CLEMENT MOORE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE; RAMON JAIME MASS, APPELLANT, V. THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Two youthful offenders appealed the denial of their motions to dismiss affidavits charging violations of community control, claiming the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that jurisdiction was vested exclusively in the parole commission. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Florida Statutes section 958.14 governs youthful offender community control violations and vests jurisdiction in the sentencing court under section 948.06(1).
The circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over violations of community control for youthful offenders. Section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1983), governs youthful offender community control violations and subjects them to section 948.06(1), which vests jurisdiction in 'the court granting such probation or community control.'
[1] Specific statutory provisions governing violations of community control programs for youthful offenders supersede more general provisions regarding jurisdiction.
[2] Alleged violations of a community control program for youthful offenders are governed by statutes that vest jurisdiction in the court that granted the community control.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We find that the more specific provisions of section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1983), govern over the more general provisions of section 958.10, Florida Statutes (1983).”
Establishes the interpretive principle the court used to resolve the statutory jurisdiction conflict in favor of the circuit court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClement Moore and Ramon Jaime Mass were convicted of criminal offenses and classified as youthful offenders. Both were sentenced to four years incarce…
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PER CURIAM.
In separate cases, the defendants were convicted of criminal offenses and classified by the respective trial courts as youthful offenders pursuant to the Florida Youthful Offender Act. See ch. 958, Fla. Stat. (1979).
Each defendant was sentenced to four years incarceration followed by two years community control. § 958.-05(2).
While serving in the community control program, affidavits of violation of community control were filed in the circuit court against the respective defendants in December 1983 and May 1984. Both defendants moved to dismiss the affidavits on the ground that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to revoke their community control. They argued that the provisions of chapter 958, Florida Statutes (1983), vested exclusive jurisdiction over the matter in the parole commission. After the denials of their motions, the defendants pled nolo contendere to the violations and appealed the jurisdictional question to this court.
We affirm.
We find that the more specific provisions of section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1983), govern over the more general provisions of section 958.10, Florida Statutes (1983).
Section 958.14 provides that alleged violations of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes (1983).
Section 948.06(1) deals with violations of probation and community control and specifically vests jurisdiction in “the court granting such probation or community control.” Loveless v. Bryson, 460 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (on motion for rehearing); Bradley v. State, 462 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). All district courts that have considered the issue are now in agreement that the present statutes vest jurisdiction in the courts over community control violations.1 See Loveless; Bradley; Smith v. State, 455 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Clem v. State, 462 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (on motion for rehearing granted); Sprulock v. State, 449 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
Accordingly, we find the circuit court had jurisdiction and affirm the denial of the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
.
We note that in the second and fourth districts, the courts initially determined that the parole commission had exclusive jurisdiction over violations of community control following incarceration, Loveless v. Bryson, 9 FLW 1908 (Fla. 2d DCA Sept. 7, 1984); Clem v. State, 8 FLW 2135 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 31, 1983), but subsequently reversed their positions finding jurisdiction in the sentencing court. Loveless v. Bryson, 460 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (on motion for rehearing): Clem v. State, 462 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (on motion for rehearing granted).
The second district court, however, appears to adhere to the view expressed in Lollis v. State, 449 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 2d DCA), cause dismissed, 453 So. 2d 45 (Fla.1984), that the parole commission has exclusive jurisdiction over charges of violation of community control following'incarceration, if those charges were filed before October 1, 1983. See Loveless, 460 So. 2d at 942; Ch. 83-131, § 20, Laws of Fla.
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Brooks v. State, 478 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 1985)…r to two years on each count. On appeal, the First District affirmed and certified the questions now before us. The other district courts of appeal have adopted the position of the First District sub judice and approved by us today. Moore v. State, 463 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985); Clem v. State, 462 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Loveless v. Bryson, 460 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Spurlock v. State, 449 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), review denied, 466 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985). We agree with the dist…
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Lane v. State, 470 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…a. 5th DCA 1984), pet. for rev. den., 466 So. 2d 212 (Fla.1985) and Bradley v. State, 462 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) authorize such a procedure and sanction for violators. See also Hart v. State, 463 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Moore v. State, 463 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Crosby v. State, 462 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Loveless v. Bryson, 460 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (on motion for rehearing); Clem v. State, 462 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (on motion for rehearing); Smith v. State, 45…
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Verdell Hill v. State, 469 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…release, not the Parole and Probation Commission. See § 948.06(1), Fla.Stat. (1983); Bradley v. State, 462 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Spurlock v. State, 449 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), review denied 466 So. 2d 212 (Fla.1985); Moore v. State, 463 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Clem v. State, 462 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Loveless v. Bryson, 460 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Smith v. State, 455 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH, SHARP and COWART, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Clem v. State, 462 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Spurlock v. State, 449 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Loveless v. Bryson, 460 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Lollis v. State, 449 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Hezekiah Smith v. State, 455 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Bradley v. State, 462 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)