LUREA CLARK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Clark appealed her conviction for second-degree murder entered through guilty plea, claiming the trial court violated due process by failing to comply with Boykin v. Alabama's requirements regarding waiver of constitutional rights. The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court adequately established the voluntariness and understanding of the plea despite the record not explicitly enumerating each waived right.
The appellate court held that while Boykin requires an affirmative showing of voluntariness and intelligence, the trial court need not enumerate each constitutional right separately when the record contains sufficient evidence of voluntary and knowing waiver. The non-silent record here—establishing voluntariness, understanding of the plea bargain, attorney satisfaction, and factual basis—permits an inference that Clark adequately waived her constitutional rights.
[1] A trial court may presume an adequate waiver of constitutional rights when entering a guilty plea if the record demonstrates the plea was voluntary, the defendant underst…
[2] A trial court's acceptance of a guilty plea is not rendered invalid by the court's inadvertent use of the term "nolo contendere" if the record otherwise reflects a knowin…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.”
Establishes Boykin's core requirement that courts must affirmatively establish the voluntariness and intelligence of guilty pleas from the record
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClark initially pleaded not guilty to a first-degree murder charge. She subsequently withdrew that plea and pled guilty to the lesser included offense…
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McCORD, Judge.
This is an appeal from judgment and sentence of appellant for second degree murder predicated upon a guilty plea. After having previously pled not guilty to an indictment charging first' degree murder, appellant appeared before the court with her attorney and withdrew her previously entered plea of not guilty and pled guilty to the lesser included offense of second degree murder. The guilty plea was entered with the understanding that there would be a presentence investigation and that she would not be sentenced to more than 20 years. The court questioned her and determined that she fully understood the plea bargain and the maximum sentence she would receive under it. The court further determined from its questions that she had not been threatened, coerced, intimidated or in any way forced to enter her plea and that she was pleading voluntarily to the charge of second degree murder. She advised that she was satisfied with the advice given to her and the services which were performed by her attorney; that she did, in fact, commit the homicide. The assistant state attorney then questioned appellant to establish a factual basis for the plea and she admitted that she did shoot Paul Walter Marshal with a pistol on the first day of June, 1974; that she did it unlawfully and from a premeditated design; that the pistol was in her possession in her purse and belonged to her mother. Although the appellant had pled guilty, the trial judge, perhaps inadvertently, accepted her “plea of nolo contendere.” Subsequently, after presentence investigation and report, she was adjudged guilty and sentenced to 20 years in the state prison.
Appellant contends that in accepting her guilty plea the trial court denied her due process in that it failed to follow the requirements set forth in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. Although the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Boykin listed three constitutional rights a defendant waives when he pleads guilty, it did not specify that the trial judge before accepting such a plea must enumerate such rights and secure an affirmative waiver from the defendant as to each of them. The court in Boykin stated:
“. . . So far as the record shows, the judge asked no questions of petitioner concerning his plea, and petitioner did not address the court.
Trial strategy may of course make a plea of guilty seem the desirable course. But the record is wholly silent on that point and throws no light on it.”
* *
“It was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner’s guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.”
The court then enumerated three constitutional rights that are waived when a plea of guilty is entered [(1) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination (2) the right to trial by jury and (3) the right to confront one’s accusers]. The court then said:
“We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record.” (Emphasis supplied)
The record in the case sub judice is at wide variance from the silent record in Boykin. Here it was established that the guilty plea was voluntary; that appellant fully understood the plea bargain that she had agreed to; that she was satisfied with the representation of her attorney and that there was a factual basis for the plea. Unlike Boykin, this is not a silent record and we can presume from this record that there was an adequate waiver by appellant of the previously enumerated constitutional rights. See Kelly v. State, Fla.App. (1st), 254 So. 2d 22 (1971); Hall v. State, Fla. App. (4th), 273 So. 2d 90 (1973); Dill v. State, Fla.App. (1st), 248 So. 2d 502 (1971); People v. Ferguson, 383 Mich. 645, 178 N.W. 2d 490; and Ford v. State, Fla.App. (1st), 317 So. 2d 473. Opinion filed August 12, 1975.
Affirmed.
RAWLS, Acting C. J., and MILLS, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Harris, 425 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…ould no longer invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in respect to these crimes. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969); Dearing v. State, 388 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Clark v. State, 317 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 83 S.Ct. 1151, 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963); United States v. Sanchez, 459 F. 2d 100 (2d Cir.1972); United States v.…
Authorities Cited
- Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1969)
- Williams v. State, 254 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Evans v. Louie L. Wainwright, 273 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
- Napoli v. State, 248 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- Ford v. State, 317 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)