CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, ETC.,

v.

3098 ALTON ROAD, LLC, ETC.,

LOBREE, J.

The City of Miami Beach (the “City”) appeals from the entry of a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring it to restore water and sewer service to property owned by 3098 Alton Road, LLC (the “property owner”). The City raises several challenges, including that it had the authority to refuse the utility service at issue pursuant to provisions of the Code of the City of Miami Beach, Florida (the “City Code”). Because the construction of City Code section 110-37 is dispositive and favors the property owner, we affirm without reaching other issues.¹ Generally, we review a circuit court’s issuance of a writ of mandamus for an abuse of discretion. See Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP, 221 So. 3d 1260, 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). However, to the extent that “the issue raised . . . requires us to construe provisions of the City’s Code of Ordinances, our standard of review is de novo.” City of Miami v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 206 So. 3d 52, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D2232, D2232 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 30, 2015) (citing Dixon v. City of Jacksonville, 774 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)).

In providing or regulating water utility services, the City exercises its proprietary powers and is “governed by the same laws and may exercise the same rights as a private corporation engaged in a similar undertaking.” Spierer v. City of North Miami Beach, 560 So. 2d 1198, 1200 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (quoting City of Winter Park v. Montesi, 448 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)). Florida law has long recognized that courts may interfere with the power “exercised by a town council in the management of one of its utilities,” where it exhibits “bad faith, fraud, arbitrary action or abuse of power.” Town of Riviera Beach v. State, 53 So. 2d 828, 831 (Fla. 1951); see also Edris v. Sebring Utils. Comm’n, 237 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970) (“The general rule is that a public utility corporation cannot refuse to render the service which it is authorized by its charter (or by law) to furnish, because of some collateral matter not related to that service.”). A writ of mandamus, therefore, may lie to compel the provision or resumption of utility services in such circumstances. Bd. of Supervisors of Englewood Water Dist. v. State ex rel. Englewood Beach Mobile Home Park, Inc., 223 So. 2d 48, 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969) (affirming mandamus where appellants “had been totally arbitrary in their refusal to allow appellee to . . . connect [with water system]”); see also City of Gainesville v. Gainesville Gas & Elec. Power Co., 62 So. 919, 920 (Fla. 1913) (observing that “[electricity provider] assumed the duty imposed by implication of law to render a reasonably adequate service during the time its rights

and duty may lawfully continue, and such duty may be enforced where no adequate excuse for nonperformance is appropriately shown”); Woodbury v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 49 So. 556, 562-63 (Fla. 1909) (deeming provision of water by public utility enforceable through mandamus); State v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 48 So. 639, 640-41 (Fla. 1908) (holding compliance by water utility corporation with reasonable requirements of law enforceable through mandamus). The City argues that section 110-37(11) of the City Code allowed it to disconnect or refuse reconnection of the water service at the property. Section 110-37(11), governing the contract between the property owner and the City, relevantly reads: All contracts shall be subject to cancellation and service thereunder discontinued by [City]:

. . .

(11) Where any owner or consumer refuses or neglects payment of bill, account or charge, by whomsoever incurred, for or on account of the premises where the water supply is furnished.

The City argues that the property owner had accrued unpaid fines in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for violations of an unrelated short-term rental ordinance prohibiting the commercial use of the property, that such fines fell within the meaning of “bill, account or charge,” and, therefore, it was entitled to discontinue its water service until the property owner paid them.

Ascertaining “[t]he plain meaning of the statute is always the starting point in statutory interpretation.” GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So. 2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007). The American Heritage Dictionary (2d ed. 1985), defines “bill” as “an itemized list or statement of fees and charges” or “costs.” An “account,” in turn, is “a list of . . . monetary transactions,” and a “business relationship involving the exchange of money or credit: a charge account.” Id. A “charge,” moreover, is an “expense; cost,” “the price set or asked for something,” or “demand[ed] payment.” Id. A “fee,” furthermore, is a “fixed charge” or a “charge for a . . . service.” Id. Clearly, a fine is not a list of fees, charges, or monetary transactions. It is also neither a price or expense, nor a charge for a service. To the contrary, a fine is more specifically “a sum of money imposed as a penalty for an offense.” Id. Even in isolation, therefore, reasonable and ordinary persons would not understand “bill,” “account,” or “charge” to mean a government-imposed fine. They would not receive notice from such language that, if they should fail to become current with a different department of government unrelated to their contract for water service, the City could terminate it on such grounds. See Fresnedo v. Porky’s Gym III, Inc., 271 So. 3d 1185, 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“[C]ourts are required to . . . giv[e] meaning to [contractual] provisions . . . such that an ordinary person would know what he was contracting away.”).

The City urges that at least one dictionary defines “bill,” in the commercial context, as a “general item of indebtedness,” Bill, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979), and that a fine could be such an item. However, “[w]hile dictionaries are beneficial in determining the meaning of individual words, we should not ‘make a fortress out of the dictionary.’” Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So. 2d 470, 472 (Fla. 1995) (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F. 2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945)). Here, a plethora of other City Code sections addressing the same subject, including 110-146, 110-191(a), (b), (h), (g), and 110-192(a)-(e), consistently qualify the words “bill,” “account,” and “charge” with the words “utility,” “service,” and “utility service,” even explicitly defining “charges” as “all fees applicable for water, sewer and stormwater services incurred and/or billed by the city’s utility billing system for services incurred.” Fines, therefore, are not contained in the plain meaning of section 110-37(11), as the lower court found. Cf. Jimenez v. State, 246 So. 3d 219, 227 (Fla. 2018) (resorting to in pari materia analysis to settle incompatible dictionary definitions). The fines accrued by the property owner, although linked to the same property receiving the water service, were for violations of ordinances unrelated and collateral to the utility. Because the City’s disconnection or refusal to resume the service based on such fines was arbitrary, we do not conclude that the lower court abused its discretion in issuing the writ. See Gainesville Gas & Elec. Power Co., 62

So. at 920; Edris, 237 So. 2d at 587; Englewood Beach Mobile Home Park, Inc., 223 So. 2d at 48. Affirmed.