LEE A. RAY, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
ELKS LODGE # 1870 OF STUART, PHILIP IRISH, CECIL HILL, WILSON WHEELER, THOMAS GIFFORD AND RALPH CLEMMONS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MEMBERS AND/OR OFFICERS OF ELKS LODGE # 1870, APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS

Fla. 4th DCA | 1995-01-18
No. 93-2757
STEVENSON, J., concurs., GLICKSTEIN, J., dissents with opinion.
649 So. 2d 292 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1995) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In this real estate contract dispute, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a judgment on the pleadings dismissing Ray's claims for breach of contract and fraud in the inducement against Elks Lodge members. The court held that a liquidated damages clause cannot serve as a defense to fraud claims and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the pleadings alone.


Holding

The court held that judgment on the pleadings was erroneous because: (1) all affirmative defenses were deemed denied when no reply was filed to them; (2) even if valid, a liquidated damages clause cannot constitute a defense to a fraud in the inducement claim; and (3) the party seeking judgment on the pleadings must be clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law based solely on the pleadings.


Headnotes

[1] A motion for judgment on the pleadings is a limited procedural device that must be decided solely on the pleadings.

[2] A judgment on the pleadings should be granted only when a party is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law based solely on the pleadings.

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Key Quotes

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(c) is a very limited procedural device. The motion must be decided on the pleadings without reference to facts which may be properly considered under other procedural vehicles and without the aid of outside matters.”

Establishes the strict standard for judgment on the pleadings motions

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Facts & Procedural History

Ray filed a pro se complaint against Elks Lodge #1870 and its officers alleging breach of written and oral contracts and fraud in the inducement relat…

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Opinion of the Court
PARIENTE, Judge.

PARIENTE, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from an order of dismissal entered pursuant to defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. This case arises out of a real estate transaction. Plaintiff, who filed his complaint pro se, alleged breaches of written and oral contracts and fraud in the inducement. Defendants admitted they breached the contract by not purchasing plaintiffs property. Defendants’ affirmative defenses raised the existence of a liquidated damages provision limiting plaintiffs damages under the contract. The trial court granted defendants’ motion, stating that the agreed-upon damages for breach was the forfeiture of the deposit.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(c) is a very limited procedural device. The motion must be decided on the pleadings without reference to facts which may be properly considered under other procedural vehicles and without the aid of outside matters. Skubal v. Cooley, 639 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); McKinzie v. Hollywood, Inc., 421 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), petition for review denied, 431 So. 2d 989 (Fla.1983). A judgment on the pleadings should be granted only when the party is clearly entitled to a judgment as a matter of law based solely on the pleadings. McKinzie.

No reply was filed to the affirmative defenses. Accordingly, all affirmative defenses are deemed denied, including those defenses directed to the liquidated damages clause. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.110(e). In addition, assuming the liquidated damages clause is valid, the clause does not constitute a defense to a claim for fraud in the inducement. Therefore, at this stage of the proceedings, we conclude that entry of a judgment on the pleadings was erroneous.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

STEVENSON, J., concurs.

GLICKSTEIN, J., dissents with opinion.

Dissent
GLICKSTEIN, Judge, dissenting.

GLICKSTEIN, Judge, dissenting.

Appellant portrays himself as a victim, but his amended complaint expresses a painfully obvious inability to accept his own responsibility in this ease. As they say, “Denial is not a river in Egypt.” A legally responsible adult, appellant made a bad bargain and received the damages to which he agreed.

I empathize with the trial judge, whose judgment in this case was — I believe — correct.


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Citator

Cited By

  • United States Fire Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 134 So. 3d 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
    …elied on the contract to rule that ADT was entitled to a judgment on the pleadings. This was error because the contractual provisions would not bar a tort claim for acts which were independent of the contract. See Ray v. Elks Lodge # 1870 of Stuart, 649 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (recognizing that liquidated damages provision in contract would not bar a claim of fraud in the inducement). Accordingly, we hold that USFI alleged a legally sufficient cause of action which was independent of any breach of…
  • PWBC, LLC. v. Palm Vista Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 417 So. 3d 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025)

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