3,807 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 3,026 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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853 So. 2d 1125·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2003-09-17
·cited 20×
Deborah Rice-Lamar, an African-American Affirmative Action Specialist, was terminated by the City of Fort Lauderdale allegedly for refusing to remove her commentary on racial discrimination from official affirmative action reports. After losing her federal discrimination and Firs
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278 F. Supp. 2d 1301·
M.D. Fla.·
2003-06-24
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The court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation to award plaintiffs $257,151.03 in attorneys' fees and $9,938.35 in costs and expenses.
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The dissent argues that the majority's finding of a violation of a substantive right to remain silent is questionable, especially given 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the lack of a prior holding on its constitutionality.
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Individuals contracted by the government to perform statutorily mandated duties are the functional equivalent of public officials and are entitled to raise a qualified immunity defense. However, a generalized right to 'familial integrity' is not sufficiently particularized to ove
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946 F.2d 1017·
3d Cir.·
1991-10-10
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The court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that the custodial officers knew or should have known of the detainee's particular vulnerability to suicide, and thus, their actions did not rise to the level of reckless indifference required for a § 1983 cl
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The court held that the Department of Social Services' failure to investigate a child abuse report did not violate federal due process rights, as the state has no affirmative constitutional duty to protect individuals from private actors, and the statute did not create a property
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891 F.2d 864·
11th Cir.·
1990-01-09
·cited 20×
The court held that the hospital and its officials did not deprive Dr. Faucher of constitutionally protected liberty or property interests without due process of law, and thus affirmed the grant of summary judgment.
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The court held that res judicata does not bar Mann's claim and vacated the district court's summary judgment, remanding for further proceedings considering City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
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883 F.2d 1472·
9th Cir.·
1989-08-30
·cited 20×
The court held that a state agency's waiver of its exclusive processing period in a worksharing agreement with the EEOC is self-executing, making a charge filed with the state agency constructively filed with the EEOC on that date. The court also held that a plaintiff's § 1983 cl
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The court held that the dismissal of the § 1983 claim and state law tort claim against the deputy sheriff in his individual capacity was error, but dismissal of claims against the Sheriff, Office of Sheriff, and County Commissioners was proper.
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The appeal is dismissed as moot because the appellant is judicially estopped from seeking damages after previously arguing that damages were unavailable and obtaining injunctive relief based on that argument.
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The Constitution does not require a hearing before the state may suspend a license if the state provides adequate post-deprivation remedies.
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The court held that denying Title VII relief based on another class member being more qualified is not a lawful reason and undermines the purpose of Title VII class actions.
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878 F.2d 1043·
8th Cir.·
1989-05-22
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The court held that the denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable collateral order, but mootness is not. The court affirmed the magistrate's denial of qualified immunity for most defendants, finding the alleged conditions violated clearly established law, but gran
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The court held that claims against Mayor Suarez and the Police Department were properly dismissed, but claims against the City of Miami and Chief Anderson could proceed. State law claims were dismissed for insufficient notice.
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Federal agents are immune from state law tort claims under the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act and from federal civil rights claims because no clearly established constitutional right was violated.
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880 F.2d 116·
9th Cir.·
1989-03-13
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The court concurred that the Hawaii Supreme Court should be allowed to determine its own justices' impartiality, as prior rulings do not automatically constitute disqualifying bias under federal law.
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866 F.2d 172·
6th Cir.·
1989-01-18
·cited 20×
The court held that the Offutts' claims of bias and property damage were not ripe for judicial review because they had not exhausted state administrative remedies or obtained a final decision from the state agency.
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864 F.2d 1436·
8th Cir.·
1989-01-04
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The dissenting judges argue that the majority erred by finding probable cause for arrest as a matter of law. They assert that probable cause in section 1983 actions is a question of fact for the jury, and that the majority's conclusion was inappropriate given the concessions made
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864 F.2d 1376·
7th Cir.·
1989-01-03
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The court held that a physician's certification for involuntary commitment and a healthcare institution's holding of a patient against their will under Illinois law constitute state action, but the patient failed to join the physician as a party for the certification claim.
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856 F.2d 594·
3d Cir.·
1988-09-12
·cited 20×
The court held that school officials owe a constitutional duty to investigate complaints and protect students from harm, and that this duty was clearly established at the time of the alleged wrongdoing.
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856 F.2d 925·
7th Cir.·
1988-09-08
·cited 20×
The court held that the present federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not barred by the prior Illinois state court judgment under the doctrine of res judicata because the two actions do not involve the same cause of action under Illinois law.
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856 F.2d 107·
9th Cir.·
1988-09-07
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The court held that a claim of mere negligence in administering a state workers' compensation act does not state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Eleventh Amendment bars suits seeking payment from the state treasury.
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The court approved the settlement agreement and certified the class action, finding the settlement fair, adequate, and reasonable given the uncertainty of the litigation's outcome.
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The court held that ordinary negligence by government officials in releasing a prisoner does not constitute a "deprivation" of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if the prisoner subsequently harms a third party.
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849 F.2d 172·
5th Cir.·
1988-07-11
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The court held that various officials were immune from liability under § 1983 and that the remaining claims were barred by prescription or lacked merit. The court also taxed costs against the appellant for frivolous appeals.
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846 F.2d 29·
7th Cir.·
1988-05-05
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The court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in granting a new trial because the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
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844 F.2d 1268·
6th Cir.·
1988-04-25
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The dissenting judge believes the majority erred in remanding the case to state court, arguing a cause of action for discriminatory conduct was stated.
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841 F.2d 853·
8th Cir.·
1988-03-14
·cited 20×
The court affirmed the dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, finding that claims against public defenders fail to state a claim and claims against judges, prosecutors, and clerks are barred by absolute immunity.
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841 F.2d 186·
7th Cir.·
1988-03-07
·cited 20×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding a long-standing custom or policy for for-cause dismissal of probationary employees.
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A police officer cannot claim qualified immunity for using deadly force against a fleeing felon if the law regarding such force was clearly established by a circuit court decision, even if the officer was personally unaware of the decision.
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514 So. 2d 1077·
Fla.·
1987-09-24
·cited 20×
The State of Florida has not waived its Eleventh Amendment and state common law immunity for suits against it and its agencies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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822 F.2d 1303·
3d Cir.·
1987-06-30
·cited 20×
Rutgers is not an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes because New Jersey has waived its sovereign immunity and Rutgers operates with significant independence.
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821 F.2d 455·
7th Cir.·
1987-06-17
·cited 20×
The court agrees that the case must be remanded, but the concurring opinion emphasizes concerns about partial fee plans and equal protection.
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The court held that the city did not assume a duty to fight the fire before the owner joined the association, nor did the city ordinances create a mandatory duty to provide fire protection to the property owner.
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The court held that Louisiana's 'B-girl' statute does not violate equal protection, due process, or First Amendment rights, and is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
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806 F.2d 326·
1st Cir.·
1986-12-05
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The court held that the district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and the officers used reasonable force in subduing the plaintiff.
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The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing the claim against Neville, denying the preliminary injunction, or granting summary judgment for Shank and Thrasher, as Sebra's claims were not justiciable under the Mindes test for military disputes.
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797 F.2d 425·
7th Cir.·
1986-07-25
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims frivolous, thus reversing the award of attorneys' fees.
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The denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, but the denial of the state action antitrust exemption is not. The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity.
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The court held that a prisoner's allegations of a guard threatening him with instant death, accompanied by racial epithets, state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even without physical injury.
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The court held that attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 can be awarded for work done on a state-law issue certified to a state supreme court, even if the federal § 1983 claim is dismissed as moot, and that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar such an award.
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The court held that the parole board's actions were too remote from the victim's death to establish a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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A person injured in an automobile accident caused by a police officer's negligent operation of a vehicle does not have a section 1983 cause of action for violation of a federal right, as such negligence does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.
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784 F.2d 299·
8th Cir.·
1986-02-14
·cited 20×
The court held that the jury improperly apportioned indivisible actual damages among defendants, requiring vacation of the award and remand for a new trial on actual damages.
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The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying attorney's fees because the plaintiffs were prevailing parties, as their lawsuit was causally linked to the defendants' stipulation not to enforce the sign ordinance.
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The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment sua sponte and on issues not properly raised, and that plaintiffs' substantive due process and equal protection claims are not barred by the adequacy of state remedies.
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781 F.2d 319·
2d Cir.·
1986-01-15
·cited 20×
The court held that a prisoner's claim against a correctional officer for filing a misbehavior report was properly dismissed, but the claim against the superintendent regarding the denial of the right to call witnesses raised a material issue of fact.
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778 F.2d 1471·
10th Cir.·
1985-12-11
·cited 20×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings that the defendant violated the plaintiff's civil rights and tortiously interfered with his contracts, and that the action was not time-barred.
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777 F.2d 1403·
10th Cir.·
1985-11-22
·cited 20×
The court held that the school board and its members in their official capacities are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and that the actual malice standard applies to defamation claims brought by public officials against non-media defendants.