525 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 135 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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681 F.2d 1183·
9th Cir.·
1982-07-22
·cited 18×
A postjudgment request for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is not subject to the ten-day time limit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or local rules governing routine costs.
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683 F.2d 1068·
7th Cir.·
1982-07-20
·cited 18×
The court held that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, that no special circumstances rendered the award unjust, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the amount awarded.
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653 F.2d 954·
5th Cir.·
1981-08-17
·cited 18×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying attorneys' fees to prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 based on the cited 'special circumstances'.
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The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant because the civil rights action brought was frivolous and without foundation.
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The court held that an inflation factor adjustment to back pay is barred by sovereign immunity, and attorneys' fees should only be awarded for the case in which the plaintiff prevailed.
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A district court may not reduce an attorney's fee award simply because the plaintiff did not prevail against all named defendants when the claims are related and the plaintiff achieved substantial relief.
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904 F.2d 634·
11th Cir.·
1990-06-28
·cited 17×
The court held that the plaintiff's termination for writing editorials and a letter constituted a violation of her First Amendment free speech rights, and that the award of attorney's fees was proper.
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864 F.2d 113·
11th Cir.·
1989-01-23
·cited 17×
The court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies, and a plaintiff cannot recover attorney's fees under § 1988 if the state entity cannot be held liable on the merits.
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The court held that plaintiffs were prevailing parties entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and that the fees awarded were reasonable, but remanded for determination of additional fees for the appeal.
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677 F.2d 560·
7th Cir.·
1982-04-30
·cited 17×
The court held that the original DMH Form 623 violated 42 U.S.C. § 407 and that the named plaintiffs had standing to challenge the system. The court affirmed the award of attorney's fees but reversed the use of a lodestar multiplier.
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928 F.2d 978·
10th Cir.·
1991-03-26
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the district court's rulings, finding no error in the dismissal of civil rights claims and the granting of summary judgment on remaining claims, and affirming the denial of attorney's fees.
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902 F.2d 401·
5th Cir.·
1990-06-05
·cited 16×
The court held that a public school district violated an employee's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by transferring her to a menial position in retaliation for enrolling her child in private school, and that the district failed to demonstrate the transfer was necessary for
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900 F.2d 116·
7th Cir.·
1990-04-19
·cited 16×
An award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is premature and not appealable as a collateral order if the plaintiff has not yet prevailed on the merits of their underlying civil rights claim.
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The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, allows for the recovery of expert witness fees as part of costs, even though the statute literally refers only to 'attorney's fees'. This interpretation is based on the Act's purpose to restore pre-Alyeska equ
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879 F.2d 1272·
5th Cir.·
1989-08-11
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the denial of the motion for a new trial and the dismissal of defendant Adams, but remanded for clarification regarding the award of attorneys' fees.
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876 F.2d 465·
5th Cir.·
1989-06-30
·cited 16×
The dissenting judge believes that a particular attorney's customary billing rate should not be presumptively the appropriate hourly lodestar rate, requiring specific justification for deviations.
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867 F.2d 291·
6th Cir.·
1989-02-02
·cited 16×
The district court abused its discretion by modifying a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) solely to avoid the mandatory application of Rule 68 costs.
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859 F.2d 797·
9th Cir.·
1988-10-19
·cited 16×
The court held that the County's ratification of its subordinates' actions in acquiring improper deeds and incorporating roads without valid rights-of-way constituted reckless disregard for plaintiffs' constitutional rights, making the County liable under § 1983. The court also h
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815 F.2d 1474·
11th Cir.·
1987-05-05
·cited 16×
The court held that the dismissal of conspiracy claims, the refusal to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state claims, and the award of attorney's fees were proper.
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811 F.2d 793·
3d Cir.·
1987-02-12
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the district court's fee award for the pre-remedy phase and hourly rates, but remanded the remedy phase for further findings on whether time was spent on achieving population equality or political advantage.
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790 F.2d 753·
9th Cir.·
1986-05-27
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding partial attorney's fees, affirming the decision regarding the amount and scope of the award.
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789 F.2d 1103·
5th Cir.·
1986-05-14
·cited 16×
The court held that the ordinance is facially and substantially overbroad, violating the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech, and thus is unconstitutional.
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760 F.2d 89·
6th Cir.·
1985-04-12
·cited 16×
The court held that a prison official's policy of automatically excluding inmate witness testimony violates due process, and that a reduction in attorney fees for duplication of services was an abuse of discretion when only one attorney was employed.
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734 F.2d 1000·
4th Cir.·
1984-05-17
·cited 16×
The dissenting judge would reverse the district court's judgment, finding that the employee's complaints were based on personal self-interest rather than matters of public concern, and thus not protected by the First Amendment.
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732 F.2d 744·
9th Cir.·
1984-05-07
·cited 16×
The court held that insufficient evidence supported the jury's finding of Southwest Marine's 'truly complete involvement' in the antitrust scheme, and that Southwest Marine was entitled to attorney's fees as a prevailing party.
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719 F.2d 1530·
11th Cir.·
1983-11-21
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court's order disallowing enhancement of attorneys' fees was insufficiently articulated and vacated the award for reconsideration, while also awarding fees for appellate services.
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695 F.2d 34·
2d Cir.·
1982-11-30
·cited 16×
The court held that the State has standing to sue under parens patriae, the federal claim is colorable, and the state law claim was violated; however, the State cannot recover attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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689 F.2d 929·
10th Cir.·
1982-09-30
·cited 16×
A contingent fee agreement does not bar recovery of attorney's fees under § 1988, and the agreed-upon fee does not constitute the maximum allowable fee.
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691 F.2d 220·
6th Cir.·
1982-09-29
·cited 16×
The court held that a supervisory official cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of subordinates unless the supervisor personally participated in or affirmatively authorized the misconduct.
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656 F.2d 212·
6th Cir.·
1981-07-27
·cited 16×
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's directed verdict for the defendants and its award of attorney fees, finding that the federal court lacked jurisdiction and that Tonti's claims were barred by res judicata and lacked evidentiary support.
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The court held that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, does not allow attorney's fees for a taxpayer who initiates proceedings against the government, but only when the government is the initiating party in litigation.
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616 F.2d 1181·
10th Cir.·
1980-03-06
·cited 16×
The court held that the bank was liable under I.R.C. § 3505(b) for supplying funds for wages with knowledge of unpaid taxes, but reversed the jury verdict on I.R.C. § 6672 liability due to an erroneous jury instruction on the burden of proof.
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605 F.2d 573·
2d Cir.·
1979-09-12
·cited 16×
Intervenors in a school desegregation case can be considered a "prevailing party" for attorneys' fees under the Emergency School Aid Act, even if they did not prevail on every issue or propose the final plan, as long as their participation contributed to achieving the lawsuit's o
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591 F.2d 1086·
5th Cir.·
1979-03-22
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court erred in awarding attorneys' fees because no issues were pending when the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976 became law, and the prior memorandum opinion was a final judgment.
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The court held that a school district could be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the actions of its Board of Trustees, and that a jury's finding of bad faith and constitutionally impermissible reasons for non-renewal, despite a general verdict against individual defendants, could
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Vicky Talbott appealed a trial court's award of attorney's fees and costs to defendant Isuzu Motors under Florida's offer of judgment statute, arguing that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act preempts the state statute. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that no co
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911 F.2d 604·
11th Cir.·
1990-09-10
·cited 15×
The court held that the district court erred in rejecting the Special Master's findings on the reasonable hourly rate and the hours expended on post-judgment fee litigation, but correctly denied enhancement for post-judgment work.
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889 F.2d 363·
1st Cir.·
1989-11-17
·cited 15×
The court held that plaintiffs who received a $16,000 settlement in a § 1983 action are prevailing parties entitled to attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as no special circumstances justified denial.
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Prevailing parties under Title VII cannot recover expert witness fees beyond the statutory limits set by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920, as Title VII's fee-shifting provision does not explicitly authorize such recovery.
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Due process does not require pre-towing notice for vehicles unregistered for over a year, but a post-towing hearing may be constitutionally required if timely requested and denied.
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859 F.2d 448·
7th Cir.·
1988-09-23
·cited 15×
Lieutenant Curry was entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct did not violate clearly established law, and therefore the jury's verdict against him must be reversed.
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A plaintiff who prevails on a constitutional claim, even if a related § 1983 claim is waived, is entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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738 F.2d 364·
10th Cir.·
1984-06-27
·cited 15×
Municipalities are immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the district court's findings on the Title VII claim and attorney's fees were not clearly erroneous.
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721 F.2d 881·
2d Cir.·
1983-11-14
·cited 15×
A district court has broad discretion to modify attorneys' fees in a settlement, even if negotiated at arm's length, and is not bound by the parties' agreement if it finds good reason to reduce the award.
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681 F.2d 1325·
11th Cir.·
1982-08-02
·cited 15×
The court held that a motion for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was timely filed, but the denial of fees for the appeal was an abuse of discretion.
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677 F.2d 64·
11th Cir.·
1982-05-24
·cited 15×
The district court retained jurisdiction to consider a motion for attorney's fees filed after the notice of appeal.
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The court held that allowing student-led prayer at school assemblies violates the Establishment Clause, but a parent who successfully sues on behalf of their child is a prevailing party eligible for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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810 F. Supp. 1551·
S.D. Fla.·
1992-11-16
·cited 14×
The court held that the City of Miami's custom and practice of arresting homeless individuals for essential life-sustaining activities in public places violated their constitutional rights, warranting injunctive relief.
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934 F.2d 158·
8th Cir.·
1991-05-23
·cited 14×
The court held that while the plaintiff was a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees, the district court erred in granting a twenty-five percent enhancement based on the results achieved and the contingent nature of the case, as these factors were already reflected in the l
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896 F.2d 927·
5th Cir.·
1990-03-21
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court erred in accepting all claimed hours without specific findings on reasonableness and in applying certain enhancements to the fee award, but affirmed the compensation for delay in payment.