3,807 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 3,026 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
-
792 F.2d 647·
7th Cir.·
1986-06-05
·cited 34×
The court held that a state judge is not absolutely immune from civil liability for firing a probation officer in violation of the officer's constitutional rights, as this is an administrative rather than a judicial act.
-
The dissenting judge argued that the appellant's conviction for kidnapping should be affirmed because the victim's confinement in a bathroom, barricaded by bags, constituted a significant deprivation of liberty, meeting the statutory test for kidnapping, even if the victim escape
-
The court held that alleged conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of property through judicial proceedings does not violate due process because adequate post-deprivation remedies (appeal) exist, and the right to a fair trial is procedural, not substantive.
-
The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish county liability under § 1983, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding discovery, mistrial, evidence admission, or damage and fee awards.
-
774 F.2d 1295·
5th Cir.·
1985-10-24
·cited 34×
A public employee's speech is protected under the First Amendment if it addresses a matter of public concern and does not unduly disrupt the government employer's operations, even if the employee holds a policymaking position.
-
766 F.2d 1567·
1st Cir.·
1985-08-08
·cited 34×
The court held that a general jury verdict based on multiple theories of liability, where at least one theory lacks sufficient evidentiary support, must be reversed because it is impossible to determine the jury's basis for the verdict. The court also held that a governmental emp
-
754 F.2d 1396·
9th Cir.·
1985-03-01
·cited 34×
The court held that a city cannot limit cable television access to a region to a single provider through an auction process, as this violates the First Amendment. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the antitrust claims.
-
The dissenting judge argues the majority opinion misinterprets the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) by disregarding legislative history and rendering statutory language ineffective. The dissent believes the EAJA was intended to place the federal government on equal footing with
-
The court held that orders denying appointment of counsel in civil cases are not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
-
The court held that federal abstention is not appropriate in this case, as the appellant alleged extraordinary circumstances involving federal constitutional violations.
-
737 F.2d 1148·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-06-22
·cited 34×
The court held that a prisoner alleging unprovoked macing and beating by correctional officers states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even without permanent injury, if the force was applied maliciously and sadistically.
-
The court held that the appellants' federal damages suit was barred by res judicata under Illinois law because the claims could have been raised in their prior state court action arising from the same set of facts.
-
720 F.2d 467·
7th Cir.·
1983-11-01
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court's dismissal of the appellant's claims was proper, as the Privacy Act claim failed because only agencies, not individuals, can be sued, and the other claims lacked merit or were not cognizable federal claims.
-
The court held that intentional destruction of prisoner property is not a due process violation if an adequate state remedy exists, but a prisoner's claim of an unreasonable search motivated by harassment requires further factual determination.
-
693 F.2d 1054·
11th Cir.·
1982-12-13
·cited 34×
The court held that while the prisoner's claim was properly brought under § 1983, it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it did not present an identifiable federal or constitutional issue.
-
682 F.2d 648·
7th Cir.·
1982-06-28
·cited 34×
The court held that the District Court erred in characterizing the violation as procedural due process and in awarding only nominal damages, and that the issue of qualified immunity for the individual defendant was not properly addressed.
-
680 F.2d 42·
7th Cir.·
1982-06-08
·cited 34×
A district court has discretion to deny attorneys' fees for time spent litigating fees when the fee request is exorbitant or the time spent is unnecessarily high, and appellate courts will only disturb such a ruling for an abuse of discretion.
-
668 F.2d 400·
8th Cir.·
1982-01-05
·cited 34×
The court held that Iowa's general five-year statute of limitations, rather than the two-year statute for injuries to person or reputation, applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
-
The court held that while a police officer's mere presence during a repossession might not constitute state action, active participation or intimidation preventing a debtor from exercising legal rights can lead to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the officer was immune
-
663 F.2d 713·
7th Cir.·
1981-10-27
·cited 34×
Witnesses are absolutely immune from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for testimony given in judicial proceedings, and prosecutors and judges are also absolutely immune for acts within their official capacities.
-
642 F.2d 311·
9th Cir.·
1981-04-16
·cited 34×
The court held that the Arizona tolling statute should be applied to an imprisoned state prisoner's § 1983 claim, despite the majority's reasoning.
-
The majority's rule allowing federal plaintiffs, not parties to a state proceeding, to interfere with that proceeding is unprecedented and contrary to established precedent.
-
The dissenting judge argues the majority erred by disregarding the jury's findings of fact, which were supported by substantial evidence, and by independently re-examining the record on issues of procedural due process and First Amendment rights.
-
A sheriff can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for establishing policies that lead to constitutional violations by deputies, even if the deputies themselves are found not liable.
-
The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to admit evidence of a confidentiality policy for police accident reports, nor in refusing to allow Pickering defenses or a qualified immunity charge, as the policy conflicted with state law and the defendants' action
-
612 F.2d 160·
5th Cir.·
1980-02-20
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the case, as the university and its officials could be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Eleventh Amendment immunity did not bar injunctive or declaratory relief.
-
The court held that Judge Mouser was performing a judicial function and thus immune from liability, and Sheriff Cowart was not personally involved and not vicariously liable for his deputies' actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
-
608 F.2d 717·
8th Cir.·
1979-10-30
·cited 34×
A pro se litigant is not entitled to attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, even if they are a trained paralegal, as the statute is intended to compensate attorneys, not the litigants themselves.
-
607 F.2d 589·
3d Cir.·
1979-09-26
·cited 34×
The court held that the termination of a stall agreement by a private racetrack, even with consultation from state racing officials, does not constitute state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the racetrack acted independently based on its own authority.
-
Federal courts should not review academic promotion decisions based on subjective evaluations of scholarly merit, absent claims of racial/sex discrimination or First Amendment violations.
-
A prisoner's challenge to the duration of confinement, even if framed as a request for damages or declaratory relief under § 1983, is properly treated as a habeas corpus matter requiring exhaustion of state remedies.
-
The Commissioner of Correction is responsible for unconstitutional jail conditions due to failure to promulgate and enforce minimum standards, and the district court's equitable remedies, including the threat of closure and ordering additional staff, were appropriate.
-
The court held that the 180-day statute of limitations for housing discrimination claims applied to §§ 1981 and 1982, but a three-year statute applied to the § 1983 claim. The court also held that the plaintiffs' claim under the Fair Housing Act was untimely.
-
555 F.2d 172·
7th Cir.·
1977-05-20
·cited 34×
The court held that the newly enacted Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 applies to pending cases, including this one, and allows for attorneys' fees against state officials sued in their official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
-
545 F.2d 244·
1st Cir.·
1976-11-09
·cited 34×
The court held that a potential investor's interest in participating in the ownership of a parimutuel greyhound racetrack is not a protected liberty or property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus does not give rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
-
The court held that the plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) failed to state a cause of action, and the state department was immune from suit.
-
522 F.2d 1110·
9th Cir.·
1975-07-08
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, finding that the allegations, if true, sufficiently pleaded state action.
-
506 F.2d 530·
10th Cir.·
1974-12-02
·cited 34×
A complaint alleging abuse of extradition power by noncompliance with law states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and cannot be dismissed as frivolous.
-
505 F.2d 802·
8th Cir.·
1974-11-22
·cited 34×
The court held that an attorney's conduct in representing a client does not constitute action under color of state law for purposes of a § 1983 claim, and the Bar Association's lack of independent power to investigate or discipline attorneys meant claims against it were frivolous
-
The court held that the state administrative remedy was inadequate because it lacked procedures for resolving factual disputes, did not address constitutional issues within judicial expertise, and could not grant the requested damages.
-
The court held that the one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery or false imprisonment does not apply to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action; instead, a longer statute of limitations applies.
-
Hospital bylaws requiring membership in a local medical society and endorsements from staff physicians are unreasonable and arbitrary, violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
-
386 F.2d 962·
9th Cir.·
1967-11-21
·cited 34×
A federal court cannot grant relief for a state bar applicant's failure to be certified until the state supreme court has made a final determination on the matter, as the committee's refusal to certify is merely advisory.
-
A federal court has the power to enjoin state legislative committee actions that violate citizens' constitutional rights, even if the committee acts under color of state law.
-
636 So. 2d 39·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1994-02-09
·cited 33×
Madison County appeals a summary judgment invalidating its 1989 and 1990 special assessment ordinances for garbage collection, landfill closure, ambulance service, and fire protection. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment that the ordinances were null and void for failur
-
The court held that Sofarelli stated a claim under the Fair Housing Act against the neighbors, but not against the county or sheriff. The court also held that § 1983 claims against all parties failed.
-
The court held that the district court's substantial reduction in attorney's fees lacked sufficient explanation and justification, requiring appellate review and recalculation.
-
-
780 F.2d 1158·
5th Cir.·
1986-01-16
·cited 33×
The court held that a jury charge improperly blending ordinary negligence with constitutional claims and failing to obtain separate verdicts for each deputy constituted reversible error, requiring a new trial for some claims. It also affirmed the dismissal of the county and rever
-
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments provide protection against excessive force by state police during arrests, and the district court erred in requiring a specific intent to infringe a constitutional right for such claims.