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971 F.2d 428·
10th Cir.·
1992-04-27
·cited 8×
The FDIC-C cannot be held directly liable for the FDIC-R's actions, and claims for future rent against a bank receiver are unprovable under federal law.
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934 F.2d 1199·
11th Cir.·
1991-06-28
·cited 8×
The court held that the D'Oench Duhme doctrine barred defenses based on unrecorded agreements, and the notes did not create a partnership or breach a duty of good faith. However, the nonrecourse nature of the notes limited liability to pledged assets.
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867 F.2d 240·
5th Cir.·
1989-03-08
·cited 8×
The court held that the FDIC is protected by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) from a borrower's claim that a deed of trust is void under state law, when that claim relies on an undisclosed side agreement.
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862 F.2d 378·
1st Cir.·
1988-11-23
·cited 8×
The court held that proper notice of default and acceleration was given, and the FDIC is protected from affirmative defenses by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
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818 F.2d 661·
8th Cir.·
1987-05-12
·cited 8×
The court held that the Executive Compensation Plan was not a 'funded' plan under ERISA because the insurance policy was treated as a general asset of the bank, not a separate res for the employee's benefit.
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935 F.2d 89·
5th Cir.·
1991-07-10
·cited 7×
The court held that the RTC, as successor in interest to a failed savings and loan, was entitled to summary judgment on promissory notes, and that the Murrays' counterclaims and set-off claims based on alleged oral agreements and unliquidated services were barred.
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805 F.2d 14·
1st Cir.·
1986-11-10
·cited 7×
The court held that the three-year statute of limitations applies to commercial loans and that Consolidated's acknowledgments of debt prevented the statute from barring the FDIC's claims. However, Suro's liability as a guarantor requires further factual development.
-
983 F.2d 644·
5th Cir.·
1993-02-16
·cited 6×
The court held that the D'Oench doctrine and related statutes do not apply to a bank's sale of an asset in a non-banking transaction, allowing breach of warranty claims to proceed.
-
972 F.2d 196·
8th Cir.·
1992-07-30
·cited 6×
The federal court's jurisdiction was exclusive after removal, rendering the state appellate court's dismissal order void.
-
947 F.2d 196·
6th Cir.·
1991-10-10
·cited 6×
The court held that the agreement tending to diminish the FDIC's interest was part of the asset itself and met the statutory requirements.
-
907 F.2d 1233·
1st Cir.·
1990-06-29
·cited 6×
Summary judgment was properly granted because the promissory note signed by Rivera was personally binding, and the agreements offered by appellants were invalid against the FDIC under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
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962 F.2d 780·
8th Cir.·
1992-04-17
·cited 5×
The court held that 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(e) applies to the Medical Center's claim for a security interest, barring it because the agreement did not meet the statute's requirements, and that the FDIC properly succeeded the FSLIC as receiver.
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858 F.2d 670·
11th Cir.·
1988-10-25
·cited 5×
-
987 F.2d 685·
10th Cir.·
1993-03-12
·cited 4×
The court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine did not bar ORA's defense regarding the ORA note because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the presence of renewal agreements in the bank's files and whether ORA lent itself to a deceptive scheme. The court affirmed
-
981 F.2d 852·
5th Cir.·
1993-01-28
·cited 4×
The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and its statutory analogue, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), apply to prevent borrowers from asserting defenses based on unwritten agreements or alterations that mislead federal bank examiners, even if the alterations were made by the bank itself.
-
981 F.2d 730·
5th Cir.·
1992-11-19
·cited 4×
The D'Oench Duhme doctrine and FIRREA bar affirmative claims against the FDIC based on unwritten or unrecorded agreements, even if the claim does not affect a specific asset.
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973 F.2d 403·
5th Cir.·
1992-09-25
·cited 4×
The court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine bars Payne's fraudulent inducement defense, but the federal holder in due course doctrine does not apply to non-negotiable guaranties, allowing Payne to assert defenses regarding notice of collateral sale and commercial reasonablene
-
947 F.2d 1153·
4th Cir.·
1991-10-23
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court correctly applied the parol evidence rule to bar the oral agreement defense, but erred in awarding attorneys' fees exceeding the actual incurred amount.
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938 F.2d 591·
5th Cir.·
1991-08-12
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court erred in granting a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal because the plaintiffs' complaint did not, on its face, establish that their claims were barred by the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine or 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
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898 F.2d 669·
8th Cir.·
1990-03-16
·cited 4×
The court held that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), in its corporate capacity, is entitled to enforce a personal guaranty against a debtor, even when the debtor raises the defense of fraudulent inducement, due to the protections afforded by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
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769 F.2d 666·
10th Cir.·
1985-08-07
·cited 4×
The court held that the defendant was estopped from denying liability on the assumption agreement under the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, and that the appeal was frivolous.
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739 F.2d 26·
1st Cir.·
1984-07-25
·cited 4×
The court held that a letter from the debtor to the bank, stating that personal guarantees had been substituted by other collateral, constituted legally sufficient written notice of cancellation under the guaranty agreement, even if the bank did not explicitly acknowledge it.
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643 So. 2d 1179·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1994-10-14
·cited 2×
The court held that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the bank is a holder in due course, requiring reversal of the foreclosure judgment.
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629 So. 2d 242·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1993-12-14
·cited 2×
The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) prevent a borrower from asserting personal defenses against a note holder who acquired the note from the FDIC, even if the note contains a consumer protection clause, unless the note itself facially manifests bilateral obligatio
-
987 F.2d 1216·
5th Cir.·
1993-04-14
·cited 2×
The court held that the FDIC's removal of the primary case was untimely, and the district court erred in denying remand. The court affirmed the summary judgment on the secondary case.
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984 F.2d 254·
8th Cir.·
1993-01-27
·cited 2×
The court held that the D'Oench doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) bar oral agreements and defenses not reflected in the bank's official records when the FDIC or its assignees are involved. Therefore, the McKenzies' counterclaims and defenses based on alleged oral promises were pro
-
973 F.2d 1160·
5th Cir.·
1992-09-16
·cited 2×
The court held that removal jurisdiction was proper and adopted the state appellate court's judgment, vacating the district court's judgment and remanding for a new trial.
-
967 F.2d 1053·
5th Cir.·
1992-08-07
·cited 2×
The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the bank's board of directors approved the permanent loan commitment, and that the plaintiffs' jury demand should not have been struck.
-
960 F.2d 567·
5th Cir.·
1992-05-15
·cited 2×
Ownership of a peanut allotment passes with the foreclosure of the entire parcel of land upon which the allotment is in effect, and an oral reservation of ownership is insufficient without the bank's agreement.
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935 F.2d 83·
5th Cir.·
1991-07-10
·cited 2×
The D’Oench, Duhme doctrine bars a debtor's claims against a financial institution's successor when the debtor lent herself to a scheme or arrangement likely to mislead banking authorities, even if the debtor's conduct was not overtly reckless.
-
937 F.2d 1350·
8th Cir.·
1991-07-03
·cited 2×
The dissenting judge would affirm the district court's judgment, finding the FDIC barred by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) from asserting claims against the bank.
-
869 F.2d 15·
1st Cir.·
1989-03-08
·cited 2×
Summary judgment for the FDIC was improper because genuine issues of material fact remain regarding whether the FDIC is a holder in due course of the promissory note.
-
751 F. Supp. 1323·
M.D. Fla.·
1994-03-31
·cited 1×
The court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) barred the plaintiffs' claims based on alleged unwritten promises for end loan financing, and also defeated the plaintiffs' affirmative defenses to the FDIC's counterclaims.
-
833 F. Supp. 1525·
S.D. Fla.·
1992-07-06
·cited 1×
The court denied motions to dismiss most counts, finding that the D'Oench doctrine and related statutes did not bar the claims at this stage and that agency allegations were sufficient to proceed.
-
790 F. Supp. 1130·
M.D. Fla.·
1992-04-08
·cited 1×
The court held that the defendants' counterclaims and affirmative defenses based on an alleged oral joint venture agreement were barred by the D'Oench doctrine and the federal holder in due course doctrine, as these agreements were not reflected in the bank's official records.
-
918 F.2d 540·
5th Cir.·
1990-12-06
·cited 1×
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) does not preclude a borrower from asserting homestead rights under Texas law, even if the deed of trust contains a disclaimer, as long as the claim is not based on a separate agreement intended to deceive the FDIC. The denial of a directed verdict on the comme
-
57 F.4th 1203·
11th Cir.·
2023-01-12
Landcastle Acquisition Corp. sued Renasant Bank to recover funds from a certificate of deposit pledged as collateral for a loan, arguing that the law firm's manager lacked authority to pledge the asset on behalf of the firm. The Eleventh Circuit held that under the D'Oench doctri
-
354 F. Supp. 2d 1334·
S.D. Fla.·
2005-01-28
The court held that the plaintiff's claims against the FDIC are not barred by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) because the relevant agreement was documented in the failed bank's records.
-
840 F. Supp. 888·
S.D. Fla.·
1993-08-10
The court held that the RTC is not barred by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) from liability for a debt owed by a failed bank, and that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the plaintiff's mechanic's lien claim.
-
983 F.2d 156·
9th Cir.·
1993-01-08
The court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) did not preclude the seller from asserting a claim to a 1.65-acre parcel based on a mistaken conveyance, as the agreement to reconvey was not secret and the FDIC may not have acquired an interest in that parc
-
973 F.2d 1448·
9th Cir.·
1992-08-24
The enforceability of a guaranty held by the FDIC is governed by federal law, specifically the D'Oench doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), which protect the FDIC from secret agreements or extrinsic documents that diminish its interest in a bank asset.
-
966 F.2d 995·
5th Cir.·
1992-07-24
The court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine's applicability to the partners' liability limitation defense could not be determined without further factual findings regarding the filing of the guaranty. The court also held that the note was not a negotiable instrument, thus pre
-
631 F. App'x 276·
S.D. Fla.·
1991-12-27
The court held that the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) is protected by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) from defendants' personal contract defenses, entitling the RTC to summary judgment on the notes. Ownership of the notes and partnership capacity were also resolved in favor of the RTC.
-
944 F.2d 307·
6th Cir.·
1991-09-19
The court held that an oral agreement to forgive a debt is unenforceable against the FDIC under the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, and the doctrine of merger by deed does not apply to such oral agreements. However, a material issue of fact exists regarding the amount of the deficiency
-
563 So. 2d 763·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1990-06-15
Madonna Corp. and Tierra Verde, a joint venture, appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the FDIC in a mortgage foreclosure dispute. The court affirmed, holding that federal law under 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) precluded Tierra Verde's claims that an unrecorded deed in l
-
899 F.2d 340·
4th Cir.·
1990-04-04
The court held that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for the plaintiff bank, as the defendants' alleged collateral agreement was barred by the D'Oench doctrine and their new evidence was untimely.
-
886 F.2d 771·
6th Cir.·
1989-09-21
The court held that defendants were not personally liable on the promissory note because the campaign committee existed, the signature was in a representative capacity, and the D'Oench doctrine does not impose liability.
-
801 F.2d 863·
6th Cir.·
1986-09-25
The court held that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver, is not bound by unwritten or improperly documented agreements that tend to diminish its interest in a failed bank's assets, even if the FDIC had knowledge of such agreements.
-
785 F.2d 1335·
5th Cir.·
1986-04-04
The court held that the district court improperly granted a sua sponte directed verdict against SIC before SIC had fully presented its case, requiring vacation and remand. The court affirmed the dismissal of SIC's cross-claim against Whitlock.