HOKE LARRY TURNER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Turner was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit petit larceny but acquitted of the underlying petit larceny itself. The court affirmed, holding that these are two separate substantive offenses and that conviction on the breaking and entering charge does not require conviction on the larceny charge.
Yes. Breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny and larceny are two separate substantive offenses arising under different penal statutes, and a conviction on the breaking and entering charge does not require a conviction on the larceny charge.
[1] A conviction for breaking and entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor is a separate offense from the misdemeanor itself, and acquittal of the misdemeanor does no…
[2] The offenses of larceny and burglary with intent to commit larceny are distinct offenses arising under different statutes.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Each count is a substantive offense and stands on its own bottom.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that breaking and entering and larceny are separate offenses that do not depend on each other for conviction
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTurner was charged with breaking and entering with intent to commit petit larceny and petit larceny arising from the same transaction. A police office…
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In this case appellant Hoke Larry Turner was originally charged by information filed in the Polk County Criminal Court of Record in two counts. Count I charged breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, to-wit: petit larceny, and Count II charged .petit larceny.
On trial before a jury he was acquitted of petit larceny on the second count and convicted on the first count charging breaking and entering with intent to commit petit larceny. It was all the outgrowth of the same transaction. Turner contends that inasmuch as he was acquitted of petit larceny he could not be convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit the petit larceny. While the situation is unusual and somewhat anomalous there is no inconsistency. Each count is a substantive offense and stands on its own bottom.
As contended in the State’s brief, breaking and entering might well have been accompanied with the requisite intent to steal something of value inside the building, but for some reason, not too difficult to fathom, no such theft was actually carried out. In Footman v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 203 So.2d 356, this 2nd District Court held that the offenses of larceny on the one hand and burglary of a building with intent to commit larceny on the other hand were two separate offenses arising under different penal statutes, and for which separate sentences could be imposed upon conviction.
There was ample evidence to sustain the verdict as to breaking and entering. Shortly after 5 o’clock A.M. a police officer in Lakeland received a call to go to a Supermarket and upon getting there observed Turner walking about 100 feet away from the building. Upon taking him into custody the officer investigated and *883found the front of the store building broken, pieces of glass lying around, and blood on the floor inside of the store window and on the pieces of glass. When Turner was apprehended and stopped, he was bleeding, with a trail of blood from the area where the window was broken and ending at the approximate location where he was arrested. Such facts were consistent with the hypothesis that Turner was the one who broke the window, cut himself in so doing, and left the premises with a trail of blood pointing directly to him as the person who had burglarized the store.
There being no other point raised to taint the judgment of conviction appealed, it is thereupon—
Affirmed.
HOBSON and McNULTY, JJ., concur.
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State v. Waters, 436 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1983)…. State, 44 Fla. 466, 32 So. 954 (1902); Clifton v. State, 26 Fla. 523, 7 So. 863 (1890); Charles v. State, 36 Fla. 691, 18 So. 369 (1895); Jackson v. State, 300 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 753 (Fla.1975); Turner v. State, 267 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); Dobry v. State, 211 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Bonamy v. State, 205 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Groneau v. State, 201 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 207 So. 2d 452 (Fla.1967). Although there may be exceptions wh…1 / 2
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Emil T. Cole v. State, 276 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)…e drug, i. e. dilaudid, that he was attempting to steal from the Park Inn Drug Store, located in the Woodlawn Park Shopping Center, he cannot be convicted of the charges alleged in the information. We do not agree. See Turner v. State, Fla.App.1972, 267 So. 2d 882. As noted previously, the appellant was charged with the offense of breaking and entering the Woodlawn Park Shopping Center. The probata, followed the allegata as we say. The evidence shows, without dispute, that [*102] the premises in issue were al…
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Mendez v. State, 280 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)…are related, it is generally held that where two separate statues are violated two separate and distinct crimes have occurred. See, Steele v. Mayo, Fla.1954, 72 So. 2d 386; Kish v. State, Fla.App.1967, 198 So. 2d 639; Turner v. State, Fla.App.1972, 267 So. 2d 882; Cooper v. State, Fla.App.1972, 261 So. 2d 859. We are, therefore, of the view that the trial court did not err in finding appellants guilty on both counts of the information and imposing one sentence upon each of them. We have considered all othe…
Authorities Cited
- Footman v. State, 203 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)