DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, APPELLANT,
v.
STEVEN JAMES ARGEROS, APPELLEE
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The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles appealed a circuit court order that granted a driver's writ of certiorari challenging a one-year license suspension for accumulation of points, on due process grounds. The appellate court reversed, holding that prior notice and hearing are not constitutionally required before suspending a license based on point accumulation under Florida law.
The Department's procedure does not violate procedural due process. Prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before suspension are not constitutionally required for license suspension based on the statutory point accumulation system.
[1] A driver's license suspension for accumulating sufficient points does not require notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the suspension to satisfy procedural due…
[2] A circuit court order granting a petition for writ of certiorari and remanding a driver's license suspension for lack of pre-suspension notice and hearing is erroneous wh…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the failure of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to provide the individual who has accumulated sufficient points to warrant suspension of his driver's license under § 322.27 with notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the suspension of the individual's license does not deprive the individual of procedural due process”
The court's holding establishing that no pre-suspension hearing is constitutionally required for point-based license suspensions
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSteven James Argeros accumulated twenty-four points within thirty-six months and the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles suspended his dri…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellee, Steven James Argeros, had his driving privilege suspended by appellant, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, State of Florida, for a period of one year for the accumulation of twenty-four points within thirty-six months as authorized by Section 322.27(2) (c), Florida Statutes 1973. Argeros filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Orange County Circuit Court to review the order of suspension. The circuit court, in its order granting the petition for a writ of certiorari and remanding the cause to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles for further proceedings, determined that the procedure followed by the Department in suspending Argeros’ driver’s license without notice and opportunity to be heard prior to suspension constituted a deprivation of due process. It is from this order that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles takes the instant appeal.
The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles here contends that the holding of the circuit court was erroneous. We must agree. The Florida Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the failure of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to provide the individual who has accumulated sufficient points to warrant suspension of his driver’s license under § 322.27 with notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the suspension of the individual’s license does not deprive the individual of procedural due process. Jones v. Kirkman, 138 So. 2d 513 (Fla.1962) ; Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So. 2d 740 (Fla.1953).
Accordingly, the order of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter an order denying appellee’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
OWEN, C. J., and CROSS, J., concur. MAGER, J., concurs specially.
MAGER, Judge
(concurring specially):
In addition to the foregoing I concur in this decision for those reasons more fully set forth in Cappadona v. Keith, Fla.App. 1974, 290 So. 2d 545, affirmed Fla.1975, 306 So. 2d 515.
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BAY Area News, Inc. v. POE, 364 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…at the Athens city ordinance did not violate the first amendment. . Compare Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 158, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971) with Jones v. Kirkman, 138 So. 2d 513 (Fla.1962) and Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Argeros, 313 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).…
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Knap v. Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles, 46 Fla. Supp. 116 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1977)…unity to be heard prior to the suspension of the individual’s license is not required, see Jones v. Kirkman, 138 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1962); Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1953); and Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Argeros, 313 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974), and that the notice of suspension simply affords one the opportunity to proceed for a restricted license or other relief, if the individual so desires. We agree with the petitioner’s contentions. Under Fla. Stat. §322.27(2)…
Authorities Cited
- Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1953)
- Jones v. Kirkman, 138 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1962)
- Cappadona v. Keith, 290 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- THE Florida BAR v. Ivor W. Howard, 306 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1975)
- Cappadona v. Keith, 306 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1975)