3,807 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 3,026 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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675 F.2d 1085·
9th Cir.·
1982-04-30
·cited 46×
The Secretary complied with the requirements of section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, as the project included all possible planning to minimize harm to parkland and no feasible or prudent alternative existed.
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The court held that the district court's finding that the force used by Officer Johnson was not actionable excessive force was clearly erroneous.
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634 F.2d 650·
1st Cir.·
1980-11-25
·cited 46×
The court held that a "more-likely-than-not" standard for forcible medication is inappropriate, and that while the state has interests in protecting patients and others, these must be balanced with patient rights through individualized assessment and due process procedures, not s
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The court held that the district court should have abstained from deciding the constitutional claims until the relevant state law issues, particularly the interpretation of the Delaware County Home Rule Charter, were resolved by the Pennsylvania state courts.
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A receiver acting under court orders shares the appointing judge's absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but a bank and corporation accused of conspiring with the receiver do not. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1981 were properly dismissed.
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A sua sponte dismissal of a pro se prisoner's complaint for failure to state a federal claim is improper if it occurs before adverse parties are served and given an opportunity to respond.
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The court held that abstention was proper for claims of project-wide exemption under the California Coastal Zone Act, but individual parcel exemption claims lacked a case or controversy and should have been dismissed.
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The court held that Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-219, a three-year statute of limitations for actions based on federal statutes, applies to the plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and Title VI, and that the plaintiff's action was untimely filed.
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The court held that an award of attorney's fees against state officials in their official capacities, payable from state funds, is permissible and not barred by sovereign immunity or the Eleventh Amendment, especially when their conduct was unreasonably obstinate.
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The court held that the complaint stated causes of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, establishing federal jurisdiction.
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The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Police Chief James D. Chadwick, finding that he was entitled to immunity from Police Lieutenant Jerry M. Stanley's First Amendment retaliation claim. The court concluded that while Stanley's speech
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The court held that the district court erred in adopting the Special Master's Report without fully addressing direct evidence of discrimination and making complete analytical findings, necessitating a remand.
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812 F.2d 426·
9th Cir.·
1987-03-05
·cited 45×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish essential elements of his claims for demotion and harassment, thus summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate.
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The court held that the plaintiffs sufficiently stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for infringement of their constitutional right of access to the courts, but failed to state a cause of action under § 1985. The court also held the claim was not barred by res judicata
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762 F.2d 444·
5th Cir.·
1985-06-10
·cited 45×
The court held that the complaint failed to allege the abuse of government power necessary to elevate an ordinary tort claim to constitutional status under section 1983.
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757 F.2d 850·
7th Cir.·
1985-03-08
·cited 45×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance, disregarding late-filed materials, and granting summary judgment based on the evidence presented. However, it erred in disallowing affidavits solely for lack of a notarial seal and in re
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Involuntarily committed mental patients have a qualified constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic medication. This right is protected by the Due Process Clause, which requires that any decision to administer such drugs against a patient's will must be based on the "profession
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The court held that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on the First Amendment claim because it failed to consider it, remanding for that purpose. However, it affirmed summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment claims, finding the plaintiff failed to establis
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The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary relief against state university officials in their official capacities, and Stephen F. Austin State University is an arm of the state. Individual defendants may be liable for constitutional violations if they knew or should have know
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627 F.2d 710·
5th Cir.·
1980-10-08
·cited 45×
The court held that the district court erred in denying class certification based on mootness of individual claims and the class's claims, and that the issue of mootness of the class's claims should not have been considered at the certification stage.
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The dissenting judge argues that the Village's zoning ordinance is a rational means to achieve legitimate zoning objectives and should be upheld.
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471 F.2d 475·
7th Cir.·
1972-07-06
·cited 45×
The court held that the plaintiff's speech, which was found to be disruptive and detrimental to the hospital's operations and patient care, provided justifiable reasons for termination, and thus no constitutional right was violated.
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942 F.3d 1047·
11th Cir.·
2019-11-07
·cited 44×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that the defendants caused his injuries and that the defendants violated clearly established constitutional rights, thus affirming the grant of qualified immunity.
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935 F.2d 1167·
10th Cir.·
1991-06-18
·cited 44×
The court held that an at-will public employee does not have a constitutionally protected property interest in their job, and termination without a name-clearing hearing does not violate a liberty interest if no false and stigmatizing charges were disseminated by the employer. Th
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904 F.2d 748·
1st Cir.·
1990-05-29
·cited 44×
The court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional rights, and the available state remedies were adequate to satisfy due process requirements.
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841 F.2d 1169·
1st Cir.·
1988-02-03
·cited 44×
The court held that plaintiffs hired in violation of PRTC regulations had no property interest in their employment and thus no due process claim, and that they failed to present sufficient evidence of political motivation for their dismissals to survive summary judgment.
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The court held that the law regarding 'confidential' employees was not clearly established at the time of the Governor's discharge of domestic staff, thus he should be granted limited immunity.
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The court held that the plaintiffs' claim for damages for a regulatory taking is premature because they have not exhausted available remedies in Puerto Rico courts, and that claims against officials in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
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The court held that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim because it was clearly established that transitory employees are protected from politically motivated non-renewal, but they were entitled to qualified immunity on the due process c
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The court held that collateral estoppel did not apply because the defendants were not parties or privies to the prior state action, and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that inmates lacked adequate access to the courts through the public defender system.
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798 F.2d 203·
7th Cir.·
1986-08-08
·cited 44×
The court must give significant weight to the executive branch's interpretation of state law when state courts have not yet ruled on the matter, especially when that interpretation does not conflict with federal law or constitutional rights.
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777 F.2d 801·
1st Cir.·
1985-11-27
·cited 44×
The court held that a jury could reasonably find a municipality liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for gross negligence in training its police officers, even if the harm resulted from a single evening's events, provided there is evidence beyond the incident itself linking the training
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The court held that while overcrowding, double-celling, inhumane restraints, inadequate medical care, and poor kitchen facilities violated the Eighth Amendment, the district court erred in mandating specific compliance with fire/safety codes and in ordering equal access to rehabi
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771 F.2d 916·
5th Cir.·
1985-09-26
·cited 44×
The court held that all 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions filed in Mississippi are governed by the one-year prescriptive period provided by Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-35 for intentional torts.
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762 F.2d 1543·
11th Cir.·
1985-06-12
·cited 44×
The court held that the Garner decision on the use of deadly force applies retroactively and that Officer Abston is not entitled to qualified immunity based on the record, requiring further factual determination on remand. The denial of the motion to dismiss was affirmed.
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The court held that the plaintiff's discharge for speech made during a television interview violated his First Amendment rights, reversing the district court's decision on this claim.
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The court held that failure to object to jury instructions or interrogatories generally precludes appellate review, except for fundamental error, and affirmed the denial of damages except for nominal damages against one defendant.
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726 F.2d 1543·
11th Cir.·
1984-03-16
·cited 44×
A hospital's policy of firing a pregnant x-ray technician to protect her fetus from radiation exposure constitutes facial discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the hospital failed to establish a BFOQ or business necessity defense.
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710 F.2d 41·
2d Cir.·
1983-06-09
·cited 44×
The court reversed the district court's dismissal, finding a glimmer of a prima facie case for reversal based on the chaotic conditions at Harlem Hospital and potential constitutional deprivations.
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A federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even when the alleged infringement of rights arises from state court proceedings, and res judicata does not bar claims summarily denied by state appellate courts.
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A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 absent evidence that the constitutional deprivation was pursuant to an official policy or custom, and a plaintiff cannot recover attorney fees from a party dismissed from the suit. However, the district court abused its discretion
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620 F.2d 1375·
10th Cir.·
1980-03-06
·cited 44×
A private individual actively conspiring with an immune state official to deprive another of constitutional rights can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if the state official is immune.
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596 F.2d 27·
2d Cir.·
1979-03-01
·cited 44×
The court held that the Consent Judgment required the State to fund additional staff for the Consumer Advisory Board as a necessary expense for carrying out its functions, even if not explicitly listed.
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The court held that the appellants' civil rights action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the issues and causes of action were the same as those litigated in prior state court proceedings.
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The court held that the defendant official was not immune from liability for summary suspensions, that plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees under § 1988, and that nominal damages were appropriate for the intangible loss of civil rights.
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558 F.2d 848·
8th Cir.·
1977-06-08
·cited 44×
The court, evenly divided, denied the petition for rehearing en banc, meaning the panel's decision stands. Judge Gibson dissented, arguing the panel misapplied Fed. R. Civ. P. 52's clearly erroneous standard.
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521 F.2d 1201·
4th Cir.·
1975-08-06
·cited 44×
The court reversed the judgment because the defendants were denied their constitutional right to a jury trial.
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The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and on the merits without proper notice and a full hearing, as the plaintiffs' allegations sufficiently invoked federal jurisdiction.
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The court held that the plaintiff's federal claims were barred by res judicata because he had the opportunity to litigate them in prior state court actions.