3,807 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 3,026 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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892 F.2d 670·
7th Cir.·
1990-01-09
·cited 26×
The court held that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims because the alleged conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights, and the pendent state law claims were properly dismissed.
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The court held that a policy-making public office, even if unpaid, is not 'property' protected by the Due Process Clause, and federal courts should not interpret state law or constitutional issues unnecessarily.
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887 F.2d 553·
5th Cir.·
1989-10-23
·cited 26×
The court held that res judicata bars Holloway's claim that the state court judgment was fraudulent, as it could have been raised in a prior federal action. The court also found the clean hands doctrine did not provide a basis to vacate the judgment.
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907 F.2d 874·
9th Cir.·
1989-10-11
·cited 26×
A federal court must stay a prisoner's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim challenging the duration of confinement, rather than dismiss it, to allow exhaustion of state remedies via habeas corpus.
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883 F.2d 416·
5th Cir.·
1989-09-19
·cited 26×
The court held that the plaintiff's appeal was timely filed and that some of his claims were not barred by the statute of limitations due to Texas' prisoner tolling provisions.
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870 F.2d 616·
11th Cir.·
1989-04-19
·cited 26×
The court held that Gwin's equal protection claims challenging the Board's parole procedures and denial of compassionate leave are properly brought under section 1983 and do not require exhaustion of state remedies, reversing the district court's dismissal of these claims.
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The City Council's arbitrary withholding of a building permit, after all requirements were met, violated the developer's substantive due process rights and constituted official policy, making the City and council members liable. The court also affirmed the dismissal of procedural
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851 F.2d 1212·
9th Cir.·
1988-07-13
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment because no special relationship was created and the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.
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Government officials are not entitled to qualified immunity if their conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights, even if the specific factual scenario is not identical to prior precedent.
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Texas child protective service workers are entitled to qualified immunity for their decision to remove children from a home without a prior court order, as their actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate clearly established law.
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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the jury's verdict awarding the plaintiff $10,000 on his section 1983 claim, finding sufficient evidence that prison officials acted with reckless disregard of the plaintiff's right to protection from sexual assault. The court also affirmed the award o
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839 F.2d 392·
7th Cir.·
1988-02-24
·cited 26×
The court held that the inmate presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the prison official's deliberate indifference to his safety, precluding summary judgment.
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835 F.2d 1175·
6th Cir.·
1987-12-30
·cited 26×
Qualified immunity does not shield defendants from suit for gross negligence and recklessness regarding patient safety.
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830 F.2d 779·
7th Cir.·
1987-10-02
·cited 26×
The court held that occasional cancellations of Muslim prayer services due to the absence of a chaplain or scheduling conflicts with recreational activities did not violate inmates' First Amendment rights, especially when alternative religious opportunities existed and security c
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The court held that the City violated the plaintiff's due process rights by failing to provide a hearing regarding his disability retirement benefits, and that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity.
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The dissenting judge disagrees with the majority's characterization of the appellee's job functions as policy-making, confidential, or official communicative tasks, and questions the interlocutory appellate jurisdiction.
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808 F.2d 1023·
3d Cir.·
1987-01-12
·cited 26×
The court held that Pace's allegations did not state a claim for a taking under the Fifth Amendment or a violation of substantive due process, and that no additional federal relief was available.
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The court held that an order denying a request for counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is not immediately appealable, but the district court should have granted leave to amend the complaint to add a defendant and conduct discovery.
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793 F.2d 846·
7th Cir.·
1986-06-12
·cited 26×
The court held that Gekas was a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but vacated the fee award due to inadequate explanation and remanded for recalculation.
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788 F.2d 1319·
8th Cir.·
1986-04-15
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the inmate's motions for appointment of counsel, as the complexity of the legal issues, the inmate's ability to present his case, and the conflicting evidence warranted legal assistance.
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A state that waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity is a "person" suable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but liability requires proof of a state policy or custom causing the deprivation, not just respondeat superior.
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490 So. 2d 69·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1985-12-17
·cited 26×
The City of Miami appealed a jury verdict finding it liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a municipal policy regarding high-speed police pursuits that resulted in the death of an innocent bystander, Mrs. Doretha Rolle, when police rammed a suspect's vehicle into a bus bench. The cou
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479 So. 2d 810·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1985-12-10
·cited 26×
Technicable, a minority-owned business, appealed the dismissal of its complaint alleging breach of a cable television license's minority business enterprise (MBE) participation requirements. The court reversed the dismissal of the third-party beneficiary claim while affirming the
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The Attorney General is absolutely immune from damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when acting in a quasi-judicial capacity to review state contracts for legality and form. Therefore, the district court's award of damages and attorney fees against the Attorney General is rev
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767 F.2d 153·
5th Cir.·
1985-08-05
·cited 26×
The court held that the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief should have been dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction due to insufficient Article III standing, as past wrongs do not establish a real and immediate threat of future injury.
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764 F.2d 796·
11th Cir.·
1985-07-02
·cited 26×
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a Fifth Amendment taking, substantive due process violation, or procedural due process violation.
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A judge is absolutely immune from liability for judicial acts performed within their jurisdiction, even if those acts are malicious or procedurally flawed. Claims for injunctive and declaratory relief require a live case or controversy, which is absent when the plaintiff has alre
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The court held that plaintiffs must prove actual damages resulting from the deprivation of their First Amendment rights, and absent such proof, they are entitled to nominal damages only.
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Orders denying motions for appointment of counsel in Title VII and § 1983 actions are not immediately appealable "final decisions" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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The court should reverse and remand for further findings on whether the employee's political affiliation was a 'but for' cause of her termination.
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755 F.2d 687·
8th Cir.·
1985-02-27
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the prisoner's complaint as frivolous without allowing him to prove a potential liberty interest in parole consideration.
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755 F.2d 338·
3d Cir.·
1985-02-22
·cited 26×
The court held that res judicata, the eleventh amendment, official immunity, and abstention doctrines did not bar the inmates' claims for damages and injunctive relief.
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748 F.2d 229·
4th Cir.·
1984-11-16
·cited 26×
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747 F.2d 55·
1st Cir.·
1984-11-02
·cited 26×
The court held that the plaintiff's claims constitute a nonjusticiable military controversy because the balance of factors, particularly interference with military function and the exercise of military expertise, weighs against judicial review.
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The court held that the trial court erred in finding that the use of mace in the Adjustment Center violated constitutional rights, as the evidence showed it was used reasonably to maintain discipline and safety after inmates refused lawful orders.
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743 F.2d 1187·
7th Cir.·
1984-09-06
·cited 26×
The court should not reach constitutional issues if statutory or state law grounds exist, and therefore should remand for determination of those grounds.
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The court held that the hospital's restriction of a physician's privileges was not "state action" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as there was insufficient nexus between the state and the hospital's decision, which was based on professional medical judgments.
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A public employee's grievance is protected by the First Amendment only if it relates to a matter of public concern, not merely personal interest.
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724 F.2d 665·
8th Cir.·
1983-12-30
·cited 26×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a county policy or custom of mistreating inmates who challenged their convictions, thus the county could not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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725 F.2d 156·
2d Cir.·
1983-12-22
·cited 26×
The court held that the plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed because they failed to present specific facts to create a genuine issue for trial, and the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
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720 F.2d 1416·
5th Cir.·
1983-12-12
·cited 26×
A guilty plea does not preclude a subsequent Section 1983 action for Fourth Amendment violations that were not litigated in the state proceedings, and dismissal of claims regarding warrantless conversation interception was proper.
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The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's § 1983 claim for failure to state a claim, exhaustion of remedies, and res judicata, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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The court held that the federal appellees' environmental assessment and programmatic environmental impact statement were insufficient to comply with NEPA for the South Salem spraying program, but that the program did not violate FIFRA's label restrictions.
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716 F.2d 141·
2d Cir.·
1983-08-24
·cited 26×
The court held that the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) provides an exclusive remedy, and a plaintiff cannot bypass its administrative procedures to seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish a causal link between the Police Chief's actions and the alleged misconduct, and that the jury instructions, while imperfect, did not constitute plain error.
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704 F.2d 1049·
8th Cir.·
1983-04-20
·cited 26×
The court held that the plaintiff waived any error in the jury instructions by failing to make a specific objection at trial, and the instruction did not constitute plain error.
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710 F.2d 632·
10th Cir.·
1983-04-18
·cited 26×
The court held that the termination of employment was neither federal nor state action, as the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the decision was attributable to a governmental policy or rule, despite the agency's governmental funding and the presence of public officials on it
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700 F.2d 37·
2d Cir.·
1983-01-26
·cited 26×
The court held that the complaint was insufficient to survive a 12(b)(6) motion because it lacked specific factual allegations and failed to provide notice of the claim. However, the failure to provide notice that the motion would be treated as a summary judgment was harmless.
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696 F.2d 145·
1st Cir.·
1983-01-07
·cited 26×
The denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in a civil case is not an immediately appealable interlocutory order under the collateral order doctrine.
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697 F.2d 1213·
4th Cir.·
1982-12-30
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the appellants' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as the allegations, if proven, could establish state action and a violation of constitutional rights.