-
416 F.2d 711·
7th Cir.·
1969-09-26
·cited 236×
The court held that requiring employees to elect between arbitration and a Title VII action was error, and that a 35-pound weight-lifting restriction was not a bona fide occupational qualification. It also held that Title VII actions are class actions for all relief, not just inj
-
678 F.2d 992·
11th Cir.·
1982-06-17
·cited 206×
The court held that the preconditions to filing a Title VII action, such as filing an EEOC complaint and receiving a right-to-sue letter, are not jurisdictional prerequisites and can be subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.
-
482 F.2d 569·
9th Cir.·
1973-07-10
·cited 105×
An employee's resort to union grievance procedures does not bar a subsequent Title VII action, and claims not initially presented to a state agency may be included in a federal complaint if reasonably related to the original charge.
-
501 F.2d 622·
2d Cir.·
1974-06-24
·cited 88×
The court held that court-ordered racial quotas to eradicate past discrimination violate sections 703(j) and 703(c)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as the legislative history clearly shows Congress intended to prohibit racial quotas under any circumstances.
-
428 F.2d 303·
5th Cir.·
1970-06-19
·cited 83×
An employee's utilization of contractual grievance-arbitration procedures does not preclude them from pursuing a Title VII action in federal court, nor does it automatically toll the statute of limitations for filing EEOC charges.
-
462 F.2d 1002·
9th Cir.·
1972-06-20
·cited 80×
The court held that employers acting in good faith reliance on state laws are not deemed to have intentionally violated Title VII, and thus damages for lost wages are not authorized.
-
438 F.2d 757·
3d Cir.·
1971-02-11
·cited 80×
The court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 applies to private employment discrimination and that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not deprive district courts of jurisdiction over § 1981 actions.
-
554 F.2d 876·
8th Cir.·
1977-05-09
·cited 72×
The court held that the Union engaged in racial discrimination by denying seniority rights and charging initiation fees to former CSC employees, and that the statute of limitations did not bar claims for continuing discrimination. The court also affirmed the availability of punit
-
704 F.2d 518·
11th Cir.·
1983-05-02
·cited 71×
A suit under Title VII cannot be maintained against a county tax collector who individually employs fewer than fifteen people, even if the county employs more, unless the county is joined as a party.
-
656 F.2d 553·
10th Cir.·
1981-01-05
·cited 70×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for her claims of discriminatory discharge, unequal pay, and denial of promotion, but that the award of attorney's fees to the defendant was improper.
-
524 F.2d 1058·
8th Cir.·
1975-10-22
·cited 61×
The court affirmed the district court's denial of class certification and individual relief, and its refusal to award attorneys' fees to the defendant.
-
840 F.2d 412·
7th Cir.·
1988-02-05
·cited 57×
The court held that retaliation for filing sex discrimination charges is not sex discrimination, nor does it automatically violate the First Amendment, and that a contingent expectation under an affirmative action plan does not constitute a constitutional property right.
-
787 F.2d 318·
8th Cir.·
1986-03-20
·cited 56×
The court held that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying retroactive competitive seniority and in defining the relevant labor pool for backpay calculations.
-
425 F.2d 702·
6th Cir.·
1970-05-14
·cited 56×
The court held that the 30-day period to file a lawsuit after receiving notice from the EEOC is a mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite and not subject to equitable extension by the courts.
-
565 F.2d 554·
9th Cir.·
1977-11-28
·cited 51×
The court held that while Inda's EEOC charge was timely filed under the 1972 amendments, Moritz's denial of re-employment constituted a separate violation allowing her charge to be considered timely. The order denying class action status was vacated for lack of specificity.
-
881 F.2d 1006·
11th Cir.·
1989-08-24
·cited 46×
The court held that the defendant willfully discriminated based on sex and retaliated against employees for protesting unequal pay, but vacated the damages award for recalculation.
-
674 F.2d 595·
7th Cir.·
1982-02-18
·cited 44×
The court held that attorney's fees can be awarded to a prevailing defendant-appellee for appellate work if the plaintiff's appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
-
550 F.2d 1343·
4th Cir.·
1976-12-28
·cited 44×
The court held that plaintiffs proved a prima facie case of racial discrimination in employment, shifting the burden to the employer to disprove it, and that the district court erred in restricting the class action.
-
667 F.2d 1074·
3d Cir.·
1981-12-01
·cited 42×
The court held that Title VII charges filed after the 180-day period following the promulgation of a discriminatory eligibility roster, but before the roster's use for hiring, were untimely. The court also held that claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 require proof of intentional discr
-
553 F.2d 720·
1st Cir.·
1977-04-25
·cited 42×
The court held that a probationary teacher's notice of intent to return did not create a property interest for procedural due process, but reversed summary judgment on the Title VII claim because the defendant's affidavits did not adequately address the specific reason for the pl
-
517 F.2d 1301·
8th Cir.·
1975-05-27
·cited 42×
The court held that the first letter from the EEOC, stating only that conciliation had failed, did not trigger the 90-day statute of limitations for filing a lawsuit.
-
507 F.2d 1242·
5th Cir.·
1975-02-12
·cited 41×
The court held that the denial of the plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis was erroneous and that the subsequent dismissal for want of prosecution was an abuse of discretion.
-
720 F.2d 505·
8th Cir.·
1983-11-03
·cited 40×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove her claims of racial and sexual discrimination under disparate impact or disparate treatment theories, and that her retaliatory discharge claim lacked merit.
-
532 F.2d 821·
2d Cir.·
1976-03-08
·cited 40×
The court concurred in the result, but the concurring opinion questioned the legality of racial quotas under Title VII.
-
733 F.2d 1373·
10th Cir.·
1984-05-02
·cited 38×
The court held that the appeal was timely filed and that the district court's findings of discrimination and award of damages were supported by the record and applicable law.
-
514 F.2d 594·
9th Cir.·
1975-04-16
·cited 38×
The court held that the plaintiff's claim was barred by her failure to file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC within the statutory 90-day period.
-
743 F.2d 199·
4th Cir.·
1984-08-20
·cited 36×
The court affirmed most of the district court's findings of discrimination and retaliation but vacated class certification for certain groups and remanded the attorneys' fees award.
-
591 F.2d 579·
10th Cir.·
1979-01-22
·cited 36×
The dissenting judge believes the trial court erred by failing to properly apply the McDonnell Douglas test for employment discrimination and by improperly limiting discovery and excluding relevant evidence.
-
479 F.2d 97·
2d Cir.·
1973-05-11
·cited 36×
The court held that while the employer did not err in hiring a more qualified male applicant, it did err by refusing to consider the female applicant for the promotion solely because of her sex.
-
551 F.2d 1136·
8th Cir.·
1977-04-01
·cited 34×
The court held that the plaintiff's sex discrimination claim regarding promotion was timely filed due to a continuing violation, but affirmed the trial court's finding that no discrimination occurred and that a hearsay statement was inadmissible.
-
550 F.2d 364·
6th Cir.·
1977-02-11
·cited 34×
The court held that the termination and/or constructive termination of an employee due to unwed pregnancy constitutes a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court also affirmed the denial of class action status for claims related to the company's pregnancy/
-
480 F.2d 240·
3d Cir.·
1973-05-25
·cited 34×
The court held that while reliance on a conflicting state statute constitutes an intentional violation of Title VII, the award of back pay and injunctive relief remains within the district court's discretion, and in this case, there was no abuse of discretion in denying such reli
-
730 F.2d 653·
11th Cir.·
1984-04-23
·cited 33×
The court held that the district court erred in refusing to order the City to administer a civil service exam and in refusing to award back pay based on a quarterly earnings formula.
-
825 F.2d 977·
6th Cir.·
1987-07-30
·cited 32×
The court held that sanctions against the plaintiff and her attorney were improper because the plaintiff's action was not frivolous or brought in bad faith, and the attorney's conduct did not unreasonably multiply proceedings. The court also reversed the taxation of costs against
-
656 F.2d 1208·
6th Cir.·
1981-08-12
·cited 32×
The court held that the district court erred by failing to conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's findings and recommendations, particularly when objections were raised and a transcript was necessary for proper review.
-
697 F.2d 1297·
9th Cir.·
1982-11-09
·cited 31×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the discrimination claims against the employer and that the shareholder preference plan, as it affects employment terms and conditions, is subject to Title VII. The court also found that the union may be liable for breach
-
676 F.2d 1043·
5th Cir.·
1982-05-24
·cited 30×
The court held that the 180-day filing period for Title VII claims is a statute of limitations, not jurisdictional, and that a continuing violation theory requires actionable conduct within the limitations period, not just the continuing impact of past discrimination. The court a
-
614 F.2d 520·
5th Cir.·
1980-03-28
·cited 30×
The court held that the prior dismissal of an EEOC suit for procedural defects did not bar the plaintiff's subsequent Title VII action, nor did the EEOC's filing of that suit preclude it from issuing a right-to-sue letter. The court also held that the plaintiff's § 1981 claim was
-
585 F.2d 210·
7th Cir.·
1978-09-14
·cited 30×
The court should strictly adhere to the ninety-day jurisdictional prerequisite for filing Title VII suits, as it is a jurisdictional matter not subject to flexible interpretation.
-
581 F.2d 975·
D.C. Cir.·
1978-07-13
·cited 30×
The court held that an employee's acceptance of an agency decision and subsequent request to reopen does not extend the 30-day jurisdictional period for filing a civil action after the final administrative decision.
-
531 F.2d 648·
2d Cir.·
1976-02-19
·cited 30×
The court held that a seniority system, while generally valid, cannot be used to perpetuate past discrimination, and relief is available to those who prove they were improperly denied rightful placement in the seniority hierarchy due to discrimination.
-
685 F.2d 1149·
9th Cir.·
1982-08-31
·cited 28×
The court held that laches is an equitable defense that requires factual findings of inexcusable delay and prejudice, and cannot be decided as a matter of law on an inadequate record, particularly concerning backpay claims.
-
520 F.2d 1312·
8th Cir.·
1975-07-17
·cited 28×
The court held that the 90-day period for filing a Title VII action after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite, and failure to comply deprives the federal court of subject matter jurisdiction.
-
488 F.2d 691·
5th Cir.·
1974-01-21
·cited 28×
The court held that the district court's findings of racial discrimination were clearly erroneous due to a lack of evidentiary support.
-
521 F.2d 881·
4th Cir.·
1971-07-23
·cited 28×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding sex discrimination.
-
763 F.2d 757·
6th Cir.·
1985-05-22
·cited 26×
Orders denying motions for appointment of counsel in Title VII and § 1983 actions are not immediately appealable "final decisions" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
-
746 F.2d 1407·
10th Cir.·
1984-10-22
·cited 26×
Summary judgment was improper because the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish a triable prima facie case of discrimination and to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding pretext for her discharge.
-
589 F.2d 316·
7th Cir.·
1978-12-21
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable injury.
-
744 F.2d 1309·
7th Cir.·
1984-10-02
·cited 25×
The 90-day period for filing a Title VII suit begins to run when the EEOC right-to-sue notice is actually received by the claimant or their attorney, provided certain conditions regarding representation are met.
-
795 F.2d 384·
5th Cir.·
1986-07-21
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court erred by improperly placing the burden on plaintiffs to prove the job-relatedness of discriminatory employment tests, and that the city failed to meet its burden of proving the tests' validity.