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674 F.2d 862·
11th Cir.·
1982-04-30
·cited 132×
The FDIC has a complete defense to state and common law fraud claims on a note acquired in a purchase and assumption transaction, for value, in good faith, and without actual knowledge of the fraud.
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725 F.2d 634·
11th Cir.·
1984-02-24
·cited 65×
The court held that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), acting as receiver and then corporate purchaser of assets, was entitled to rely on the bank's official records under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) to establish its interest in a loan participation, precluding extrinsic e
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655 F.2d 743·
7th Cir.·
1981-07-17
·cited 59×
The court held that the D'Oench doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) do not bar defenses arising from explicit terms within the asset the FDIC seeks to enforce.
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907 F.2d 1101·
11th Cir.·
1990-08-03
·cited 58×
The court held that the acquisition agreement's explicit exclusion of obligations to stockholders meant the successor institution (New Freedom) was not liable for the shareholders' fraud claims.
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894 F.2d 750·
5th Cir.·
1990-02-21
·cited 55×
The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine bars claims against the FDIC and bridge banks based on unrecorded agreements, even if the borrower was unaware of the agreement's fraudulent nature or was coerced.
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651 F.2d 355·
5th Cir.·
1981-07-20
·cited 52×
The court held that 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) protects the FDIC from unwritten collateral agreements that diminish an asset's value, unless specific statutory requirements are met. Judge Clark, concurring, believes the majority's interpretation of the statute's reach is too broad.
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880 F.2d 1267·
11th Cir.·
1989-08-21
·cited 49×
The court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine estops the defendant from asserting defenses based on an alleged oral agreement to fund the entire project, as this agreement was not reflected in the savings and loan's records and would mislead regulatory authorities.
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915 F.2d 1013·
5th Cir.·
1990-10-31
·cited 44×
The D’Oench, Duhme doctrine bars the Bowens' claims against the FDIC, as receiver, because their suit is based on an unrecorded oral agreement with the failed bank.
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885 F.2d 266·
5th Cir.·
1989-10-10
·cited 40×
The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the jury's findings of fraud and misrepresentation were supported by sufficient evidence and that FSLIC's defenses were not applicable.
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868 F.2d 1151·
10th Cir.·
1989-02-16
·cited 35×
The court held that the FDIC was not entitled to summary disposition based on Langley v. FDIC because the notes were already voided by a prior judgment. The court also held that Grubb had standing under Rule 10b-5 because he was directly induced by misrepresentations and personal
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932 F.2d 46·
1st Cir.·
1991-05-03
·cited 34×
The D'Oench doctrine bars borrowers' affirmative claims against the FDIC based on secret oral agreements, even if those claims sound in tort.
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795 F.2d 1102·
1st Cir.·
1986-06-27
·cited 32×
The court held that the FDIC met its burden for summary judgment, and the appellants' defenses and claims were immaterial under federal law or unsupported by admissible evidence.
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716 F. Supp. 1416·
M.D. Fla.·
1989-07-20
·cited 30×
The court granted dismissal for failure to allege damages for Pine Trace on multiple counts and for Bader on Count III, but denied dismissal on other grounds, struck specific affirmative defenses, and partially granted/denied motions regarding jury trial and severance.
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907 F.2d 1523·
5th Cir.·
1990-07-25
·cited 29×
The D’Oench, Duhme doctrine bars borrowers from bringing actions against the FDIC as receiver based on fraud in the inducement, even if those actions are framed as federal securities law claims.
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939 F.2d 1225·
5th Cir.·
1991-08-28
·cited 28×
The court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) bar the Hamiltons' setoff claim based on an unwritten banking custom regarding timely fund advances, as these obligations were not reflected in the bank's records.
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834 F.2d 248·
1st Cir.·
1987-12-07
·cited 28×
The court held that a release agreement, which did not meet the requirements of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), was invalid against the FDIC, and that no novation occurred that would extinguish the guarantors' liability.
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737 F.2d 1513·
11th Cir.·
1984-08-01
·cited 27×
The FDIC is entitled to 100% of unearned premium refunds from Gulf Life, as Gulf Life's defenses are barred by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) and federal common law, and Vonna Jo Gregory's appeal fails due to lack of proof of bankruptcy discharge.
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847 F.2d 440·
7th Cir.·
1988-06-01
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in awarding Rule 11 sanctions because Tekfen's arguments, while persistent, were not frivolous and were understandable given the court's inconsistent rulings and denial of discovery.
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913 F.2d 487·
8th Cir.·
1990-08-31
·cited 24×
The FDIC is not bound by unrecorded agreements that diminish its interest in a bank asset, but a customer can prove actual payments or misappropriations against the FDIC.
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892 F.2d 47·
8th Cir.·
1989-12-15
·cited 24×
The court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) protect subsequent purchasers of notes acquired by the FDIC from defenses based on secret oral agreements, and that this protection extends to the subsequent purchaser, Merchants.
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872 F.2d 1240·
6th Cir.·
1989-04-17
·cited 24×
The court held that the FDIC failed to prove the existence of a second debt secured by the deed of trust, and therefore the deed of trust was extinguished by operation of law upon payment of the first debt, making the FDIC's reliance on 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) misplaced.
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858 F.2d 441·
8th Cir.·
1988-10-06
·cited 23×
The court held that federal common law, specifically the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and its statutory codification, bars an accommodation guarantor from asserting defenses based on oral side agreements against the FSLIC as receiver.
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898 F.2d 996·
5th Cir.·
1990-04-06
·cited 22×
The court held that the notice of appeal only conferred jurisdiction over the partnership, not the individual partners, and affirmed the summary judgment for FSLIC based on the D'Oench doctrine, rejecting the partnership's defenses.
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872 F.2d 707·
6th Cir.·
1989-04-06
·cited 22×
The court held that the oral agreement to repurchase loan participations was unenforceable because it was not an independent collateral agreement and was barred by the parol evidence rule, and also because it violated federal public policy protecting the FDIC.
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772 F.2d 1262·
6th Cir.·
1985-09-11
·cited 22×
The dissenting judge argues that the FDIC should not be immune from state law defenses like usury and failure of consideration when collecting on notes acquired in a purchase and assumption transaction, as this undermines borrower expectations and disrupts commercial relationship
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867 F.2d 1381·
11th Cir.·
1989-03-16
·cited 21×
The court held that Morley lacked standing to challenge the FDIC's financial assistance program because he failed to demonstrate a judicially cognizable injury, the alleged injury was not fairly traceable to the FDIC's conduct, and a favorable decision would not redress his claim
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856 F.2d 112·
10th Cir.·
1988-09-07
·cited 21×
The court held that 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) bars guarantors from asserting fraud in the inducement based on unwritten misrepresentations against the FDIC, and that a continuing guaranty accrues a new cause of action as each underlying debt matures.
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968 F.2d 1332·
1st Cir.·
1992-06-19
·cited 20×
The court held that the FDIC, as receiver, cannot raise federal defenses for the first time on appeal under FIRREA, and that the D'Oench doctrine does not bar all claims related to the kickback scheme.
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923 F.2d 353·
5th Cir.·
1991-01-28
·cited 20×
The federal holder in due course doctrine does not apply to non-negotiable instruments, and summary judgment was premature on the defendant's prevention of performance claim due to insufficient discovery.
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937 F.2d 845·
3d Cir.·
1991-06-27
·cited 18×
Investors cannot raise fraud in the inducement as a defense to enforcement of unconditional promissory notes by the RTC when the RTC acquired the notes from a failed bank, due to the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
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928 F.2d 1077·
11th Cir.·
1991-04-17
·cited 17×
The D'Oench doctrine applies to subsidiaries of federally insured banking institutions and bars claims based on unrecorded agreements, regardless of the FSLIC's knowledge of those claims prior to acquisition.
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953 F.2d 975·
5th Cir.·
1992-02-20
·cited 16×
The court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine does not bar claims for wrongful acceleration and commercially unreasonable disposition of collateral, as these arise from implied obligations of the loan agreement, not secret oral agreements. However, other claims based on oral pr
-
939 F.2d 1231·
5th Cir.·
1991-08-28
·cited 16×
The court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine does not bar Laguarta's defense based on the loan agreement's funding obligations, and that the record was insufficient to grant summary judgment on the budget issue.
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921 F.2d 241·
9th Cir.·
1990-12-21
·cited 16×
The D'Oench doctrine applies to bar counterclaims and defenses based on an alleged oral agreement to lend the full amount when that agreement is not clearly and explicitly reflected in the bank's records.
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928 F.2d 1558·
11th Cir.·
1991-04-25
·cited 15×
The D'Oench doctrine applies even when borrowers act in good faith and reasonably, barring defenses based on unrecorded agreements or conditions, including the truth of a bank's financial statements.
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895 F.2d 824·
1st Cir.·
1990-02-07
·cited 15×
The court held that Bracero's liability on the mortgage note was discharged when the underlying debt was paid and cancelled, and that FDIC could not enforce the note against Bracero.
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861 F.2d 853·
5th Cir.·
1988-12-15
·cited 15×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellants' motion to join the FDIC as Receiver, as the appellants had waived their right to do so by failing to oppose the substitution of the FDIC as Corporate earlier.
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919 F.2d 384·
6th Cir.·
1990-11-19
·cited 14×
Federal common law applies to claims involving the FDIC's role as receiver or purchaser of assets from a failed bank, and the FDIC receives priority over former stockholders' direct actions against officers and directors.
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909 F.2d 306·
8th Cir.·
1990-07-18
·cited 14×
The court held that the Janikula and Jensen memoranda, the fraud defense, and the termination defense based on the Lund letter are all barred by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) because they do not meet the statute's requirements for agreements to be valid against the FDIC.
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893 F.2d 139·
7th Cir.·
1990-01-11
·cited 14×
The court held that a setoff based on rescission of a loan participation due to alleged oral misrepresentations by the failed bank is barred by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), as such misrepresentations are treated as unwritten agreements that cannot diminish the FDIC's rights.
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869 F.2d 270·
6th Cir.·
1989-02-17
·cited 14×
The dissenting judge would hold that Turner's negligence in executing the guaranty in blank substantially contributed to its alteration, precluding his defense under Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-3-406.
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640 F.2d 699·
5th Cir.·
1981-03-26
·cited 14×
The court held that the obligors failed to present evidence of a breach of contract by the lender or FDIC, and that FDIC was protected by federal statute from unwritten agreements.
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872 F.2d 955·
10th Cir.·
1989-04-20
·cited 13×
The court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine protects the FSLIC from undisclosed agreements, even if memorialized in the failed lender's records.
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610 So. 2d 531·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1992-12-04
·cited 12×
The Lassiters appealed a summary judgment foreclosing their mortgage held by the Resolution Trust Corporation, arguing their affirmative defenses of fraud, failure of consideration, and setoff were improperly barred. The court reversed, holding that the D'Oench doctrine and 12 U.
-
955 F.2d 583·
8th Cir.·
1992-01-30
·cited 12×
The court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and its statutory counterpart preclude claims based on alleged oral side agreements that were not in writing and properly executed. The court also found no abuse of discretion in dismissing the claims with prejudice without leave to
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920 F.2d 334·
6th Cir.·
1990-11-28
·cited 12×
The court held that the D'Oench doctrine does not apply when the FDIC does not acquire an asset from a failed institution, even if it seeks to protect the FDIC from liability.
-
874 F.2d 264·
5th Cir.·
1989-06-02
·cited 12×
The court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine was inapplicable and that TNB was entitled to set off debts owed to the insolvent bank due to fraud in loan participations.
-
984 F.2d 1571·
10th Cir.·
1993-02-09
·cited 11×
The court held that the D'Oench doctrine and FIRREA's statutory counterpart, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), bar Castleglen's claims against the RTC, whether characterized as contract defenses or affirmative tort claims, because the alleged misrepresentations constituted fraud in the induce
-
855 F.2d 196·
5th Cir.·
1988-08-30
·cited 10×
Under the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, Watkins is estopped from asserting fraud against FSLIC because his alleged oral agreement with the bank was not in writing.
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825 F.2d 143·
7th Cir.·
1987-07-16
·cited 10×
The court held that a guaranty signed by the defendant was a valid asset of the failed bank, and an alleged oral agreement to limit liability was unenforceable against the FDIC under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).