525 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 135 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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A plaintiff prevails under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act if their lawsuit caused the defendant to achieve the plaintiff's goal, unless the defendant proves the claim lacked colorable merit and the change was gratuitous.
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690 F.2d 742·
9th Cir.·
1982-10-21
·cited 38×
A district court may use its equitable authority under Rule 70 to compel state officials to pay attorney fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, even if state law prohibits such payment, due to the Supremacy Clause.
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620 F.2d 235·
10th Cir.·
1980-04-28
·cited 38×
The trial court erred in denying attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 based on the defendant's good faith or a general sense of injustice.
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The court held that a plaintiff who obtains interim relief on a non-constitutional ground can be considered a prevailing party eligible for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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831 F.2d 829·
9th Cir.·
1987-10-22
·cited 37×
The court held that the jury instructions for the § 1983 claim were erroneous because they allowed liability based on mere negligence, contrary to Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, the denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was reversed.
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806 F.2d 1364·
9th Cir.·
1986-12-23
·cited 37×
The court held that officers are not per se shielded from liability by a magistrate's issuance of a warrant and that a policy of gross negligence in training or supervision can give rise to § 1983 liability.
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758 F.2d 147·
6th Cir.·
1985-03-19
·cited 37×
The court held that admitting testimony containing a legal conclusion was harmless error, and that a single instance of derogatory language or a downgraded evaluation, without more, does not constitute a separate claim for employment discrimination.
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The court held that under Oklahoma law, an employee handbook can create a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment, requiring due process before termination.
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790 F.2d 1071·
4th Cir.·
1986-04-21
·cited 36×
The dissenting judge believes the trial court properly calculated attorney's fees based on rates at the time services were rendered and reasonably disallowed certain litigation expenses.
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713 F.2d 1416·
9th Cir.·
1983-08-23
·cited 36×
The concurring judge believes the majority opinion's section on defendants' good faith efforts should be deleted. He argues it may discourage officials from rectifying issues and could confuse legal practitioners.
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The court held that the jury instructions on the plaintiff's federal claims were deficient and misleading, requiring reversal and a new trial.
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The court held that a plaintiff who prevails in arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement, even if motivated by a Title VII lawsuit, is not entitled to attorney's fees under Title VII's fee-shifting provision.
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863 F.2d 525·
7th Cir.·
1988-11-23
·cited 35×
The court held that a trade association's mere concern with the stare decisis effect of a district court opinion is insufficient to justify intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2).
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768 F.2d 303·
10th Cir.·
1985-07-17
·cited 35×
A municipality can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional deprivations resulting from its official policy or custom, even if individual officers' actions do not independently violate civil rights.
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756 F.2d 564·
7th Cir.·
1985-03-04
·cited 35×
A judgment obtained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a local government employee acting within the scope of employment constitutes a "tort judgment" under Illinois law, making the local entity liable for that judgment and associated attorney's fees and costs, even if punitive damag
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The court held that while some injunctive relief was warranted, the plaintiffs were entitled to further relief, including potential damages for constitutional violations, and that the case should be remanded for further consideration of class certification and damages.
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789 F.2d 1225·
6th Cir.·
1986-05-06
·cited 34×
The court held that attorney's fees could not be awarded against counsel for failing to amend a complaint or refuse to sign a pretrial order without evidence of bad faith or unreasonable multiplication of litigation, and that fees could not be awarded against the plaintiff for he
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783 F.2d 1104·
D.C. Cir.·
1986-02-21
·cited 34×
The court held that plaintiffs were prevailing parties entitled to attorneys' fees for securing a pre-election injunction, but remanded for reconsideration of the 'special circumstances' defense and specific fee calculations.
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728 F.2d 1030·
8th Cir.·
1984-02-23
·cited 34×
A plaintiff is a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if they succeed on any significant issue that achieves some of the benefit sought, even if not all claims are won.
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727 F.2d 167·
7th Cir.·
1984-02-14
·cited 34×
An association lacks standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a state's refusal to facilitate voter registration in public offices, as this does not constitute a direct and personal injury to the association or its members.
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669 F.2d 865·
2d Cir.·
1982-01-21
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court properly found the state and city liable for failing to provide appropriate education to handicapped children and affirmed the allocation of attorneys' fees based on relative culpability.
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The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as its reasoning was based on an overly restrictive interpretation of precedent and failed to consider key factors.
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The court held that attorney's fees for public interest lawyers should be calculated on the same basis as for private practitioners, without regard to their salaries.
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608 F.2d 717·
8th Cir.·
1979-10-30
·cited 34×
A pro se litigant is not entitled to attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, even if they are a trained paralegal, as the statute is intended to compensate attorneys, not the litigants themselves.
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The court held that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 applies to cases pending at the time of its enactment, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar such awards against states.
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761 F.2d 622·
11th Cir.·
1985-05-28
·cited 33×
The court held that the trial judge erred in excluding relevant evidence and making prejudicial comments, requiring a retrial on the issue of the police chief's good faith and justification for termination. The court also found that the city was not vicariously liable for illegal
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810 F.2d 844·
9th Cir.·
1984-02-07
·cited 33×
A preemption claim under the Supremacy Clause, based on federal occupation of a field or conflict with federal goals, does not give rise to a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore does not support an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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The court held that a plaintiff can be considered a prevailing party for attorney's fees under the Fees Act even if the lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed, provided the lawsuit was the catalyst for remedial action.
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818 F.2d 1227·
5th Cir.·
1987-06-15
·cited 32×
The court held that attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 are a collateral issue, meaning a judgment on the merits is final and appealable even if fees are undetermined. The court also held that reducing a lodestar fee award solely based on nominal damages or success against few
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The court held that while the risk of nonpayment in a civil rights case may justify an upward adjustment to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the district court must make specific findings regarding the fee arrangement and the actual likelihood of success at the outset. The
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The court held that while the mayor/magistrate was immune for judicial acts, his prior non-judicial acts of investigation and complaint issuance, done with malice, were not shielded by judicial immunity. The city was liable because the mayor's actions represented official city po
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716 F.2d 669·
9th Cir.·
1983-09-22
·cited 32×
The court held that the River and Harbor Improvements Act does not create enforceable federal rights for pleasure craft owners, thus precluding a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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The court held that plaintiffs who obtained what they sought through voluntary compliance after filing suit, rather than through litigation, did not prevail for purposes of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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The court held that the Village's adult movie zoning ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and an impermissible prior restraint, and the license revocation ordinance lacked sufficient procedural protections and constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint. The court reversed
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632 F.2d 848·
10th Cir.·
1980-09-09
·cited 32×
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of attorney's fees to the defendant, finding the plaintiff's action was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
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617 F.2d 1224·
7th Cir.·
1980-01-30
·cited 32×
The court held that the state must pay the full cost of nursing home care when a spouse with sufficient income refuses to contribute, despite legal obligation.
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The court held that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 applies to pending cases and allows for attorney's fees for time spent litigating fee awards.
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The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding no clear error in its factual determinations and awarding attorney's fees for appellate work.
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533 F.2d 1361·
5th Cir.·
1976-06-08
·cited 32×
The court held that the district court's findings of dilution were insufficient without specific findings tied to established legal criteria, requiring a remand for reconsideration.
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838 F.2d 260·
8th Cir.·
1988-01-29
·cited 31×
The court affirmed the district court's award of attorneys' fees, finding that compensation for delay in payment was permissible and that the allocation of fees solely against the State was not an abuse of discretion.
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The court held that the district court applied incorrect legal standards in awarding attorney's fees and calculating the amount, and that the appeal of the denial of sanctions was untimely.
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810 F.2d 1551·
11th Cir.·
1987-03-02
·cited 31×
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The court held that the City of Anaheim cannot constitutionally prohibit ISKCON from soliciting donations on the walkways outside the convention center and stadium, and that the city's solicitation ordinance is facially unconstitutional.
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679 F.2d 795·
9th Cir.·
1982-06-15
·cited 31×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees that exceeded the jury verdict and included time spent on unsuccessful but related claims.
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The court held that the plaintiff's success on minor tort claims did not qualify him as a prevailing party for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and remanded constitutional claims for further consideration.
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The court held that attorney's fees are awardable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to prevailing parties in civil rights actions, and that damages claims against certain city officials were barred by immunity.
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944 F.2d 344·
7th Cir.·
1991-09-17
·cited 30×
The court held that the jury verdict of negligence should not be overturned based on the doctrine of assumption of risk, as the inmate did not voluntarily assume the risk of rape.
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847 F.2d 735·
11th Cir.·
1988-06-20
·cited 30×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in determining the hourly rate and reducing the hours expended without adequate explanation, requiring remand for reconsideration. However, the court affirmed the district court's deduction for partial success.
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821 F.2d 22·
1st Cir.·
1987-06-12
·cited 30×
The court held that plaintiffs were prevailing parties, but current hourly rates could not be used to compensate for delay due to Eleventh Amendment immunity; historical rates must be applied, and a deduction is made for duplicative fee litigation hours.
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819 F.2d 1362·
7th Cir.·
1987-05-15
·cited 30×
The court held that attorney's fees could be awarded against the plaintiffs because their claims were largely frivolous, but fees could not be awarded against their attorneys under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.