JENNIFER MARTIN
v.
CRAIG SATER

Fla. 5th DCA | 2025-12-10
No. 2024-1301
Soud, J., Wallis, J., Lambert, J., Edwards, J., Boatwright, J., MacIver, J., Makar, J., Eisnaugle, J., Kilbane, J., Jay, C.J., Speicher, J.
2025 FL 11773 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2025)

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Holding

When a marital settlement agreement is incorporated into a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, a party seeking to set aside the agreement must seek relief from the judgment itself under Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540, not under the Casto v. Casto test. Rule 12.540(b)(3) permits relief from a final judgment only upon a showing of fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by the non-moving party, not upon a showing of unfairness or unreasonableness of the agreement's terms. The trial court's denial of Martin's motion was affirmed because the record contained insufficient evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by Sater.

Headnotes

[1] When a marital settlement agreement is incorporated into a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, a party seeking to set aside the agreement must seek relief from the…

[2] Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540, not the Casto v. …

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Key Quotes

“When a marital settlement agreement is incorporated into a judgment, relief from the agreement requires relief from the judgment.”

Establishes the fundamental principle that post-judgment challenges to incorporated agreements must be brought as challenges to the judgment itself, not to the agreement.

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Facts & Procedural History

Jennifer Martin and Craig Sater separated after a 28-year marriage. The parties voluntarily attended mediation sessions with a certified family law me…

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Topics
Motion To Set Aside Marital Settlement Agreement Florida Family Law Rule Of Procedure 12.540 Petition For Dissolution Of Marriage Florida Rule Of Civil Procedure 1.540

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Opinion of the Court
Jay

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________ Case No. 5D2024-1301 LT Case No. 2022-DR-10836 _____________________________ JENNIFER MARTIN, Appellant, v. CRAIG SATER, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County. Kathryn M. Speicher, Judge. Elizabeth Siano Harris, of Harris Appellate Law Office, Mims, for Appellant. Curtis N. Flajole, of Curtis N. Flajole, P.A,, Rockledge, for Appellee. December 10, 2025

EN BANC

SOUD, J.

Appellant Jennifer Martin appeals the trial court’s denial of her verified motion to set aside marital settlement agreement, which she filed after entry of the final judgment ratifying the agreement, making it a part of the judgment, and dissolving her

I.

Martin and Sater separated after a more than 28-year marriage. During their marriage, Sater was a dentist, and Martin worked in the dental practice. Contemplating the immediate filing of a petition for dissolution of their marriage, the parties voluntarily attended numerous mediation sessions with a certified family law mediator who was an attorney and had been contacted by Martin to conduct the mediation. The result was a marital settlement agreement.1 Casto, 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987). Martin claimed that during mediation of the parties’ divorce, she remained “an emotional

1 An addendum to the agreement that benefited Martin was later signed by the parties.

II.

In resolving this case, we first consider which law governs Martin’s motion. Should the motion have been resolved under the dictates of Casto, or does Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540 drive the trial court’s analysis? And we do so de novo. See O’Hair v. O’Hair, 396 So. 3d 630, 631 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024) (citing Bosem v. Musa Holdings, Inc., 46 So. 3d 42, 44 (Fla. 2010)), review denied, No. SC2024-0853, 2024 WL 3515473 (Fla. July 24, 2024). Though the trial court’s Casto analysis was consistent with our binding precedent in Suppa, we now conclude Casto does not apply. Rather, rule 12.540 governs.

A.

1.

At the outset, it is helpful to recall Casto and certain of its progeny. In Casto, the parties entered into a postnuptial agreement approximately one year prior to filing a dissolution action—when the parties were not contemplating divorce. See

2 At the time of Macar, rule 12.540 provided that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 applied except that there was no time limit on claims of fraudulent financial affidavits in marital or paternity cases. See 803 So. 2d at 709 n.4; see also Suppa, 871 So. 2d at 989 n.1.

2.

Rule 12.540 governs a party’s motion seeking relief from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The rule provides five grounds upon which a movant may be granted relief from judgment. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540(b). Pertinent here, the rule allows a movant to timely seek relief from a final judgment when the adverse party engaged in “fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct.” See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.540(b)(3). Importantly, the plain language of rule 12.540(b) provides no opportunity for relief from a final judgment based upon an alleged unfairness or unreasonableness of a marital settlement agreement incorporated thereby. Rather, relevant to the case before us, rule 12.540(b)(3) focuses entirely on the alleged conduct of the non-moving party and allows for relief from a final judgment

B.

With this law in mind, we turn to this case. Martin’s motion was governed by rule 12.540 because the final judgment dissolving the marriage and incorporating the marital settlement agreement was entered before she sought relief. As the Sixth District succinctly concluded in O’Hair, “[w]hen a marital settlement agreement is incorporated into a judgment, relief from the agreement requires relief from the judgment.” 396 So. 3d at 631 (emphasis added). And when a party seeks relief from an agreement ratified and incorporated by a final judgment, she “must do so by seeking relief from the judgment, not the agreement.” Id. at 632–33 (citing Miller v. Preefer,1 So. 3d 1278, 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“Effectively, the trial court had incorporated the settlement agreement into its final judgment resolving the 1992 lawsuit. When it did, the settlement agreement, even though it contained an illegal covenant restraining trade, essentially became sheltered within the judgment. To undo the settlement agreement, or even just the covenant not to compete recited within it, Miller was required to undo the judgment itself.”)). We agree. The entry of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage is a terminal event in the litigation of the petition for dissolution of marriage. And once the time for appeal has run, it resolves “for all time” the substantive terms of the parties’ divorce, as framed by the petition (and any counter petition). See Miller v. Fortune Ins., 484 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. 1986).3

3 Rule 12.540(b) is “substantively identical” to rule 1.540. See Macar, 803 So. 2d at 709 n.4. As a result, “motions filed under rule 12.540(b) are governed by the body of law applicable to rule 1.540(b).” Shlimbaum v. Shlimbaum, 394 So. 3d 1157, 1161 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). See also Gjokhila v. Seymour, 349 So. 3d 496, 499 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).

C.

Nonetheless, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Martin’s motion because the record makes clear that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate any basis under rule 12.540 to vacate the final

III.

As a result, we AFFIRM the trial court’s order denying Martin’s motion to set aside the marital settlement agreement. In doing so, and in light of the statement in Macar indicating that the Casto analysis applies only to agreements entered into prior to litigation and discovery, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question as one of great public importance: DOES MACAR V. MACAR, 803 SO. 2D 707 (FLA. 2001)

REQUIRE THE TRIAL COURT TO APPLY FAMILY RULE

12.540 RATHER THAN THE “UNFAIRNESS TEST” OF CASTO V. CASTO, 508 SO. 2D 330 (FLA. 1987) TO THE RESOLUTION

OF POST-JUDGMENT LITIGATION SEEKING TO SET ASIDE

A

MARITAL

SETTLEMENT

AGREEMENT—THAT

WAS

ENTERED INTO JUST PRIOR TO FILING FOR DIVORCE AND

WITH THE SPECIFIC INTENT TO INCORPORATE IT INTO A

FINAL JUDGMENT OF DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE—

WHERE THE PARTIES DID NOT ENGAGE IN FORMAL

DISCOVERY OR LITIGATION BEFORE ENTRY OF FINAL

JUDGMENT? It is so ordered.

WALLIS, LAMBERT, EDWARDS, BOATWRIGHT, and MACIVER, JJ., concur.

MAKAR, J., concurs in result only with opinion.

EISNAUGLE, J., concurs in result with opinion in which KILBANE, J., concurs.

HARRIS, J., recused.

_____________________________

Footnotes
1 Pertinent here, the parties agreed to the distribution of considerable marital assets, alimony, and other necessary considerations involved with dissolving the marriage. Regarding equitable distribution, the agreement included a detailed list and valuation of assets identifying the dental practice (and a related company), numerous properties, automobiles, and financial accounts the parties owned. Just two days after the parties signed the agreement, Martin petitioned to dissolve the marriage. The trial court entered its uncontested final judgment of dissolution of marriage that ratified the marital settlement agreement and made it a part of the judgment. Nearly nine months later, Martin filed her verified motion to set aside the marital settlement agreement, relying on Casto v.
2 marriage to Appellee Craig Sater. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We affirm because Martin failed to establish a legally sufficient basis to set aside the final judgment of dissolution of marriage under Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540. In reaching this decision, we recede from Suppa v. Suppa, 871 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), which declined to apply Rule 12.540 under similar circumstances.
3 wreck” because her father died in June 2019, and she had to put down her dog. She also alleged Sater, who was “in full control of the finances,” never provided financial disclosures and “provided misinformation” by telling her that the agreement “was the best she was going to get in Court and that she better sign or she was going to get nothing. If we go to Court, I guarantee you, I will get more than you.” As a result of her state of mind, lack of financial disclosure, and the alleged misinformation from Sater, she asserted the agreement should be set aside as it was “patently unfair on its face and would shock the conscious [sic].” Relying on Casto, the trial court denied the motion. Specifically, the trial judge found insufficient evidence that Sater engaged in “fraud, deceit, duress, coercion, misrepresentation, or overreaching” and that Martin “had a general knowledge and understanding of the Husband’s business and its generated income” and she failed to show the agreement was unfair to her in its terms. This appeal followed.
4 Casto, 508 So. 2d at 332. After the husband filed his petition for dissolution of marriage, and before entry of final judgment, the wife successfully moved to set aside the postnuptial agreement. See id. Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court held that a postnuptial agreement may be set aside if the challenging spouse establishes: (a) that the agreement “was reached under fraud, deceit, duress, coercion, misrepresentation, or overreaching”; or (b) “that the agreement makes an unfair or unreasonable provision for that spouse,” and the defending spouse is not able to show either (i) full and frank disclosure regarding the assets and income of the parties or (ii) “a general and approximate knowledge [of the] challenging spouse” as to the character and extent of the marital property. See id. at 333. Years later, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the Casto analysis to a post-judgment challenge of a marital settlement agreement reached by counseled parties after the dissolution action was filed and the parties conducted discovery. See Macar v. Macar, 803 So. 2d 707, 711–13 (Fla. 2001). In this context, the Florida Supreme Court held, [R]ule 1.540, and not Casto, provides the framework for challenging settlement agreements entered into after the commencement of litigation and utilization of discovery procedures. . . . Casto applies only to agreements entered into prior to litigation and discovery, because before spouses file for dissolution, they engage each other as fiduciaries and as such, fraudulent behavior may be perpetrated more easily. Id. at 713.2 Thereafter, we held in Suppa that the Casto analysis applied to a post-judgment challenge to a marital settlement agreement reached by parties (with the assistance of a paralegal) in
5 contemplation of an imminent petition for dissolution action, which was filed shortly thereafter. See 871 So. 2d at 988–90. Following a hearing on the petition, the trial court entered its “Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage with Marital Settlement Agreement.” See id. at 988. Less than one month later the former wife moved to set aside the judgment, alleging fraud and misrepresentations by the former husband and her lack of adequate knowledge of her rights and financial resources of the marriage. See id. at 988–89. Relying on Casto, the trial court granted the motion and set aside the agreement. See id. at 989–90. We affirmed, stating, “[t]his case is controlled by Casto.” Id. at 990. Finally, in 2024 the Sixth District decided O’Hair, which is factually similar to both Suppa and the case sub judice. After twenty-eight years of marriage, the O’Hairs entered into a marital settlement agreement. See O’Hair, 396 So. 3d at 632. Shortly thereafter, the husband petitioned for simplified dissolution of marriage. See id. The trial court entered final judgment ratifying and incorporating the agreement. See id. More than ten years later, relying on Casto, the former wife moved to set aside the agreement, and the trial court, based on Casto, granted the motion. See id. The Sixth District reversed and remanded for further proceedings, concluding that “this case is not . . . governed by Casto.” See id. at 633. Rather, the Sixth District concluded the trial court’s decision must be determined under rule 12.540. See id.
6 if the movant shows that the non-challenging spouse engaged in “fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct.”
7 There is but one lone exception to “this absolute finality” wrought by entry of the final judgment—the “narrow range of circumstances” set forth in rule 12.540 that vests the trial court with jurisdiction to relieve a party from the judgment. See id.; see also Bane v. Bane, 775 So. 2d 938, 941 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Miller); O’Hair, 396 So. 3d at 632–33. And other than that provided by the rule, trial courts “have no authority” to vacate or modify the final judgment. See Bigelow v. Ritsema, 289 So. 3d 550, 551 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (holding that it is “a well-established rule that ‘trial courts have no authority to alter, modify, or vacate a final judgment except as provided in Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.530 and 1.540’ and Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure 12.530 and 12.540.” (quoting Levy v. Levy, 900 So. 2d 737, 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005))). Here, Martin and Sater entered into the marital settlement agreement after mediation—not as fiduciaries, but as parties soon to be legally adverse in an imminent dissolution action to effectuate their divorce. And the final judgment entered by the trial court ratified their agreement and made it a part of the final judgment. As a result, it is the final judgment, rather than the agreement, that possesses legal force and effect in providing the parties’ respective rights and obligations. It is the final judgment by which the parties are bound—to which each party is entitled to enforcement and subjected to contempt for noncompliance. Therefore, Martin was required to seek relief from the final judgment itself, not the marital settlement agreement made a part thereof. See O’Hair, 396 So. 3d at 632–33. And there is only one path in Florida law by which she could seek such relief—that paved by rule 12.540. Outside of that “narrow” path, the trial court simply is without jurisdiction to vacate or modify the final judgment. See Miller, 484 So. 2d at 1223. Therefore, the trial court’s decision had to be considered under the provisions of rule 12.540—not Casto. In reaching this conclusion, we recede from our decision in Suppa.
8 judgment. See Crupi v. Crupi, 784 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). In denying the motion, the trial court found there was “no sufficient evidence to prove” that Sater engaged in “fraud, deceit, duress, coercion, misrepresentation, or overreaching.” While couched in the vernacular of Casto, this finding addresses the grounds for relief available under rule 12.540(b)(3). And the trial court’s findings in this regard are supported by the record before us.
9 KILBANE, J., concurs in result with opinion in which Jay, C.J., concurs.

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