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581 F.2d 275·
1st Cir.·
1978-07-28
·cited 442×
A party may be considered a "prevailing party" for attorney's fees if they succeed on any significant issue that achieves some benefit sought in litigation, and fees should be awarded unless special circumstances render them unjust.
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662 F.2d 975·
3d Cir.·
1981-09-30
·cited 108×
The dissenting opinion argues that a plaintiff relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 should be able to establish a prima facie case through a showing of racially disparate impact, not solely direct evidence of discriminatory purpose.
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779 F.2d 1509·
11th Cir.·
1986-01-14
·cited 103×
Florida has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as its statutory waivers are limited to traditional tort claims or indemnification of officers sued in their individual capacities.
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652 F.2d 458·
5th Cir.·
1981-08-03
·cited 102×
The court held that the district court erred in denying attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, as the case was pending on the Act's effective date and plaintiffs may be considered prevailing parties if their lawsuit was a catalyst for remedial
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630 F.2d 1231·
7th Cir.·
1980-09-19
·cited 90×
Prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees for appellate work on the merits and for time spent litigating their entitlement to fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act.
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602 F.2d 894·
9th Cir.·
1979-08-16
·cited 88×
The court held that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 applied to cases pending on its enactment date, and that the plaintiff was a prevailing party entitled to seek fees.
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585 F.2d 47·
3d Cir.·
1978-07-19
·cited 87×
The court should affirm the district court's judgment regarding attorney's fees, as the trial judge did not err in applying the Lindy II rule for fee calculations.
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711 F.2d 1136·
2d Cir.·
1983-06-15
·cited 82×
The concurring judge agrees with the majority opinion but expresses reservations about the hourly rate and bonus factor awarded to counsel.
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600 F.2d 70·
7th Cir.·
1979-05-31
·cited 80×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the consent decree and refusing hiring quotas, but it misapplied the test for awarding attorneys' fees. The judgment is reversed and remanded for a determination of the proper amount of fees.
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599 F.2d 1316·
4th Cir.·
1979-06-18
·cited 78×
The court held that the district court must make specific factual findings to determine if the plaintiffs were prevailing parties entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and whether any special circumstances warranted denying the award.
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748 F.2d 1543·
11th Cir.·
1984-12-19
·cited 77×
The court held that the admission of testimony regarding age-based comments was not an abuse of discretion, but reversed and remanded awards of backpay and frontpay due to the district court's failure to properly consider the issue of reinstatement. The court also vacated the awa
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649 F.2d 509·
7th Cir.·
1981-05-21
·cited 76×
The court affirmed the district court's judgment regarding compensatory and punitive damages but remanded the award of attorney's fees for reconsideration.
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594 F.2d 118·
5th Cir.·
1979-04-27
·cited 70×
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738 F.2d 188·
7th Cir.·
1984-06-19
·cited 65×
The court held that the district court erred in disallowing out-of-pocket expenses and in reducing hourly rates without adequate justification, requiring a remand for further evaluation.
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578 F.2d 34·
2d Cir.·
1978-06-15
·cited 65×
The court held that the district court erred in denying attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 by applying an incorrect legal standard. A prevailing party should ordinarily recover fees unless special circumstances render an award unjust.
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684 F.2d 1375·
11th Cir.·
1982-09-07
·cited 62×
A party is not considered a "prevailing party" entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if their initial favorable judgment is later vacated or reversed on the merits.
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588 F.2d 634·
8th Cir.·
1978-12-13
·cited 62×
The court held that attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 should be awarded for all time reasonably expended on a matter, not just on the specific issue on which the plaintiff ultimately prevailed. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in award
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773 F.2d 1145·
11th Cir.·
1985-10-15
·cited 61×
The federal government is liable for attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) when acting under color of federal law, to the same extent as a state would be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for similar violations.
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719 F.2d 1496·
10th Cir.·
1983-10-24
·cited 60×
A section 1988 attorney's fee award should not be limited by a contingent fee agreement between the client and attorney, and the client's contingent fee obligation should be adjusted to match the court-awarded fee.
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611 F.2d 1302·
9th Cir.·
1980-01-21
·cited 58×
The court held that attorneys' fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, nor are they precluded by the fact that the prevailing party's counsel is a state-funded legal aid organization. The court also found that challenges to the amount of the
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585 F.2d 613·
4th Cir.·
1978-09-29
·cited 58×
The court held that due to intervening Supreme Court decisions, the case must be remanded for further proceedings regarding damages and potential claims against the school district, and for consideration of attorney's fees.
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665 F.2d 724·
5th Cir.·
1982-01-14
·cited 56×
The hospital district is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the award for mental anguish due to procedural due process violations is affirmed, but the award for lost salary is reversed.
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621 F.2d 1331·
5th Cir.·
1980-07-24
·cited 54×
The court held that municipalities and counties are not liable under Bivens for the acts of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior, and that joint and several liability was improperly imposed on Deputy Saldivar for the actions of Officer Maddox.
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735 F.2d 264·
7th Cir.·
1984-05-18
·cited 50×
A brief suspension for unprofessional conduct does not violate a public employee's liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, nor does it infringe upon the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment.
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677 F.2d 681·
8th Cir.·
1982-05-14
·cited 50×
The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict against Sheriff Pirch and Deputy Kipping, and that Kipping was entitled to qualified immunity.
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629 F.2d 697·
1st Cir.·
1980-08-12
·cited 50×
A motion for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 must be filed within the 10-day period prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) for motions to alter or amend a judgment, and the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a late request.
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672 F.2d 549·
5th Cir.·
1982-04-08
·cited 49×
A plaintiff may be considered a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act even without a formal judgment, if their lawsuit was a substantial factor in achieving the desired outcome.
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633 F.2d 1338·
9th Cir.·
1980-12-16
·cited 47×
A state statute that implicitly prohibits student assignments for racial balancing while permitting them for other reasons constitutes an impermissible racial classification under the Equal Protection Clause.
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744 F.2d 1226·
6th Cir.·
1984-10-01
·cited 44×
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609 F.2d 514·
D.C. Cir.·
1979-09-26
·cited 44×
The dissenting judge argues that the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, authorizes fee awards against the United States, and that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees to the prevailing parties.
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575 F.2d 21·
1st Cir.·
1978-05-05
·cited 44×
The court held that the defendant official was not immune from liability for summary suspensions, that plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees under § 1988, and that nominal damages were appropriate for the intangible loss of civil rights.
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558 F.2d 97·
2d Cir.·
1977-06-22
·cited 44×
The court affirmed the district court's holding that the Transit Authority's blanket exclusion of methadone users violated constitutional rights and affirmed the award of attorneys' fees, but modified the fee award by eliminating the 'premium'. The court also reversed the denial
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605 F.2d 638·
2d Cir.·
1979-07-13
·cited 43×
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar an award of retroactive welfare benefits against a County Social Services Commissioner, as a county is not an 'arm of the State' for these purposes. The court also affirmed the award of attorney fees.
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562 F.2d 550·
8th Cir.·
1977-09-19
·cited 42×
The trial court's finding that the plaintiff failed to prove discrimination was clearly erroneous; racial discrimination in housing is unlawful under federal civil rights acts.
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923 F. Supp. 1546·
S.D. Fla.·
1996-03-12
·cited 41×
The court held that the Attorney General and the Florida Bar are liable for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, with specific apportionment, and that the plaintiff is entitled to reasonable costs.
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898 F.2d 553·
7th Cir.·
1990-03-27
·cited 38×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence regarding the propriety of the Orchard Road project, and affirmed the denial of the motion for a new trial, but modified the damages award for lost wages.
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749 F.2d 1148·
5th Cir.·
1985-01-07
·cited 38×
A plaintiff prevails under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act if their lawsuit caused the defendant to achieve the plaintiff's goal, unless the defendant proves the claim lacked colorable merit and the change was gratuitous.
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574 F.2d 423·
8th Cir.·
1978-04-18
·cited 38×
The court held that a plaintiff who obtains interim relief on a non-constitutional ground can be considered a prevailing party eligible for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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728 F.2d 428·
10th Cir.·
1984-02-16
·cited 37×
The court held that under Oklahoma law, an employee handbook can create a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment, requiring due process before termination.
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709 F.2d 345·
5th Cir.·
1983-07-11
·cited 36×
The court held that the jury instructions on the plaintiff's federal claims were deficient and misleading, requiring reversal and a new trial.
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663 F.2d 443·
3d Cir.·
1981-10-26
·cited 36×
The court held that a plaintiff who prevails in arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement, even if motivated by a Title VII lawsuit, is not entitled to attorney's fees under Title VII's fee-shifting provision.
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594 F.2d 997·
5th Cir.·
1979-04-26
·cited 35×
The court held that while some injunctive relief was warranted, the plaintiffs were entitled to further relief, including potential damages for constitutional violations, and that the case should be remanded for further consideration of class certification and damages.
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653 F.2d 80·
2d Cir.·
1981-06-25
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as its reasoning was based on an overly restrictive interpretation of precedent and failed to consider key factors.
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616 F.2d 598·
1st Cir.·
1980-03-03
·cited 34×
The court held that attorney's fees for public interest lawyers should be calculated on the same basis as for private practitioners, without regard to their salaries.
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605 F.2d 175·
5th Cir.·
1979-10-26
·cited 34×
The court held that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 applies to cases pending at the time of its enactment, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar such awards against states.
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721 F.2d 318·
11th Cir.·
1983-12-12
·cited 33×
The court held that a plaintiff can be considered a prevailing party for attorney's fees under the Fees Act even if the lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed, provided the lawsuit was the catalyst for remedial action.
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801 F.2d 570·
2d Cir.·
1986-09-10
·cited 32×
The court held that while the risk of nonpayment in a civil rights case may justify an upward adjustment to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the district court must make specific findings regarding the fee arrangement and the actual likelihood of success at the outset. The
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734 F.2d 185·
5th Cir.·
1984-05-29
·cited 32×
The court held that while the mayor/magistrate was immune for judicial acts, his prior non-judicial acts of investigation and complaint issuance, done with malice, were not shielded by judicial immunity. The city was liable because the mayor's actions represented official city po
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638 F.2d 24·
5th Cir.·
1981-02-23
·cited 32×
The court held that plaintiffs who obtained what they sought through voluntary compliance after filing suit, rather than through litigation, did not prevail for purposes of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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631 F.2d 497·
7th Cir.·
1980-09-23
·cited 32×
The court held that the Village's adult movie zoning ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and an impermissible prior restraint, and the license revocation ordinance lacked sufficient procedural protections and constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint. The court reversed