CITY OF TAMPA, APPELLANT,
v.
W.A. BROWN, AS TRUSTEE OF THE ONE HUNDRED ELEVEN ON HUNDRED THIRTEENTH STREET TRUST, APPELLEE
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The City of Tampa appeals the trial court's voiding of nine code enforcement liens against real property because the City sent the lien orders by regular mail instead of certified mail. The Florida District Court of Appeal reverses, holding that the statute does not require certified mail delivery for code enforcement board orders imposing liens.
Code enforcement board lien orders are not required to be served by certified mail. Section 162.12, which mandates certified mail for all notices required by the code enforcement statute, applies only to notices that are themselves statutorily required—not to final orders imposing liens, which the statute does not require to be served in any particular manner.
[1] A code enforcement board order entered pursuant to sections 162.07 and 162.09, Florida Statutes (1995), is not a "required notice" under section 162.12, Florida Statutes…
[2] Statutory provisions governing code enforcement do not require that a copy of a section 162.07 order be provided to the violator.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The question, however, is not what the order may contain, but rather what is a 'required notice.' If a notice is 'required,' section 162.12 governs its delivery”
Establishes the court's analytical framework distinguishing between statutory notices and final orders, which is central to the holding
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe City of Tampa issued nine code enforcement liens on real property owned by W.A. Brown as trustee. After conducting hearings and finding code viola…
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PATTERSON, Judge.
The City of Tampa (the City) appeals from a final judgment, which declares nine of its code enforcement hens on a parcel of real property to be void ab initio because the City failed to send its orders to the property owner by certified mail. We reverse.
The sole issue in this case is whether a code enforcement board order entered pursuant to sections 162.07 and 162.09, Florida Statutes (1995), must be provided to the property owner by certified mail. The City concedes that the orders at issue were sent by regular mail. In reaching its conclusion that certified mail delivery was required, the trial court determined that code enforcement board orders contained “notices” which require comphance with section 162.12, Florida Statutes (1995). The question, however, is not what the order may contain, but rather what is a “required notice.” If a notice is “required,” section 162.12 governs its delivery:
162.12 Notices.—
(1) All notices required by this part shall be provided to the alleged violator by certified mail, return receipt requested; by hand delivery by the sheriff or other law enforcement officer, code inspector, or other person designated by the local governing body; or by leaving the notice at the violator’s usual place of residence with any person residing therein who is above 15 years of age and informing such person of the contents of the notice.
When a code violation is discovered, the violator must receive a notice of a hearing under section 162.12. See § 162.06, Fla. Stat. (1995). If the court finds a code violation at the hearing, it enters an order pursuant to section 162.07. This order may include a deadline for compliance and notice that a fine may be imposed for failure to comply. See § 162.09, Fla. Stat. (1995). The statute does not require that a copy of this order be provided to the violator. If the violator fails to comply with the section 162.07 order, a second order may be entered under section 162.09 imposing a continuing fine. This order, upon recording in the public records, becomes a lien on the property. See § 162.09(3), Fla. Stat. (1995). It is this type of order which is the subject of this case.
Section 162.09, however, does not provide for a hearing and does not require that the order entered be provided to the violator. In fact, in regard to each of the hens imposed in this case, the trial court conducted a hearing, after notice, and a copy of the order was provided to the violator, albeit by regular mail. Because there is no statutory requirement that a copy of the order be provided to the violator, it cannot be a “required notice” under section 162.12.
It is necessary to fill the procedural gaps in this statute by the common-sense application of basic principles of due process. The violator received notice, had the opportunity to be heard, and was provided a copy of the final order from which an appeal could be taken. Nothing more is required. The statute does not require the service of the final order in a certain manner and, more particularly, by certified mail. Therefore, we reverse.
We acknowledge apparent conflict with Personal Rep. of Estate of Jacobson v. Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, 685 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
Reversed.
PARKER, C J., and FULMER, J., concur.
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Massey v. Charlotte Cnty., 842 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…r the statute is facially unconstitutional. However, in this context we have previously noted, “It is necessary to fill the procedural gaps in [chapter 162] by the common-sense application of basic principles of due process.” City of Tampa v. Brown, 711 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also Michael D. Jones, P.A. v. Seminole County, 670 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (stating, “[a]l-though [code enforcement] boards can assert a lien against real or personal property, presumably section 162.09 would be in…
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Shlishey THE Best, Inc. v. Citifinancial Equity Servs., Inc., 14 So. 3d 1271 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…wo reasons. First, this court has previously held that when a statute contains procedural gaps, those gaps will be filled “by the commonsense application of basic principles of due process.” Massey, 842 So. 2d at 145 (quoting City of Tampa v. Brown, 711 So. 2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)). Thus, the absence of an explicit statutory procedure for post-sale proceedings did not give the trial court liberty to simply ignore the procedural due process rights of interested parties. Second, contrary to CitiFinan-c…
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Ciolli v. City OF Palm BAY, 59 So. 3d 295 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…roperly executed proof of mailing or affidavit confirming the first class mailing.... . Chapter 162 does not specifically provide that a copy of the enforcement order must be provided to the violator. However, as observed in City of Tampa v. Brown, 711 So. 2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), "[i]t is necessary to fill the procedural gaps in this statute by the common-sense application of basic principles of due process."…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Personal Representative OF the Estate OF Frederick Jacobson v. Attorneys' Title Ins. Fund, Inc., 685 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)