J.M. AND A.S., APPELLANTS,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2000-07-19
Nos. 3D99-2531, 3D99-2524
Before COPE, LEVY and GERSTEN, JJ.
762 So. 2d 1029 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2000) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Parents appealed termination of their parental rights, arguing the evidence was insufficient and the termination petition was filed prematurely. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the termination, holding that the evidence was legally sufficient and the petition was timely filed under the applicable statutory provision.


Holding

The court affirmed the termination, holding that ample competent substantial evidence supported the required elements for termination. The petition was timely filed because it was filed under Florida Statutes § 39.806(1)(c), which contains no specific time requirement, and was filed after the six-month case plan had expired, satisfying the requirements of § 39.802(8).


Headnotes

[1] Ample competent substantial evidence can legally support the termination of parental rights, even if some evidence favors the parents.

[2] A father's argument regarding the premature filing of a termination of parental rights petition is waived if not raised in the trial court.

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Key Quotes

“While the mother and father point to evidence which favors their side of the case, there was ample competent substantial evidence which supports the elements required for a termination.”

The court's rejection of the sufficiency of evidence argument on appeal.

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Facts & Procedural History

The mother and father's parental rights were terminated by the trial court. A case plan was approved by the court on May 11, 1998, for a six-month per…

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Opinion of the Court
COPE, J.

COPE, J.

J.M., the mother, and A.S., the father, appeal an order terminating parental rights. We affirm.

The mother and father argue that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a termination of parental rights. We disagree. While the mother and father point to evidence which favors their side of the case, there was ample competent substantial evidence which supports the elements required for a termination. As the evidence was legally sufficient, we reject the mother’s and father’s argument on this point.

The mother and father also argue that the petition for termination of parental rights was filed prematurely. They say that the petition could not be filed without their having had a full twelve months in which to comply with the case plan, and that the petition was filed too soon. As the father did' not make this argument in the trial court, we reject his argument for lack of preservation.

We reject the mother’s argument on this point on the merits. The petition was filed in this case under paragraph 39.806(l)(c), Florida Statutes, which allows termination of parental rights “[wjhen the parent or parents engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services.” § 39.806(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). This particular statutory provision does not contain a requirement for any, particular period of time under a case plan. The twelve-month pro vision which the mother refers to is contained in a different statutory alternative, paragraph 39.806(1)(e). See Department of Children and Families v. A.L., 723 So. 2d 342, 343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), review dismissed sub nom. M.B. v. Department of Children and Families, 729 So. 2d 392 (Fla.1999).

In this case the mother entered into a case plan which was approved by the court on May 11, 1998, and was for a six-month period, not twelve months. The petition for termination of parental rights was filed eight months later. As the Department points out, the relevant statute provides:

(8) Whenever the department has entered into a case plan with a parent with the goal of reunification, and a petition for termination of parental rights based on the same facts as are covered in the case plan is filed prior to the time agreed upon in the case plan for the performance of the case plan, the petitioner must allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has materially breached the provisions of the case plan.

Id. § 39.802(8) (emphasis added). Thus, the petition in this case was timely, not .premature, because it was filed after the case plan had expired.

The mother bases her argument on a different provision of section 39.806, Florida States, which states, “A petition for termination of parental rights may also be filed when a child has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the court, and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the parents.” Id. § 39.806(l)(e). That statute goes on to say that “the failure of the parents to substantially comply for a period of 12 months after an adjudication of the child as a dependent child constitutes evidence of continuing abuse, neglect, or abandonment....” Under that statutory provision, “[sjueh 12-month period may begin to run only after the entry of a disposition order placing the custody of the child with the department or a person other than the parent and the approval by the court of a case plan with a goal of reunification with the parent.” Id.

The mother’s reliance on paragraph 39.806(l)(e) is misplaced, because the petition for termination of parental rights in this case was filed under a different paragraph, 39.806(l)(c). We therefore need not conduct any further analysis under paragraph 39.806(l)(e).1

For the stated reasons, the judgment of termination of parental rights is affirmed.

. As already explained, the mother’s case plan was for six months, not twelve months. Further, by the time the termination case came to trial, it had been more than twelve months since the case plan was entered into.


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Citator

Cited By

  • S.T. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 789 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 39.806(l)(f), Fla. Stat. (1999); Perry v. State, 776 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)(court may question witness in the interest of justice in quest for truth); J.M. v. Florida Dep’t of Children & Families, 762 So. 2d 1029, 1029 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)(court may terminate parental rights upon proof that “continuing involvement of the parent ... threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of ser…
  • R.J. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 866 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See K.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 834 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); F.A.F. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 804 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); J.M. v. Florida Dep’t of Children & Families, 762 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).…

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