-
475 F.2d 270·
2d Cir.·
1973-03-05
·cited 127×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for conspiracy to defraud the United States and substantive violations of statutes related to stolen securities, but not for conspiracy to transport stolen securities in interstate commerce.
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616 F.2d 2·
2d Cir.·
1979-12-19
·cited 92×
The court affirmed the convictions, finding that despite an ill-conceived jury instruction, the overall charge was balanced and did not prejudice the defendants.
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516 F.2d 458·
5th Cir.·
1975-07-24
·cited 70×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict of perjury, that the questions asked were material, and that the prosecutor's closing argument did not constitute reversible error.
-
550 F.2d 818·
2d Cir.·
1977-02-25
·cited 66×
The court held that the trial judge properly sustained a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege claim against self-incrimination, as the witness had reasonable cause to fear prosecution for perjury if he testified truthfully after having previously testified under immunity.
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529 F.2d 962·
6th Cir.·
1976-02-12
·cited 58×
The court held that misstating the statute in an indictment is not grounds for dismissal if the defendant is not misled and the facts alleged constitute a crime under a valid statute. It also held that a delay in trial, while significant, did not violate speedy trial rights when
-
568 F.2d 1049·
3d Cir.·
1977-11-29
·cited 56×
The court held that the admission of evidence of other crimes, not charged in the indictment and not discussed in the grand jury testimony, amounted to a constructive amendment of the indictment, requiring a new trial.
-
548 F.2d 75·
3d Cir.·
1977-01-03
·cited 55×
A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 may not stand where the indictment fails to set forth the precise falsehood alleged and the factual basis of its falsity with sufficient clarity. Ambiguous questioning by the government, especially in a grand jury context, can render a convicti
-
622 F.2d 985·
9th Cir.·
1980-01-30
·cited 50×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for making false declarations before a grand jury, and that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.
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515 F.2d 1274·
D.C. Cir.·
1975-07-14
·cited 50×
The court held that the questions posed to the defendant before the grand jury were not impermissibly vague and that sufficient evidence existed to support his conviction for making false declarations.
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526 F.2d 178·
1st Cir.·
1975-12-03
·cited 48×
The court held that the defendant's negative responses to FBI and Strike Force questioning did not constitute 'statements' within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and therefore he was not placed in a dilemma requiring Fifth Amendment warnings before his grand jury appearance.
-
583 F.2d 346·
7th Cir.·
1978-08-24
·cited 45×
The court held that the district court failed to comply with Rule 11 requirements regarding informing the defendant of the nature of the charges and establishing a factual basis for the plea on Count I, necessitating vacating the plea. However, compliance was found for Count X.
-
552 F.2d 226·
8th Cir.·
1977-03-23
·cited 44×
The court held that Counts II and III of the indictment were multiplicitous, reversing the conviction on Count III. It affirmed the convictions on Counts I and II, finding the statements were not literally true and were material to the grand jury investigation.
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603 F.2d 682·
7th Cir.·
1979-08-22
·cited 40×
The dissenting judge believes the Madison City Police Department is not an 'enterprise' under Title IX and that the introduction of Madison County evidence was unduly prejudicial, requiring reversal.
-
502 F.2d 1173·
7th Cir.·
1974-09-12
·cited 40×
A police officer's false testimony before a grand jury, even if given under the duress of a police department rule or an over-warning by the prosecutor, is not excused and can be the basis for a perjury conviction.
-
497 F.2d 317·
3d Cir.·
1974-05-14
·cited 40×
The court held that the defendant's false statements were material and that the jury instructions regarding 'knowingly' were proper, but remanded for a hearing on the issue of the recantation provision.
-
555 F.2d 317·
2d Cir.·
1977-05-06
·cited 38×
The court held that indictments based on testimony given before the same grand jury that heard immunized testimony must be dismissed for substantive offenses, but not for false declaration counts. State transactional immunity does not shield from federal prosecution, but federal
-
577 F.2d 194·
3d Cir.·
1978-04-28
·cited 36×
A conviction for false declarations before a grand jury under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 cannot stand if the indictment fails to clearly set forth the precise falsehoods alleged and the factual basis for their falsity.
-
552 F.2d 1265·
7th Cir.·
1977-04-19
·cited 36×
It was impermissible to show the jury that Kopel consulted his attorney before answering incriminating questions, as this violates due process principles established in Doyle v. Ohio.
-
744 F.2d 555·
7th Cir.·
1984-08-31
·cited 34×
The court held that fabricating records after receiving a grand jury subpoena constitutes an endeavor to obstruct justice, and that false statements made to a grand jury are material if they have the potential to impede the investigation.
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538 F.2d 466·
2d Cir.·
1976-05-14
·cited 34×
The court held that the appellant's false statements to the grand jury regarding his intervention in a criminal prosecution were material to the grand jury's investigation into official corruption and interference with gambling laws, and that the indictment was not multiplicitous
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836 F.2d 684·
1st Cir.·
1988-01-13
·cited 32×
The court held that the appellant's conviction for perjury on Count 27 must be reversed because his statement was literally true, but affirmed the convictions on other counts and the conspiracy conviction.
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782 F.2d 367·
2d Cir.·
1986-01-31
·cited 29×
A perjury conviction cannot stand if based on answers that were literally true, even if misleading, or if based on fundamentally ambiguous questions that were not properly submitted to the jury.
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504 F.2d 332·
8th Cir.·
1974-10-10
·cited 29×
The court held that the defendant's conviction for making a false material declaration was valid, affirming the lower court's judgment.
-
585 F.2d 71·
3d Cir.·
1978-10-05
·cited 28×
The denial of a motion to bar retrial on grounds of collateral estoppel is an appealable collateral order, and retrial on perjury charges is not barred by collateral estoppel when the acquittal on related extortion charges was based on the government's failure to prove specific d
-
505 F.2d 971·
4th Cir.·
1974-10-18
·cited 28×
-
703 F.2d 645·
1st Cir.·
1983-04-01
·cited 26×
The court affirmed convictions for conspiracy to possess stolen goods, receiving/possessing stolen goods, perjury, and assault on a federal officer, finding sufficient evidence and proper joinder.
-
791 F.2d 331·
4th Cir.·
1986-05-27
·cited 25×
The court held that the district court erred in refusing to sequester a government witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 615, and that a conviction based on that witness's testimony must be reversed. The court also found the evidence minimally adequate to establish the materiali
-
635 F.2d 441·
5th Cir.·
1981-01-27
·cited 24×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for false declarations before a grand jury and that the jury instructions and prosecutor's remarks did not constitute reversible error.
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638 F.2d 1375·
5th Cir.·
1981-03-13
·cited 23×
The court held that inconsistent statements, only one of which was made under oath, are insufficient to support a conviction for making false material declarations. It also held that while the government's contact with the defendant without his counsel was improper, it did not wa
-
904 F.2d 1166·
7th Cir.·
1990-06-14
·cited 22×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the sentencing departure for one defendant was reasonable.
-
776 F.2d 600·
6th Cir.·
1985-11-07
·cited 22×
The court held that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment because the delay in commencing trial was not properly excluded under the Speedy Trial Act's 'ends of justice' provision, as the reasons for the continuance were not the actual m
-
671 F.2d 262·
8th Cir.·
1982-02-09
·cited 20×
The court held that the appellant's false declarations before the grand jury were material to the investigation, and the government sufficiently established the scope of the grand jury's inquiry.
-
587 F.2d 5·
6th Cir.·
1978-11-06
·cited 20×
The court held that the materiality of testimony in a false declaration case is a question of law for the court, not a question of fact for the jury, and that the evidence supported the jury's finding of inconsistency.
-
545 F.2d 1106·
8th Cir.·
1976-11-09
·cited 20×
The court held that the defendant's false declarations to the grand jury were material to the investigation, and affirmed the conviction on count I. The court applied the concurrent sentence doctrine to count II.
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728 F.2d 1043·
8th Cir.·
1984-02-24
·cited 18×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove the falsity and materiality of the defendant's statements to the grand jury and that the defendant's other arguments on appeal lacked merit.
-
940 F.2d 1004·
7th Cir.·
1991-08-13
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the convictions of Alan Scop and Raphael Bloom, finding no reversible error in the admission of evidence, jury instructions, or sentencing, and rejecting claims of inconsistent verdicts and double jeopardy.
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900 F.2d 512·
2d Cir.·
1990-03-30
·cited 14×
The court affirmed the convictions for false declarations and obstruction of justice but vacated the sentence, finding insufficient evidence to support the Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for substantially interfering with the administration of justice.
-
608 F.2d 666·
5th Cir.·
1979-12-21
·cited 14×
The court held that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on materiality and that any error in admitting testimony on materiality was harmless. The court also found that despite an erroneous instruction on reasonable doubt, the jury charge as a whole adequately conv
-
813 F.2d 477·
1st Cir.·
1987-03-09
·cited 12×
The court held that the exclusionary rule of 18 U.S.C. § 2515 applies to the government even if it is an innocent recipient of an illegally intercepted communication, and there is no exception for perjury prosecutions.
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672 F.2d 1085·
2d Cir.·
1982-03-02
·cited 12×
The court held that the defendant's actions did not constitute a valid recantation under 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) because he never admitted his testimony was false or offered to retract it. Therefore, his conviction for making false declarations before a grand jury stands.
-
511 F.2d 766·
5th Cir.·
1975-04-21
·cited 12×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict the appellant of making false material declarations before the grand jury and that his testimony was material to the investigation.
-
889 F.2d 1374·
5th Cir.·
1989-11-27
·cited 10×
The court affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding no error in the indictment's sufficiency, the admission of 'flight' evidence and instructions, the sufficiency of evidence, or the application of sentencing guidelines.
-
767 F.2d 364·
7th Cir.·
1985-07-19
·cited 8×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the indictment provided sufficient notice, the district court did not err in admitting co-conspirator statements, and the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.
-
671 F.2d 1159·
8th Cir.·
1982-03-02
·cited 8×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for deprivation of rights under color of law and for making false declarations to a grand jury, and that jury instructions were proper.
-
577 F.2d 119·
10th Cir.·
1978-06-05
·cited 8×
The court held that Dunn's recantation, admitting his prior immunized grand jury testimony was false, justified using that immunized testimony to establish the corpus delicti for his prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c). The court also found the indictment sufficiently stated an
-
839 F.2d 1433·
11th Cir.·
1988-03-14
·cited 6×
The court held that even if a witness has a constitutional right to consult an attorney during grand jury proceedings, the government's failure to provide one does not excuse perjury.
-
666 F.2d 1196·
8th Cir.·
1981-12-16
·cited 6×
The court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time of his grand jury testimony, and his statements were material to the grand jury's investigation.
-
590 F.2d 750·
8th Cir.·
1979-01-22
·cited 4×
The court held that the appellant's false grand jury testimony was material and that the government's failure to provide an inventory of intercepted communications did not require suppression of the evidence.
-
540 F.2d 846·
6th Cir.·
1976-08-23
·cited 4×
The court held that grand jury witnesses, even if suspected of lying, are not entitled to Fifth Amendment warnings when indicted for perjury, and that the government had probable cause to believe Fromin was involved in criminal activity for wiretap purposes.
-
522 F.2d 1025·
9th Cir.·
1975-06-19
·cited 4×
The dissent argues that the conviction should be reversed because the government failed to prove Cash knowingly made false declarations, as his answers could have been truthfully interpreted in relation to the true seller of the bonds.