC presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the company's seniority system was maintained in a discriminatory manner.
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469 F.2d 1249·
8th Cir.·
1972-12-04
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statute of limitations, as the filing with the EEOC tolled the limitations period.
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671 F.2d 1072·
8th Cir.·
1982-02-10
·cited 19×
The court held that the district court had jurisdiction over the claims and that the award of prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees was not an abuse of discretion, but vacated and remanded the judgment on liability due to uncertainty about the plaintiff's test score and potent
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547 F.2d 446·
9th Cir.·
1976-10-18
·cited 19×
The court held that the district court had jurisdiction over the retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, but affirmed the dismissal of the sex discrimination claim because affirmative action policies do not require selecting a less qualified woman over a more qualified man.
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873 F.2d 1069·
7th Cir.·
1989-05-03
·cited 18×
The court held that an amendment to a complaint adding a party defendant does not relate back to the original filing date if the new party did not receive notice of the action within the applicable statute of limitations period, and that the 30-day filing requirement for employme
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774 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1985-09-30
·cited 18×
The district court did not clearly err in finding that Dr. Kumar was denied tenure due to race and national origin.
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687 F.2d 74·
5th Cir.·
1982-09-27
·cited 18×
The court held that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the sufficiency of the EEOC charge and the applicability of equitable tolling, precluding summary judgment.
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684 F.2d 577·
8th Cir.·
1982-07-29
·cited 18×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory firing and that the employer articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. The court also affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment on the discriminatory hiri
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645 F.2d 1365·
10th Cir.·
1981-03-11
·cited 18×
A seniority system that perpetuates past discrimination and was created or maintained with discriminatory intent is not a bona fide system protected by Title VII's § 703(h) exemption, and the union can be held liable for its role in maintaining such a system.
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639 F.2d 509·
9th Cir.·
1981-02-12
·cited 18×
The court held that a deputy district attorney position is considered part of the elected District Attorney's personal staff, exempt from Title VII coverage, and that retaliation claims were properly submitted to the jury as First Amendment free speech issues.
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928 F.2d 978·
10th Cir.·
1991-03-26
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the district court's rulings, finding no error in the dismissal of civil rights claims and the granting of summary judgment on remaining claims, and affirming the denial of attorney's fees.
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744 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1984-09-17
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding the evidence supported the conclusion of discriminatory discharge and that the denial of prejudgment interest and fringe benefits was not an abuse of discretion.
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589 F.2d 974·
9th Cir.·
1978-07-07
·cited 16×
The court held that a stipulation of jurisdiction, even after a merits decision, can establish a continuing violation for timeliness purposes if the defendant was aware of the facts supporting it.
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721 F.2d 1412·
D.C. Cir.·
1983-11-29
·cited 15×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights (OHR) was an agent of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or had apparent autho
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663 F.2d 1268·
4th Cir.·
1981-10-21
·cited 15×
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding that the plaintiffs had established claims of racial discrimination in promotion and constructive discharge, and that the named plaintiffs were appropriate class representatives.
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788 F.2d 1485·
11th Cir.·
1986-05-09
·cited 14×
The court held that the exclusion of evidence of prior discrimination was an abuse of discretion that substantially affected the appellant's ability to prove her claims, and that the sex discrimination claim also warranted further consideration regarding failure to reinstate.
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785 F.2d 1396·
9th Cir.·
1986-03-27
·cited 14×
The court held that the plaintiffs' claims were timely filed, administrative remedies were exhausted, and the district court's finding of intentional wage discrimination was not clearly erroneous.
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773 F.2d 561·
4th Cir.·
1985-09-25
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court's orders prohibiting communication with class members were legally erroneous, and its finding that Bloomsburg's preference for experienced labor constituted a business necessity was clearly erroneous.
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735 F.2d 38·
2d Cir.·
1984-05-23
·cited 14×
An employee's claim that his employer retaliated against him for filing a racial discrimination complaint is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The jury instructions and verdict form adequately presented this claim.
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730 F.2d 306·
5th Cir.·
1984-04-23
·cited 14×
The court held that while educational requirements were job-related and not discriminatory, written examinations and selection from eligibility certificates did have a disparate impact on black applicants, violating Title VII. The court reversed certain injunctive relief and cost
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629 F.2d 773·
2d Cir.·
1980-07-24
·cited 14×
Regulations issued by HEW concerning sex discrimination in educational employment are valid under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.
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62 F. Supp. 2d 1344·
S.D. Fla.·
1999-02-12
·cited 13×
The court held that the plaintiff's claims were barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for failing to establish a prima facie case of retaliation or pretextual discrimination.
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902 F. Supp. 1503·
M.D. Fla.·
1995-03-08
·cited 13×
The court held that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the plaintiff was subjected to racial discrimination and retaliation, thus denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
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869 F.2d 1033·
7th Cir.·
1989-02-22
·cited 12×
The court held that a police officer does not have a constitutionally protected property interest in a particular rank on a promotional eligibility roster, and the district court abused its discretion by ordering promotion without a showing that the corrected ranking was improper
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750 F.2d 520·
6th Cir.·
1984-12-14
·cited 12×
The court affirmed the district court's findings of individual constructive discharge and class-wide discrimination, but reversed the awards for back pay and attorney fees due to the trial judge's recusal and subsequent reassignment.
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698 F.2d 1003·
9th Cir.·
1983-02-08
·cited 12×
The court held that the sex discrimination claims were untimely because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charges were not filed within the 300-day limit, and the paychecks did not constitute a continuing violation.
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643 F.2d 435·
6th Cir.·
1981-03-09
·cited 12×
A settlement with a state civil rights agency, which resulted in a promotion but no back pay, does not preclude an employee from pursuing a Title VII claim for back pay in federal court.
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628 F.2d 1058·
8th Cir.·
1980-07-30
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court erred in failing to shift the burden of proof to the defendants to show the patrol requirement was necessary for effective job performance.
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568 F.2d 58·
8th Cir.·
1977-12-15
·cited 12×
The court held that the plaintiff's Title VII claim was barred by failure to file a timely EEOC charge, and his § 1981 claim was barred by the Arkansas three-year statute of limitations for actions on liabilities created by statute.
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507 F.2d 1378·
7th Cir.·
1974-12-18
·cited 12×
A local rule allowing a magistrate to be assigned Title VII cases as a master is invalid because it conflicts with statutory provisions requiring judges to hear and determine such cases.
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438 F.2d 935·
8th Cir.·
1971-02-26
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying a preliminary injunction because the full impact of alleged discriminatory seniority practices was unclear on the record, and resolution of complex issues like foreman selection and hiring practices should await a full
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799 F.2d 976·
5th Cir.·
1986-09-12
·cited 11×
The court held that a constructive discharge claim under § 1983 requires proof that the employer intended to force the employee's resignation to avoid a pretermination hearing, and that damages for mental anguish and physical pain cannot be awarded separately in a procedural due
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267 So. 3d 1094·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2019-04-09
·cited 10×
An incident report complaining of a supervisor's unprofessional management style and interpersonal conduct, without allegations of legal violations or specific factual support for conclusory claims of disparate treatment, does not qualify as a protected disclosure under the Whist
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692 F.2d 548·
8th Cir.·
1982-11-12
·cited 10×
Notice of a right-to-sue letter to an attorney's employee does not trigger the ninety-day filing period if the client did not direct the letter be sent to the attorney or the attorney did not personally acknowledge receipt.
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661 F.2d 531·
6th Cir.·
1981-09-23
·cited 10×
The court held that statistical evidence, buttressed by anecdotal proof of discouraged applications, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment regarding promotions and transfers, reversing the district court's dismissal. However, the court affirmed the
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568 F.2d 64·
8th Cir.·
1977-12-16
·cited 10×
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553 F.2d 860·
3d Cir.·
1977-03-23
·cited 10×
The court held that the district court improperly dismissed the complaint without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to conduct discovery on jurisdictional facts.