EMIL T. COLE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Emil Cole appealed his convictions for breaking and entering a shopping center and restaurant with intent to commit petit larceny. The court affirmed, rejecting Cole's argument that the information was fatally defective because he only intended to steal drugs from the drug store, not commit crimes against the other premises.
The information was not fatally defective. Cole's conviction was proper because the evidence showed he broke and entered the Woodlawn Park Shopping Center premises, which contained multiple businesses under one roof, and his intent to steal drugs from the drug store within those premises was sufficient to establish the offense charged.
[1] A conviction for breaking and entering a building with intent to commit a misdemeanor is not precluded by the failure to actually commit the intended misdemeanor.
[2] Circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to prove the intent required for the offense of breaking and entering.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Intent is the gist of the offense charged. It was amply proven by the circumstantial evidence.”
Establishes that intent is the critical element for breaking and entering, and that Cole's admitted intent to steal drugs from the drug store satisfied this requirement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCole was charged with breaking and entering the Woodlawn Park Shopping Center and Park Inn Restaurant, both located at the same address in St. Petersb…
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The appellant, Emil T. Cole, seeks review of his convictions and sentences. The record reveals the following:
A two-count information was filed against appellant Cole by the state attorney of Pinellas County. He was charged with breaking and entering a building other than a dwelling house with intent to commit a misdemeanor, to wit: petit larceny, contrary to Section 810.05, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. In Count One of the information the building was described as that certain building known as Woodlawn Park Shopping Center, located at 1800 16th Street North, in the City of St. Petersburg. In Count Two of the information the building was described as that certain restaurant building known as Park Inn Restaurant, located at 1800 16th Street North in the City of St. Petersburg.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to both offenses, waived trial by jury with the consent of the court, and the case was tried before the Honorable William A. Patterson, Circuit Judge, in Pinellas County. Appellant was found guilty and sentenced under Count One to a term of six months to three years in the state penitentiary, and, under Count Two, to a term of six months to one year in the state penitentiary for attempt to commit the offense charged in said count, the terms to run concurrently.
The appellant asserts that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for new trial.
Appellant’s precise point is a challenge to the information. He contends it is fatally defective for the reason that he is charged therein with the commission of crimes that he did not intend to commit. Such contention is not well founded and is without merit. The evidence of the guilt of the appellant is clear and convincing.
The main thrust of appellant’s contention is that since he was frustrated in securing the drug, i. e. dilaudid, that he was attempting to steal from the Park Inn Drug Store, located in the Woodlawn Park Shopping Center, he cannot be convicted of the charges alleged in the information. We do not agree. See Turner v. State, Fla.App.1972, 267 So.2d 882. As noted previously, the appellant was charged with the offense of breaking and entering the Woodlawn Park Shopping Center. The probata, followed the allegata as we say. The evidence shows, without dispute, that *102the premises in issue were all under one common roof and attic. Appellant was arrested in the common attic by police officers from the St. Petersburg Police Department. A silent alarm system went off and alerted the law enforcement authorities and they are to be highly complimented for the efficient manner in which they responded and acted. Further, Cole, upon arrest and after being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, admitted to Detective Donald J. Handstad, who testified as a witness for the state, that he was a heroin addict; had a $150 a day habit; intended to break into the drug store to steal drugs to satisfy his habit; but, that he did not intend to steal from the Park Inn Restaurant. Intent is the gist of the offense charged. It was amply proven by the circumstantial evidence. Edwards v. State, Fla.App.1968, 213 So.2d 274; Hall v. State, Fla.App.1972, 260 So.2d 881.
Appellant is entitled to a fair and impartial trial and he was accorded one. The discerning trial judge, after hearing all of the evidence and oral argument of counsel for the parties at the conclusion of the case, found the appellant guilty as charged in Count One and guilty of attempt to commit the offense charged in Count Two of the information.
We have very carefully considered the appellant’s contention in the light of the record and briefs of counsel, oral argument was waived by stipulation, and have concluded that no reversible error has been demonstrated.
Therefore, for the reasons stated, the judgments and sentences appealed from are hereby
Affirmed.
HOBSON, A. C. J., concurs.
McNULTY, J., concurs in conclusion only.
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Rozier v. State, 402 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…or conveyance at the time the offender entered or remained in it (section 810.02(3)). . Vawter v. State, 63 So. 2d 255 (Fla.1953); Charles v. State, 36 Fla. 691, 18 So. 369 (1895); Dowis v. State, 326 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Cole v. State, 276 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). . For similar reasoning relating to the word “knowingly,” see State v. Buffett, 397 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). . The allegation in count 2 was not sufficient to allege a trespass which would be a misdemean- or of the first…
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State v. Fields, 390 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…ment, but without requisite clarity. The intent to commit a crime within the structure has long been recognized as the “gist of the offense.” Charles v. State, 36 Fla. 691, 18 So. 369 (1895); Vawter v. State, 63 So. 2d 255 (Fla.1953); Cole v. State, 276 So. 2d 100 (Fla.2d DCA 1973). Yet, since at least 1876, it has also been held that: Where the definition of an offense, whether it be at common law or by statute, “includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offense in th…
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Dowis v. State, 326 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)…ttery, or for that matter, the intent to commit any misdemeanor. The intent charged in the Information is an essential element of the offense, Vawter v. State, 63 So. 2d 255 (Fla.1953); Jenkins v. State, 58 Fla. 62, 50 So. 582 (1909); Cole v. State, 276 So. 2d 100 (Fla.App. 2nd, 1973), and the State’s failure to prove such element is fatal. Simpson v. State, 81 Fla. 292, 87 So. 920 (1921). The State’s evidence of intent was wholly circumstantial and, far from excluding every reasonable hypothesis of lack of i…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Edwards v. State, 213 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Hall v. State, 260 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- Hoke Larry Turner v. State, 267 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)