VILLAGE OF PALMETTO BAY, FLORIDA, ET AL.

v.

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed December⁴, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-0230 Lower Tribunal No. 22-3627 ________________

Village of Palmetto Bay, Florida, et al., Appellants,

vs.

Miami-Dade County, Florida, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Migna Sanchez-Llorens, Judge.

Falk, Waas, Solomon, Mendlestein & Davis, P.A., Norman M. Waas, Jessica M. Hernandez, and John C. Dellagloria, Village Attorney, for appellants.

Geraldine Bonzon-Keenan, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Annery Pulgar Alfonso, Bruce Libhaber, and Dale P. Clarke, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ.

MILLER, J.

2

This appeal arises out of a long-debated bridge construction project. Miami-Dade County intends to construct a bridge over the Cutler Drain Canal C-100, which is located within the confines of the Village of Palmetto Bay (the “Village”) and fund the project from unencumbered road impact fees reserved in trust for the purpose of funding infrastructure. During a declared state of emergency precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Miami- Dade County Board of County Commissioners dispensed with certain procedural requirements, known as the three-day and four-day rules, and approved the project without advance agenda notice or committee referral. The parties reached an impasse in the statutorily circumscribed alternative dispute resolution process, and the Village and two of its residents subsequently filed an injunctive and declaratory relief action in the circuit court seeking to halt construction. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, finding that the procedural requirements were properly suspended due to the stated emergency and funding for the project did not run afoul of either the Miami-Dade Home Rule Charter or Miami-Dade Code. That decision is under review. I For nearly two decades, residents have debated the proposed construction of a bridge over Cutler Drain Canal C-100 at Southwest 87th

On June 2, 2021, the Board convened a public hearing and adopted Ordinance No. 21-41, approving the fiscal year 2020–2021 mid-year budget’s adjustments and amendments. The ordinance reflected an allocation of $3.1 million from the Reserve for Future Capital Projects category of the Department of Transportation and Public Works Road Impact Fee Program for the Bridge Project. On September 28, 2021, the Board

Some seven months later, both the County and TPO declared an impasse in the conflict resolution proceedings. The Village brought suit the following month, and the parties filed dueling summary judgment motions. The trial court entered final judgment in favor of the County, and this appeal ensued. II A summary judgment ruling is subject to de novo review. See Reyes v. Baptist Health S. Fla. Found., Inc., 360 So. 3d 438, 440 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023). We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). A The Village contends the Board ran afoul of the County Code by relying on the COVID Ordinance to circumvent the attendant three-day and four-day rules. The three-day rule sets forth the requirements for advance committee referral. It provides, “A copy of each agenda item shall be furnished to the members of each committee and subcommittee not later than three (3) working days before a vote may be called on the item.” Miami-Dade County, Fla., Code Ch. 2, Art. I, § 2-1, R. 4.01(n) (2020). The four-day rule governs

Id. at R. 4.01(k) (emphasis added). Consistent with this language, the COVID Ordinance engrafts specific exceptions on the three-day and fourday subsections for “emergency matters, matters during declared states of emergency, and time sensitive matters, as set forth in rule 4.01(k).” Id. at R. 4.01(k), 5.05(c).

The COVID Ordinance is not limited by its terms to emergencies. Instead, it broadly encompasses all matters arising “during declared states of emergency.” The Village, however, relies upon a pre-vote discussion among the commissioners regarding the eleventh-hour calendaring, along with the “whereas” clauses reflected in the preamble of the ordinance, for the

Miami-Dade County, Fla., Code Part 1, Art. 1, § 1.02(A) (2020) (emphasis added). Unlike resolutions, ordinances require published notice. Id. at § 1.02(B); see also Miami-Dade County, Fla., Code Part I, Citizens’ Bill of Rights § (A)(6) (2020). And here, the Bridge Resolution approved the funding for the Bridge Project.

10

The County responds that the Bridge Project funding was approved by prior ordinance in that reserved, unallocated road impact fees were already appropriated when the Board adopted the fiscal year 2020–2021 County budget. Hence, it argues that it logically follows that the Bridge Resolution did not purport to appropriate funds in the first instance. “Appropriation” is not defined in the Charter. In accord with guiding authority, we therefore look to the “contemporary, common meaning” of the word. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). The American Heritage Dictionary defines appropriation as “[s]omething appropriated, especially public funds set aside for a specific purpose” or “[a] legislative act authorizing the expenditure of a designated amount of public funds for a specific purpose.” The Am. Heritage Dictionary, Appropriation (5th ed. 2022). Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage similarly defines the term as “a public body’s act of voting a sum of money for any of various public purposes.” Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 72 (3d ed. 2011); see also Graham v. Haridopolos, 108 So. 3d 597, 603 (Fla. 2013) (citing § 216.011, Fla. Stat. (2007)) (“‘Appropriation’ is defined as a ‘legal authorization to make expenditures for specific purposes within the amounts authorized by law.’”). When read together, these definitions compel the

We need not resolve this issue, however, as it is not dispositive on this record. As the trial court correctly observed, two alternative independent bases support the County’s course of conduct. First, Florida law sets forth a de facto exception to the general rule that appropriation must be made by ordinance, rather than resolution. See § 129.06(2), Fla. Stat. (2021). To that end, section 129.06(2)(c) provides that “[t]he reserve for future construction and improvements may be appropriated by resolution of the board for the purposes for which the reserve was made.” § 129.06(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). And here, the anticipated expenditure of unencumbered road impact fees was consistent with the purpose for which the reserve was made. Hence, a resolution was statutorily authorized. See Alachua County v. Watson, 333 So. 3d 162, 166 (Fla. 2022).

Second, the Board cured any asserted procedural infirmities when it adopted Ordinance Nos. 21-41 and 21-98, following a public hearing. See Forte v. Miami-Dade County, 271 So. 3d 155, 157 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). The ordinances approved and adopted fiscal year 2021–2022 mid-year budget adjustments and amendments, including the specific allocation of $3.1 million from the Reserve for Future Capital Projects category of the

III

In closing, we reiterate that the County was and is the ultimate decider as to the necessity of the Bridge Project. Because its actions were consistent with the applicable regulatory framework, it acted within its purview in approving the construction. We therefore find no reversible error and affirm in all respects.