AMAURI PEREZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Amauri Perez was convicted of aggravated battery for throwing and striking a police officer with a traffic barricade during a foot chase, causing a rotator cuff injury requiring surgery. The appellate court affirmed the conviction under the statute's provision for causing great bodily harm, rejecting Perez's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.
The conviction is affirmed under § 784.045(1)(a)1 because the record establishes that Perez's act of striking the officer with the barricade caused great bodily harm (the torn rotator cuff requiring surgery), even though the barricade was not used as a deadly weapon under § 784.045(1)(a)2.
[1] Aggravated battery may be established by intentionally or knowingly causing great bodily harm, even if a deadly weapon was not used.
[2] A jury may find that great bodily harm was caused by an object when the victim falls over that object during an altercation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the record establishes that that act, which was admittedly a simple battery, "cause[d] the officer "great bodily harm," the tearing of a rotator cuff in his shoulder requiring extensive treatment and surgery”
Establishes the court's holding that aggravated battery conviction was proper under the great bodily harm provision despite the barricade not being a deadly weapon
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring a foot chase, Perez threw at and struck a police officer with a traffic barricade. The officer fell over the barricade and suffered a torn rota…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
We reject the defendant’s contention that the evidence does not support his conviction for aggravated battery.1 § 784.045(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000).2 Although we agree that his throwing at and striking a police officer with a traffic barricade during a foot chase did not involve the use of the barricade as a “deadly weapon” so as to constitute a violation of section 784.045(1)(a) 2, see Williams v. State, 651 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Aiken v. State, 425 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), the judgment is affirmed under section 784.045(1)(a)1 because the record establishes that that act, which was admittedly a simple battery, “cause[dj” the officer “great bodily harm,” the tearing of a rota-tor cuff in his shoulder requiring extensive treatment and surgery, see Coronado v. State, 654 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Owens v. State, 289 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), which the jury could properly find occurred when he fell over the barricade. See Heck v. State, 774 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Cunningham v. State, 650 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).3
Affirmed.
. Perez was also found guilty of resisting arrest with violence. There is no claim of error in that conviction.
. 784.045. Aggravated battery.—
(l)(a) A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery: 1. Intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; or
2. Uses a deadly weapon.
.As we understand the defendant's position on this issue, it is that the evidence does not appropriately demonstrate that the admittedly serious shoulder condition was "caused” by the barricade, as charged in the information, as (possibly) opposed to the physical scuffle which occurred a minute or two later when the officer finally apprehended Perez and took him into custody. As we hold, we do not agree with this contention in the light of the evidence concerning the manner in which each of the two, supposedly distinct, incidents occurred.
We emphasize, however, that even an acceptance of the defendant's position would not justify a reversal. This is because, as Perez concedes, the second incident also involved a simple battery by Perez upon the officer. Thus, at best, and without dispute, his "great bodily harm,” see § 784.045(1)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (2000), was caused by either or both batteries committed by the defendant. No matter which, he was therefore justly convicted of the crime of aggravated battery. See 1 W.L. LaFave & A.W. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 312, at 405 n. 68 (1986); § 312, at 410 n. 90 (Supp.2002), citing People v. Crane, 308 Ill.App.3d 675, 242 Ill.Dec. 378, 721 N.E. 2d 657 (1999), appeal denied, 188 Ill.2d 569, 246 Ill.Dec. 126, 729 N.E. 2d 499 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 948, 121 S.Ct. 349, 148 L.Ed.2d 281 (2000).
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The defendant’s motion for rehearing correctly points out that our opinion did not sufficiently emphasize the statutory requirement under section 784.045(1)(a)1, Florida Statutes (2000), that the defendant “intentionally or knowingly” cause the great bodily harm we found had been sustained in this case. See Perez v. State, 825 So. 2d 957, 958, n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). Upon review of the record in the light of the defendant’s arguments on rehearing, however, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish this element of the offense.
Rehearing denied.
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Amauri Perez v. State, 825 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…did not sufficiently emphasize the statutory requirement under section 784.045(1)(a)1, Florida Statutes (2000), that the defendant “intentionally or knowingly” cause the great bodily harm we found had been sustained in this case. See Perez v. State, 825 So. 2d 957, 958, n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). Upon review of the record in the light of the defendant’s arguments on rehearing, however, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish this element of the offense. Rehearing denied.…
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E.M.M. v. State, 836 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…r v. State, 672 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). See generally D.C. v. State, 567 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Compare Forchion v. State, 214 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)(broom handle thrown at victim not used as a deadly weapon); Perez v. State, 825 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)(barricade thrown at victim not used as deadly weapon). Affirmed.…
Authorities Cited
- Owens v. State, 289 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Jackson v. State, 654 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Alfraedo Williams v. State, 651 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Coronado v. State, 654 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Aiken v. State, 425 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Heck v. State, 774 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Amauri Perez v. State, 825 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
- Cunningham v. State, 650 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
- Dowdell v. Johnson, 531 U.S. 948 (U.S. 2000)
- Brown v. Moore, 531 U.S. 948 (U.S. 2000)