3,807 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 3,026 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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722 F.2d 503·
9th Cir.·
1983-12-20
·cited 14×
The court held that an alleged plan to prosecute a person, including witness coercion and falsifying evidence, does not state an actionable wrong under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if it fails to allege the violation of a constitutionally protected interest.
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Parole officials are absolutely immune for quasi-judicial functions like granting or revoking parole, but not for the knowing dissemination of false information to outside parties.
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718 F.2d 906·
9th Cir.·
1983-08-16
·cited 14×
The court held that a jury demand on a civil cover sheet is insufficient under Rule 38(b) and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a late jury trial request.
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710 F.2d 1461·
10th Cir.·
1983-06-28
·cited 14×
The appellate court dismissed the appeal of the denial of a preliminary injunction as moot because the election had already occurred, and the court declined to address the merits of the constitutional claim.
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The court held that a pro se complaint is frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling them to relief, adopting the standard from Estelle v. Gamble. The court found the claims regarding jail conditions and a
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705 F.2d 759·
5th Cir.·
1983-05-26
·cited 14×
The dissenting judge argues the majority erred in rejecting the one-satisfaction rule for § 1983 cases, creating a new tort scheme without authority and misinterpreting deterrence principles.
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705 F.2d 179·
6th Cir.·
1983-04-19
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court's jury instruction on punitive damages was erroneous because it applied a higher standard than required by Smith v. Wade, and therefore reversed the award of punitive damages.
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The court affirmed the district court's findings, holding that some plaintiffs were unlawfully arrested without probable cause and deprived of due process, while others were lawfully arrested or their claims failed.
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701 F.2d 864·
10th Cir.·
1983-03-08
·cited 14×
A plaintiff seeking damages under § 1983 must prove actual injury; in the absence of such proof, only nominal damages are recoverable, even for Eighth Amendment violations.
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697 F.2d 213·
8th Cir.·
1982-12-30
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing the inmate's four lawsuits and did not abuse its discretion in denying his requests for witnesses and counsel.
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694 F.2d 1091·
7th Cir.·
1982-12-08
·cited 14×
Summary judgment for defendants is affirmed because officers had probable cause to arrest for obstruction of process, used reasonable force, and provided adequate medical attention.
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The court held that the one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery does not apply to actions for breach of official duty by police officers.
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686 F.2d 541·
7th Cir.·
1982-08-12
·cited 14×
A jury verdict for a plaintiff in a section 1983 discharge case cannot stand if the plaintiff fails to prove that protected activity was a motivating factor in the discharge, or that the employer would not have discharged the employee absent the protected activity, or that the de
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679 F.2d 1313·
9th Cir.·
1982-06-22
·cited 14×
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The court held that an applicant for an initial concealed weapon license does not possess a property or liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause when the issuing authority has discretion to deny the license.
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678 F.2d 578·
5th Cir.·
1982-06-14
·cited 14×
The court held that the refusal to postpone an administrative hearing pending the outcome of a related criminal prosecution did not unconstitutionally impair the appellee's Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
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678 F.2d 504·
4th Cir.·
1982-05-18
·cited 14×
A private employer cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 solely on the basis of respondeat superior.
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The court held that the Third Amendment's protection against quartering troops extends to individuals with a lawful occupation or possession interest in a house, not just fee simple owners. It also held that while the state's emergency justified summary eviction without pre-depri
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676 F.2d 306·
8th Cir.·
1982-04-27
·cited 14×
The court held that a sheriff acting under a court order is immune from a § 1983 suit, and that Tymiak failed to state a claim against other defendants for acting under color of state law.
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676 F.2d 98·
4th Cir.·
1982-04-01
·cited 14×
The court held that a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act before filing suit in federal court, and a § 1983 claim cannot be used to circumvent this requirement.
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The court held that the district court erred in finding no constitutional violations regarding cell block conditions and the New Man's Section, and that inmate conduct does not absolve the prison administration of its responsibility to maintain constitutional conditions.
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660 F.2d 379·
8th Cir.·
1981-10-01
·cited 14×
The court held that a motion to dismiss treated as a summary judgment motion requires giving all parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence. The district court erred by dismissing the complaint without providing such an opportunity.
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653 F.2d 907·
5th Cir.·
1981-08-06
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court correctly applied Georgia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries to the appellant's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, and that the claim was time-barred.
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653 F.2d 289·
7th Cir.·
1981-07-07
·cited 14×
The court held that the prosecuting attorney cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful detention exceeding 24 hours because Indiana law vests the duty to bring arrestees before a magistrate within statutory limits solely with the city police, not the prosecutor.
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The majority holds that the discharge for political activism was permissible, relying on cases upholding statutory prohibitions of partisan political activities. The dissenting judge disagrees, finding the district court's factual determination that the employee's political activ
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The court held that the plaintiffs' Section 1983 action was time-barred because the complaint was not filed within the applicable two-year statute of limitations and the tolling statute did not apply.
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651 F.2d 214·
4th Cir.·
1981-03-18
·cited 14×
The court held that plaintiffs were prevailing parties entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because the consent order conferred a benefit by resolving uncertainty and expanding access rights, and no special circumstances justified denial.
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644 F.2d 41·
1st Cir.·
1981-03-13
·cited 14×
The court held that transferred prisoners retain a right to access Maine courts and that Maine officials remain responsible for ensuring this access, even if the prisoners are housed in federal facilities.
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639 F.2d 257·
5th Cir.·
1981-03-12
·cited 14×
A federal court abused its discretion by adjudicating a pendent state claim when the federal question presented was insubstantial.
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639 F.2d 1090·
4th Cir.·
1981-02-05
·cited 14×
The court held that the former police officers did not possess a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest in their employment that was violated by their dismissal without a hearing. However, they are entitled to a grievance hearing under state law.
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638 F.2d 599·
3d Cir.·
1980-11-25
·cited 14×
The court held that a local housing authority receiving federal funding is not automatically an "agency" of the United States immune from attorneys' fees awards under 28 U.S.C. § 2412. It also held that the district court must apply the "special circumstances" standard when consi
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The court held that the magistrate applied an incorrect standard in dismissing the prisoner's claims against the warden and that the prisoner's motion for additional witnesses should be reevaluated.
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626 F.2d 1218·
5th Cir.·
1980-10-01
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court erred in requiring the plaintiff to pay half of the attorney's fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as such a reduction is not justified by the nature of the case.
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The court held that the Burford abstention doctrine was inapplicable to a case alleging constitutional violations in a juvenile detention home, and federal courts have jurisdiction over such claims.
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624 F.2d 569·
5th Cir.·
1980-08-20
·cited 14×
The court held that the regulation governing publications in prisons was constitutional both on its face and as applied, and that the refusal to distribute the newsletter was a reasonable measure to maintain prison security.
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654 F.2d 1280·
9th Cir.·
1980-04-29
·cited 14×
The court held that abstention under the Pullman doctrine was appropriate because the case involved sensitive social policy, state law could resolve the controversy, and the interpretation of state statutes regarding juvenile detention conditions was doubtful.
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614 F.2d 1016·
5th Cir.·
1980-04-02
·cited 14×
The court held that the plaintiff's complaint adequately stated a claim for a due process violation, as prison regulations may create a liberty interest in remaining in general population status.
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617 F.2d 1016·
3d Cir.·
1980-03-25
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the in forma pauperis complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) based on abstention principles, as the claim was neither frivolous nor malicious.
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The court held that the plaintiff had no legitimate claim of entitlement to the soil erosion permit, and therefore was not deprived of any property interest in violation of the fourteenth amendment, nor did the defendants conspire to violate civil rights.
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611 F.2d 936·
1st Cir.·
1979-12-28
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court did not err in preventing cross-examination regarding prior disciplinary actions and in its jury instructions on lawful arrest authority.
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609 F.2d 259·
6th Cir.·
1979-11-13
·cited 14×
The court held that actions of state administrators of a mixed federal and state program may be considered 'under color of state law' for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if federal law also applies.
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604 F.2d 271·
4th Cir.·
1979-07-25
·cited 14×
Maryland must provide judicial commitment hearings to individuals acquitted by reason of insanity and summarily committed, shifting the burden of proof to the state to demonstrate dangerousness.
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599 F.2d 243·
8th Cir.·
1979-05-14
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court erred by converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment without providing the pro se plaintiffs with notice and an opportunity to respond.
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The court held that the exclusion of evidence identifying the decedent as a robber was erroneous, and the plaintiff's subsequent argument emphasizing his innocence was improper.
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The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict regarding the plaintiff's section 1983 claims, including First Amendment violations and lack of procedural due process, and that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or jury instruct
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A sheriff can be vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a deputy's actions if state law provides for such liability, and a sheriff may be personally liable for punitive damages based on his own participation in unconstitutional conduct.
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The court held that the trial court erred in barring expert testimony regarding the angle of the shooting, which was crucial to determining the reasonableness of the officer's actions and the credibility of witness testimony.
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577 F.2d 262·
5th Cir.·
1978-07-27
·cited 14×
The court held that claims arising from alleged mistreatment while incarcerated are not time-barred as continuing wrongs, but claims regarding refusal to arrest prior to incarceration are time-barred. The court also held that Georgia's tolling statute for prisoners does not apply
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The court held that the Executive Secretary of the Disciplinary Commission is clothed with quasi-judicial immunity for actions taken in that role, and that no genuine issue of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment.
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Witnesses in state judicial proceedings are absolutely immune from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 for testimony given in their official capacity.