ZACH RICHMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant Richman appealed his conviction for attempted second-degree murder with a firearm, claiming his sentencing scoresheet contained errors regarding offense severity levels and mandatory minimum sentences. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting both the scoring error claim and the consecutive sentence challenge.
The scoresheet was correctly calculated under Florida law: second-degree murder (level ten) is reduced one level for attempt (level nine) and then increased one level for firearm use (level ten). Consecutive mandatory minimum sentences were permissible because Richman was convicted of armed burglary of two separate apartments.
[1] A scoresheet correctly calculates the offense level for attempted second-degree murder with a firearm by reducing the base offense level for second-degree murder by one l…
[2] The 1995 amendment to the Florida Statutes reduced the offense level reduction for an attempt from two levels to one level.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Second degree murder is a level ten offense, § 921.0012, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998), which is reduced to a level nine offense as an attempt, § 777.04(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997), which is then increased to a level ten offense on account of the use of a firearm.”
Explains the correct calculation of the offense level for attempted second-degree murder with a firearm under the applicable statute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRichman was convicted of attempted second-degree murder with a firearm (crime date July 28, 1998) and armed burglary of two apartments in the same bui…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the judgment on authority of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).
By pro se submission, defendant-appellant Richman claims that his scoresheet contains a scoring error on the primary offense at conviction, attempted second degree murder with a firearm. We reject this claim as the scoresheet is correct on this issue. Second degree murder is a level ten offense, § 921.0012, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998), which is reduced to a level nine offense as an attempt, § 777.04(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997), which is then increased to a level ten offense on account of the use of a firearm. Id. § 775.087.1
We distinguish this case from Williams v. State, 784 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), where the defendant was convicted for attempted second degree murder and during sentencing the court reduced the severity level by two levels pursuant to section 777 .04(4)(a), Florida Statutes. The version of the Florida Statutes applicable in Williams was the 1993 version which allowed for a two level reduction for an “attempt.” The “attempt” statute was subsequently amended and pursuant to the amended version, the offense level is dropped one level for an attempt. Ch. 95-184, § 14, at 1703-04, Laws of Fla.2 Two other cases, Franco v. State, 786 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), and State v. Wilson, 734 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), appear likewise to involve the pre-amended version of the statute, and we distinguish those cases as well.
In 1995, the legislature amended section 775.087, Florida Statutes, to provide that there is a one-level increase for the use of a firearm. Ch. 95-184, § 19, at 1708, Laws of Fla. As stated earlier in this opinion, that provision applies to this defendant.3
We note, and distinguish, Degregorio v. State, 750 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). There, the defendant’s sentence was not increased one level on account of the use of a firearm pursuant to section 775.087(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (1995). Based on a stated crime date of July 3, 1997, the amended version of section 775.087 should have applied to Degregorio. We distinguish the case because that issue apparently was not raised by the parties and was not addressed by the court.
Defendant also argues that he should not have received two consecutive three-year mandatory minimum sentences on account of the use of a firearm. We reject that argument as well. Defendant was convicted of armed burglary of two apartments in the same apartment building. Consecutive mandatory minimum sentences were permissible. Sprow v. State, 639 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
Affirmed.
. The crime date was July 28, 1998.
. Chapter 95-184 was subsequently determined to violate the single subject rule. Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000). Chapter 95-184 is thus invalid with respect to crimes committed between October 1, 1995 and May 24, 1997. Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924, 928 (Fla.2000). The defendant's crime dale of July 28, 1998 is after May 24, 1997 so the amended version of the attempt statute, as reflected in paragraph 777.04(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), applies to the defendant.
. As to the impact of Heggs on the effective date, see note 2 supra.
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Reid v. State, 799 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…d version of the statute, which would have reduced appellant’s offense by only one level for an attempt, does not apply. Thus, appellant’s attempted second degree murder offenses should have been scored as level eight offenses. See Richman v. State, 793 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). The one level increases due to appellant’s use of a firearm are also inapplicable. Id.; see also Williams v. State, 784 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s convictions, but reverse his sentences on…
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Torres v. State, 798 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…ERSED and REMANDED. COBB, and SAWAYA, JJ., concur. . §§ 782.04(2), 775.087(1), Fla. Stats. . § 812.13, Fla. Stat. .§ 790.19, Fla. Stat. . October 1, 1995 to May 24, 1997. See Salters v. State, 758 So. 2d 667 (Fla.2000). . See Richman v. State, 793 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). See also Greene v. State, 714 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Rivera v. State, 718 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).…
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Macknell Jesse Carvil v. State, 891 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…rder with a firearm should have been classified as level eight offenses under the 1994 sentencing guidelines, not as level ten offenses. See § 777.04(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993); Reid v. State, 799 So. 2d 394, 400 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Richman v. State, 793 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Thus, proper scoring of Carvil’s scoresheet will, again as the State conceded, result in a maximum guideline sentence of 6.79 years, nearly four and one-half years shorter than the 11.4 years to which he is currently sentenced. W…
Authorities Cited
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967)
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- Xzavier Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2000)
- Degregorio v. State, 750 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Feldman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., Inc., 639 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Brodley S. Williams v. State, 784 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- State v. Wilson, 734 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Cala v. State, 786 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
- Franco v. State, 786 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)