SANDRA E. PINEIRO, APPELLANT,
v.
RIGOBERTO PINEIRO AND LAW FIRM OF FRANKLIN & CRISCUOLO, APPELLEES
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The court held that a civil contempt order was improper because the underlying orders did not authorize freezing assets for attorney's fees and the contempt power cannot be used for property rights settlement.
[1] A court cannot freeze assets solely to secure payment of a party's own attorney's fees.
[2] The contempt power of a court cannot be invoked for the settlement of property rights, as opposed to alimony, support, or maintenance.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant sold marital stock options after a final judgment of dissolution, violating prior orders freezing the assets and granting an attorney's char…
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KLEIN, J.
Appellant was held in civil contempt for selling a marital asset, after a final judgment of dissolution, in violation of earlier orders freezing the asset and granting an attorney’s charging hen against appellant’s marital assets. We reverse.
In 2001, during dissolution proceedings, the court issued a temporary relief order that provided, among other things, that appellant, who was employed by General Electric, was not to withdraw any of her GE stock options without leave of court. In 2003, the court entered an order granting her lawyers, the appellee law firm, a charging lien, and in 2004 determined the amount of the lien. This was all before the final judgment of dissolution, which awarded appellant, as equitable distribution, $131,437 in GE stock options.
In the meantime, appellant had cashed in her stock options without notice to the court or interested parties. For this the trial court found appellant to be in civil contempt for violating the 2001 temporary relief order freezing the options, and the 2004 charging hen order which gave her former lawyers the right to payment from her marital assets. It is that order which is the subject of this appeal.
When the court first ordered the wife not to dispose of her GE stock options, it was not for the purpose of protecting her counsels’ attorneys’ fees. Indeed the court did not have the authority to freeze her assets in order to pay her own attorneys. Rinkor v. Brborich, 957 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Levinson v. Levinson, 895 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Widom v. Widom, 679 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Nor, as appellant points out, can the contempt power of a court be invoked for the “settlement of property rights as opposed to alimony, support or maintenance of one to whom the duty is owed.” Whelan v. Whelan, 736 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Enforcement through contempt of debts not involving support violates Article I, section 11 of the Florida Constitution, which prohibits imprisonment for debt. We accordingly reverse the order of contempt.
STONE and FARMER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Simpson v. Simpson, 68 So. 3d 958 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…ation that appellee could not be held in contempt for failing to pay appellant’s car loan, we find the trial court committed no error. The contempt power of the trial court cannot be used to settle disputes in rights to property. Pineiro v. Pineiro, 988 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Contempt can be used to enforce alimony, support, or maintenance awards alone since “[e]nforcement through contempt of debts not involving support violates Article I, section 11 of the Florida Constitution, which prohibits…
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Moustafa Farghali v. Farghali, 187 So. 3d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…n order enforceable through the court’s contempt power. “[T]he contempt power of a court [cannot] be invoked for the ‘settlement of property rights as opposed to alimony, support or maintenance of one to whom the duty is owed.’ ” Pineiro v. Pineiro, 988 So. 2d 686, [*341] 687 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quoting Whelan v. Whelan, 736 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). “Enforcement through contempt of debts not involving support violates Article I, section 11 of the Florida Constitution, which prohibits imprisonmen…
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Huber v. Disaster Solutions, LLC, 180 So. 3d 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…d DCA 2012) (“Under Florida law, the remedies available to enforce the breach by a party of a property settlement provision in a marital settlement agreement are those available to creditors against debtors.”) (citation omitted); Pineiro v. Pineiro, 988 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (explaining that the contempt power of the court cannot be used to enforce debts); Montanez v. Montanez, 697 So. 2d 184, 186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (explaining that it is well-settled in Florida that debts not involving support…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Whelan v. Whelan, 736 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Widom v. Widom, 679 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Levinson v. Levinson, 895 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- Surdakowski v. State, 957 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)