PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF FREDERICK JACOBSON, APPELLANT,
v.
ATTORNEYS' TITLE INSURANCE FUND, INC., APPELLEE
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The personal representative of Frederick Jacobson's estate appeals a summary judgment requiring him to reimburse a title insurance company for an administrative lien on his property. The court reversed, holding that the lien was invalid because the Monroe County Code Enforcement Board failed to comply with statutory notice and recording requirements.
The administrative lien was never valid because Monroe County failed to strictly comply with statutory requirements under sections 162.12(1) and 162.09(3), Florida Statutes (1989). The court held that the county did not even substantially comply with the requirements for obtaining a lien, and therefore the title company was a mere volunteer in satisfying the purported lien.
[1] A statutory lien is not acquired unless applicable notice requirements are strictly complied with, absent language stating otherwise.
[2] Notice of an alleged violation authorizing a lien must be sent by certified mail, hand delivery, or by leaving the notice at the violator's place of residence.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where a statutory lien is given on compliance with stated requirements, absent language stating otherwise, a lien is not acquired unless the applicable notice requirements are strictly complied with.”
Establishes the strict compliance standard for statutory liens and notice requirements.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1989, Monroe County Code Enforcement Board placed an administrative lien on Jacobson's real property for code violations. The property was sold thr…
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PER CURIAM.
The personal representative of the estate of Frederick Jacobson1 appeals from a final summary judgment finding Jacobson liable for an administrative lien placed against his real property in 1989 by the Monroe County Code Enforcement Board. The property was sold three times after the lien was recorded but only the final purchaser, Maggie Kaspersetz, discovered the encumbrance, albeit after she purchased the property and received title insurance from appellee, Attorneys’ Title Insurance Fund (“ATIF”). ATIF paid the lien and sued, as subrogee, Jacobson. The case was first filed in Dade County and thereafter transferred to Monroe County. The trial court entered final summary judgment in the amount of $22,500, plus $4,394 as prejudgment interest in favor of ATIF. Attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $4,209 were additionally awarded to ATIF at a subsequent hearing.
We reverse the final summary judgment and award of attorney’s fees and hold that the administrative lien was never valid because the Monroe County Code Enforcement Board was not in compliance with statutory requirements.
Where a statutory lien is given on compliance with stated requirements, absent 'language stating otherwise,.a lien is not acquired unless the applicable notice requirements are strictly complied with. Stresscon v. Madiedo, 581 So. 2d 158, 159-60 (Fla.1991). Section 162.12(1), Florida Statutes (1989), which authorizes the lien in this case, requires that the alleged violator be sent notice by certified mail, by hand delivery, or by leaving the notice at the violator’s place of residence. The record in this case shows that the required notice was sent only by regular mail. In addition, section 162.09(3), Florida Statutes (1989) states that, if the lien is to be recorded in the public records, a certified copy of the order imposing the fine must be recorded. The records show that the order recorded by the county was not a certified copy.
In view of the county’s facially apparent failure to notice or record the lien in compliance with the statute, we hold that it did not even substantially comply with the statutory requirements for obtaining a lien. See, e.g., Mirror and Shower Door Prods., Inc. v. Seabridge, Inc., 621 So. 2d 486, 487 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (“nly immaterial errors and omissions in the form of the notice have been excused by the courts.”). Consequently, there was never a valid lien in the first instance. Therefore, the title company was a mere volunteer in satisfying the purported lien.
Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of ATIF and remand with instructions that judgment be entered in favor of appellant.
Reversed with directions.
. Jacobson died during the pendency of this appeal and the personal representative of his estate was duly substituted as the appellant.
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City OF Tampa v. W.A. Brown, 711 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…e statute does not require the service of the final order in a certain manner and, more particularly, by certified mail. Therefore, we reverse. We acknowledge apparent conflict with Personal Rep. of Estate of Jacobson v. Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, 685 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Reversed. PARKER, C J., and FULMER, J., concur.…
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W.A. Brown v. City OF Tampa, 748 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 1999)…ally accepted review of the opinion in City of Tampa v. Brown, 711 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), based on alleged express and direct conflict with the opinion in Personal Representative of the Estate of Jacobson v. Attorneys’ Title Insurance Fund, 685 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Upon further consideration, we find that jurisdiction was improvidently granted in this case. Accordingly, we hereby dismiss review of this cause. It is so ordered. HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and QUINCE…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Robinson, 581 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1991)
- Mirror & Shower Door Prods., Inc. v. Seabridge, Inc., 621 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)