KNAP
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES

Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. | 1977-10-04
No. 77-525-AP
46 Fla. Supp. 116 Dade County Circuit Court (1977)

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Synopsis

Knap challenges her driver's license suspension imposed by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles for accumulating 24 points within 36 months. The court grants her petition for writ of certiorari, holding that a suspension becomes effective upon the department's issuance of notice under proper statutory procedure, regardless of whether the driver actually receives it.


Holding

The suspension becomes effective upon the department's statutory proper issuance of notice, not upon the driver's actual receipt. Therefore, the original July 2, 1975 suspension order was effective from that date, and the 1977 reissuance was improper because the suspension period had already expired.


Headnotes

[1] A driver's license suspension is effective from the date of issuance, even if the driver fails to receive actual notice, provided the department has given statutorily pro…

[2] Failure to notify the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles of a change of address does not invalidate a driver's license suspension order if proper notice was…

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Key Quotes

“Under Fla. Stat. §322.27(2) (c) (1975) and §322.251 (1975), the effect of a suspension is not affected by the failure of the driver actually to receive the notice of that suspension so long, as in this case, the department has given statutorily proper notice.”

Establishes the controlling legal standard that suspension effectiveness depends on proper statutory notice procedures, not actual receipt

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Facts & Procedural History

Petitioner Laurie Ann Knap accumulated 24 points within 36 months, triggering a one-year suspension under Florida law. On July 2, 1975, the Department…

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Opinion of the Court
ALAN R. SCHWARTZ, GERALD T. WETHERINGTON and HERBERT STETTIN, Circuit Judges.

*117ALAN R. SCHWARTZ, GERALD T. WETHERINGTON and HERBERT STETTIN, Circuit Judges.

Final judgment granting petitioner’s writ of certiorari: Petitioner, Laurie Ann Knap, had her driving privileges suspended by the respondent, State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Driver Licenses, for a period of one year for the accumulation of 24 points within 36 months as authorized by Section 322.27(2)(c), Florida Statutes. The first order of suspension was mailed to the petitioner on July 2, 1975. The department mailed the order of July 2, 1975, by certified mail pursuant to Florida Statute 322.251. The notice was returned, because petitioner had moved from Gainesville to North Miami without notifying respondent pursuant to Florida Statute 322.19. Thereafter, in 1977, upon petitioner’s application for renewal of her license a new order of revocation dated June 24, 1977 suspended petitioner’s license for 12 months beginning on June 15, 1977 for the accumulation of 24 points within 36 months, this was actually a reissue of the original order of 1975 for the points accumulated prior to 1975 and therefore resulted in a suspension equal to 3/2 years. The respondent takes the position that the suspension began when the notice of suspension was actually delivered to the petitioner. It is from this order of suspension dated June 24, 1977, that petitioner has filed this petition for writ of certiorari.

The petitioner contends that the department’s procedure was erroneous, that the original order, issued in 1975, was effective from the date of its issuance and that, therefore, the suspension period has long since expired. The petitioner bases her contention on the fact that notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the suspension of the individual’s license is not required, see Jones v. Kirkman, 138 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1962); Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1953); and Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Argeros, 313 So.2d 55 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974), and that the notice of suspension simply affords one the opportunity to proceed for a restricted license or other relief, if the individual so desires.

We agree with the petitioner’s contentions. Under Fla. Stat. §322.27(2) (c) (1975) and §322.251 (1975), the effect of a suspension is not affected by the failure of the driver actually to receive the notice of that suspension so long, as in this case, the department has given statutorily proper notice. Accordingly, the petition for writ of certiorari shall be and it is hereby granted, and the suspension order dated June 4, 1977, of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Driver Licenses, is hereby set aside and it is ordered that the petitioner be allowed to renew her driver’s license upon successfully taking the re-examination test and paying the reinstatement fee.


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