525 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 135 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
-
A party may be considered a "prevailing party" for attorney's fees if they succeed on any significant issue that achieves some benefit sought in litigation, and fees should be awarded unless special circumstances render them unjust.
-
823 F.2d 1073·
7th Cir.·
1987-06-29
·cited 172×
The court held that the majority's approach to Rule 11 sanctions transforms the rule into a source of derivative litigation and that the due process claim was not objectively frivolous.
-
713 F.2d 546·
10th Cir.·
1983-06-15
·cited 169×
The court denied a petition for rehearing, but a dissenting judge argued that attorney's fees should be severely limited to only emergency relief, as the underlying case became moot due to state renovations.
-
562 F.2d 114·
1st Cir.·
1977-09-13
·cited 132×
The court held that while the transfer was a violation of the plaintiff's First Amendment rights, the award of punitive damages was not justified, and the case must be remanded to reconsider damages for lost wages and mental distress based on whether the transfer constituted a co
-
The dissenting opinion argues that a plaintiff relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 should be able to establish a prima facie case through a showing of racially disparate impact, not solely direct evidence of discriminatory purpose.
-
Florida has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as its statutory waivers are limited to traditional tort claims or indemnification of officers sued in their individual capacities.
-
The court held that the district court erred in denying attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, as the case was pending on the Act's effective date and plaintiffs may be considered prevailing parties if their lawsuit was a catalyst for remedial
-
773 F.2d 1169·
11th Cir.·
1985-10-15
·cited 98×
The court held that judges and prosecutors are immune from civil liability for their official acts, and that inmate claims for injunctive relief are moot upon transfer. The court also affirmed the dismissal of claims against the public defender and found no abuse of discretion in
-
656 F.2d 264·
7th Cir.·
1981-08-10
·cited 95×
The court held that the State's appeal of the attorneys' fee allocation was without merit, as the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the plaintiffs prevailed against the State and in allocating a portion of the fees to it.
-
Prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees for appellate work on the merits and for time spent litigating their entitlement to fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act.
-
The court held that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 applied to cases pending on its enactment date, and that the plaintiff was a prevailing party entitled to seek fees.
-
750 F.2d 1383·
7th Cir.·
1984-12-19
·cited 87×
The court held that the district judge erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the City of Berwyn due to a procedural defect and that the plaintiff should have been offered a new trial instead of a remittitur on punitive damages against Montoro. The court also
-
The court should affirm the district court's judgment regarding attorney's fees, as the trial judge did not err in applying the Lindy II rule for fee calculations.
-
773 F.2d 1004·
9th Cir.·
1985-10-03
·cited 83×
The court held that an excessive use of force claim by law enforcement officers during the post-arrest transport of an arrestee is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a Fourth Amendment violation, and the Parratt analysis does not apply to such claims.
-
649 F.2d 1193·
5th Cir.·
1981-07-10
·cited 83×
The court's opinion, which this judge concurs with, holds that a local government entity is liable under § 1983 when its official policy or custom inflicts injury, not solely for the acts of its employees or agents.
-
The concurring judge agrees with the majority opinion but expresses reservations about the hourly rate and bonus factor awarded to counsel.
-
799 F.2d 343·
7th Cir.·
1986-08-25
·cited 80×
The court held that the intervenors' appeal was timely because the district court's substantive alterations to the judgment restarted the time for appeal, even though successive Rule 59 motions are generally not permitted to toll appeal time.
-
792 F.2d 958·
10th Cir.·
1986-06-02
·cited 80×
The court held that the plaintiff's lawsuit was not causally linked to the securing of relief and the defendant's conduct was not legally required, thus the plaintiff is not a prevailing party under § 1988.
-
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the consent decree and refusing hiring quotas, but it misapplied the test for awarding attorneys' fees. The judgment is reversed and remanded for a determination of the proper amount of fees.
-
The court held that the district court must make specific factual findings to determine if the plaintiffs were prevailing parties entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and whether any special circumstances warranted denying the award.
-
The court held that the admission of testimony regarding age-based comments was not an abuse of discretion, but reversed and remanded awards of backpay and frontpay due to the district court's failure to properly consider the issue of reinstatement. The court also vacated the awa
-
The court affirmed the district court's judgment regarding compensatory and punitive damages but remanded the award of attorney's fees for reconsideration.
-
791 F.2d 1329·
9th Cir.·
1986-03-03
·cited 70×
The court held that the law was sufficiently clear in May 1981 to subject a public official to civil liability for authorizing blanket strip searches of minor offense arrestees, but that the plaintiff was not a prevailing party entitled to attorney fees.
-
695 F.2d 485·
7th Cir.·
1982-12-15
·cited 70×
The court held that the district court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict for two defendants, and that the jury's punitive damages award against another defendant was supported by the evidence. The court also held that prisoners can bring claims for excessive
-
-
650 F.2d 184·
9th Cir.·
1981-07-06
·cited 68×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fees, as the lawsuit was not the sole or primary catalyst for legislative change.
-
587 F.2d 159·
5th Cir.·
1978-12-18
·cited 68×
The court held that Texas obscenity statutes are unconstitutional as applied because they lack the procedural safeguards required by Freedman v. Maryland, specifically failing to ensure a prompt final judicial determination after preliminary injunctions are issued.
-
869 F.2d 427·
9th Cir.·
1988-10-11
·cited 67×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by improperly reducing the attorney fee award based on factors already subsumed in the lodestar calculation and by misapplying Rule 11 sanctions to post-signing conduct.
-
615 F.2d 163·
5th Cir.·
1980-04-07
·cited 67×
The court held that the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous and that the appellant established a prima facie case of employment discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, which the city failed to rebut.
-
697 F.2d 761·
7th Cir.·
1983-01-06
·cited 66×
The court held that the Maclin factors are persuasive for appointing counsel in this case, particularly given the plaintiff's blindness and potential difficulty in securing representation.
-
657 F.2d 931·
7th Cir.·
1981-08-20
·cited 66×
The court held that the district court erred in awarding a multiplier and excessive hours for attorneys' fees, but affirmed the grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict for one defendant and the interest rate on the judgment.
-
632 F.2d 1251·
5th Cir.·
1980-12-17
·cited 66×
The court held that the fire department's rules were not facially unconstitutional as applied, but that the plaintiff's speech was constitutionally protected and a motivating factor in his denial of promotion. The court affirmed the order to make the plaintiff whole but remanded
-
806 F.2d 1316·
7th Cir.·
1986-11-26
·cited 65×
An order to pay interim attorney's fees is appealable under the collateral order doctrine if the party ordered to pay faces irreparable harm from immediate payment that cannot be recovered if the order is later reversed.
-
The court held that the district court erred in disallowing out-of-pocket expenses and in reducing hourly rates without adequate justification, requiring a remand for further evaluation.
-
The court held that the district court erred in denying attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 by applying an incorrect legal standard. A prevailing party should ordinarily recover fees unless special circumstances render an award unjust.
-
683 F.2d 1044·
7th Cir.·
1982-07-13
·cited 64×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying the appointment of counsel, failing to raise unpleaded First Amendment issues, refusing to reopen the case for witness testimony, or in finding no due process violation for a prison regulation's procedural delay.
-
623 F.2d 29·
7th Cir.·
1980-06-06
·cited 64×
The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment as undisputed facts established probable cause for the arrest and prosecution, and that the appeal from the attorney fees award was untimely as no separate notice of appeal was filed from that order.
-
660 F.2d 280·
7th Cir.·
1981-09-18
·cited 63×
The court held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 because they did not allege an actual deprivation of constitutional rights or injury, and affirmed the award of attorney's fees to the defendants.
-
611 F.2d 1109·
5th Cir.·
1980-02-15
·cited 63×
The court held that an independent school district is amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that a teacher's classroom expression, even if controversial, is protected speech unless it overbalances her usefulness as an instructor.
-
A party is not considered a "prevailing party" entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if their initial favorable judgment is later vacated or reversed on the merits.
-
635 F.2d 915·
1st Cir.·
1980-12-11
·cited 62×
The court held that a rigid percentage-of-recovery ceiling on attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is impermissible, as it undermines the statute's goal of encouraging civil rights litigation.
-
The court held that attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 should be awarded for all time reasonably expended on a matter, not just on the specific issue on which the plaintiff ultimately prevailed. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in award
-
786 F.2d 320·
7th Cir.·
1986-03-17
·cited 61×
The dissenting judge argues that the district court's fee award calculation, based on a contingent fee contract reflecting market value, was reasonable and that the majority failed to provide adequate guidance.
-
773 F.2d 1145·
11th Cir.·
1985-10-15
·cited 61×
The federal government is liable for attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) when acting under color of federal law, to the same extent as a state would be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for similar violations.
-
628 F.2d 488·
5th Cir.·
1980-10-22
·cited 61×
The court held that the speech of a public employee was protected under the Pickering balancing test, not the compelling state interest test.
-
A section 1988 attorney's fee award should not be limited by a contingent fee agreement between the client and attorney, and the client's contingent fee obligation should be adjusted to match the court-awarded fee.
-
The court held that attorneys' fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, nor are they precluded by the fact that the prevailing party's counsel is a state-funded legal aid organization. The court also found that challenges to the amount of the
-
The court held that due to intervening Supreme Court decisions, the case must be remanded for further proceedings regarding damages and potential claims against the school district, and for consideration of attorney's fees.
-
796 F.2d 1205·
9th Cir.·
1986-08-15
·cited 56×
The court vacated the district court's attorney's fee award due to lack of specificity and granted in part the motion for attorney's fees on appeal, reducing the requested amount.
-
724 F.2d 881·
11th Cir.·
1984-01-19
·cited 56×
An order resolving all issues except attorney's fees is a final, appealable order, even if the fees have not yet been awarded.