UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
CHARLES LEVERN HUDSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. CARMELINA VERA ROJAS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

11th Cir. | 2012-07-02
Nos. 10-14428, 10-14662
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, and TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON, CARNES, BARKETT, HULL, MARCUS, WILSON, PRYOR, MARTIN, FAY and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
685 F.3d 1260 Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (2012) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases
Opinion of the Court
BY THE COURT:

BY THE COURT: We previously vacated the panels’ opinions to rehear these appeals en banc. United States v. Rojas, 659 F. 3d 1055 (11th Cir.2011); United States v. Hudson, 659 F. 3d 1056 (11th Cir.2011). The issue before us in both cases was whether the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which raised the quantities of crack cocaine required to trigger mandatory-minimum penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), applies to defendants sentenced after the Act’s effective date of August 3, 2010, but whose conduct occurred before that date.

On June 21, 2012, the United States Supreme Court answered the question and held that the more lenient mandatory-minimums in the Act do apply to all of those defendants sentenced after August 3, 2010, when the Act took effect. Dorsey v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012).

Accordingly, we now vacate the defendants’ sentences, and remand both appeals back to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida for re-sentencing consistent with the decision by the Supreme Court. VACATED and REMANDED.

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  • United States v. Bishop Capers, 708 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2013)
    …e FSA did not apply to their respective sentencing guidelines calculations because their crimes were committed prior to the Act being passed on August 3, 2010. The government concedes that this was error, and we agree. See United States v. Hudson, 685 F. 3d 1260, 1260-61 (11th Cir.2012) (en banc). Therefore we vacate Mr. Little’s and Mr. Capers’s sentences and remand their cases for resentencing in light of the FSA. III. CONCLUSION In sum, we reach the following conclusions: (1) Mr. Frederick’s conviction…
  • United States v. Erick Hinds, 713 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2013)
    …ers already sentenced and those not yet sentenced as of August 3) cannot make a critical difference.” Id. While we have applied Dorsey in vacating the sentences of defendants who were sentenced post-FSA for pre-FSA offenses, United States v. Hudson, 685 F. 3d 1260 (11th Cir.2012) (en banc), we have not explicitly addressed whether the FSA applies to a de novo resentencing following an initial pre-August 3, 2010 sentencing. We now hold that there is no meaningful difference between an initial sentence and a r…

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