FRANK PUDDU, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

v.

ROYAL NETHERLANDS STEAMSHIP COMPANY, DEFENDANT AND THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. MAUDE JAMES, INC., THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

WATERMAN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, a longshoreman, was in the employ of the stevedore corporation, Maude James, Inc., when that corporation was loading refrigerator cargo into a reefer hatch of defendant’s vessel, M.S Helena. Plaintiff, during this operation, was the gangwayman standing by. Presumably, if there were need to give signals to winchmen, that would have been appellant’s function. Appellant was injured when one of the booms, part of the ship’s equipment with which the longshoremen were working, buckled and broke.

Appellant brought suit against defendant Royal Netherlands Steamship Company, the owner of the vessel, alleging negligence and unseaworthiness.1 Three other members of the stevedore gang were also injured and commenced actions against the defendant. The case of one of these other longshoremen was to be tried by a judge with jury, and appellant stipulated that his case be tried simultaneously by that same judge sitting without jury.

In the jury case there was a verdict for the defendant after a prolonged trial. Thereafter in appellant’s ease the trial judge filed a written opinion containing findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered a decree dismissing the action. From this decree, adverse to him, the longshoreman appeals.

In order to prevail, appellant must satisfy us that the findings below are clearly erroneous and that, though there may be evidence to support them, we are left, after reviewing the entire evidence, with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed. McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20, 75 S.Ct. 6, 99 L.Ed. 20 (1954). This burden appellant has failed to carry. The cause of the buckling of the boom was the major issue before the trial judge. The eyewitness and expert evidence introduced by plaintiff and the stevedore corporation tended to show that the boom was defective and that it was not reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was used, and that the stevedore gang was doing its work at the time of the buckling in a normal and proper manner. Hence plaintiff claimed that his injury was caused by the negligence of the defendant and the unseaworthiness of the M.S. Helena in that she was equipped with a defective boom. Defendant’s eyewitness and expert evidence tended to show that the boom was in good serviceable condition and was caused to buckle by the negligent conduct of the members of the stevedore gang in failing properly to handle the ship’s gear. Resolving the conflicting testimony the trial judge found that the accident occurred while the stevedore gang was raising a rain tent that had been placed over the reefer hatch the previous day, and that in doing so the longshoremen caused the falls of the winch to be stretched to an angle of almost 180 degrees, a maneuver called “high lining,” which resulted in an unusual and dangerous stress on the boom and was the sole cause of its collapse.

The court therefore concluded after considering the conflicting testimony of the eyewitnesses and the experts that the sole cause of the buckling of the boom was the negligent conduct by the longshoremen of the stevedore operations; that inasmuch as the owner of the vessel was in no way responsible for the conduct of these operations it was not negligent with respect to any duty it owed Puddu, and that inasmuch as the ship’s equipment with which the stevedore gang was work ing was in good serviceable and workable condition, the M.S. Helena was not unseaworthy.

One of the ship’s crew was an eyewitness, and he testified for the defendant. The trial judge made no findings with respect to this circumstance; and appellant would have us hold that the seaman’s presence there caused his employer, the steamship company, to have some responsibility in connection with the stevedoring operations. It is uncontradicted that this crewman was present under orders to prevent cargo pilferage by the longshoremen and had no other duty. Merely stating the admitted reason for the presence of this able-bodied seaman disposes of appellant’s tenuous argument.

Bound as we are by the rule in Mc-Allister, supra, we can find no ground upon which to reverse the findings and conclusions below and therefore affirm the decree.

Plaintiff is not entirely uncompensated for the injury he suffered, as he is entitled to receive payments under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq.

Affirmed.

. Plaintiff sued Royal Netherlands Steamship Company only, and thereafter that defendant interpleaded as a third party defendant plaintiff’s employer, Maude James, Inc., setting forth that, in the event the steamship company should be found liable to the longshoreman the stevedore company in turn should be held liable to the steamship company on its implied warranty that it would perform its stevedoring work in a reasonably careful and prudent manner. The third party defendant put in evidence on its own account at trial. Inasmuch as the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s case, the case of the defendant against the-third party defendant was ordered dismissed without prejudice.

PER CURIAM.

All of the active judges concurring, except Judge CLARK, who dissents, the application is denied.

PER CURIAM.

The merits of this appeal were orally argued before a panel of this court on December 5, 1961, and the dismissal by the court below of the longshoreman’s complaint was unanimously affirmed on January 3, 1962 by opinion reported at 303 F. 2d 752. Thereafter counsel for appellant timely filed an application for a rehearing in banc. On February 20, 1962 this application was denied by the in banc court, 303 F. 2d 754, Judge Clark alone dissenting, 303 F. 2d 754.

A further request was timely made by appellant for a reconsideration of the denial of his application for rehearing. Judge Clark also requested reconsideration and, on April 9, 1962, this request was granted, four judges, Chief Judge Lumbard and Judges Moore, Friendly and Kaufman dissenting. Leave was granted counsel to file additional briefs by April 19, 1962.

After full reconsideration the court affirms the dismissal below of the appellant’s complaint. Six judges adopt the panel opinion of January 3, 1962 as the opinion of the in banc court, with one judge concurring in a separate opinion and two judges dissenting in separate opinions.

HAYS, Circuit Judge

(concurring in the result).

I concur in the result. However, it seems to me that, on the issue of unseaworthiness, it is necessary to say more than the majority opinion says.

The difficulty with the concept of unseaworthiness arises from the fact that while the authorities hold that there is liability without fault, there is no case which holds that there is absolute liability. The situation demands, then, that without regard to fault, we fix a point short of absolute liability. But logical coordinates for fixing a point, such as the time during which a particular condition continues to exist, are entirely lacking. Time is obviously irrelevant since notice to the shipowner is of consequence only if his liability is limited by fault. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S.Ct. 926, 4 L.Ed. 941 (1960).

Perhaps the best that can be done is, like Judge Hand in Grillea v. United States, 232 F. 2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956), to take as the starting point a condition of reasonable fitness for intended use, to consider this condition as impaired by the conduct or process which is the subject of litigation, and to call the resulting condition “unseaworthiness.” The conduct or process by which the fitness is changed to unfitness is not then to be classified as itself constituting unseaworthiness.

A ship is not unseaworthy because it has glass in a window which might be broken. The injuries of a seaman who negligently breaks such a glass are not the result of unseaworthiness, nor are the injuries of a seaman who is cut by the falling glass. But injury incurred in stepping on the broken glass does result from unseaworthiness.

The rule is far from satisfactory, but it has the virtue of being possible, though not easy, of application, and of having behind it the authority of a great judge. The situation itself does not permit the formulation of a really satisfying rule.

In the present case the defect arose “as a momentary step or phase in the progress of work on board” and “should be considered as an incident in a continuous course of operation” and not an unfitness of the ship. Grillea v. United States, supra, at p. 922.

CLARK, Circuit Judge

(dissenting).

I am disappointed that I cannot bring my brethren—as I had hoped—to consider in any detail the serious problems posed by this case. The majority opinion is directly contra to our holding in Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 2 Cir., 211 F. 2d 277, affirmed Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133, in which we held that negligence of the longshoremen could create a hazard which would constitute unseaworthiness. See also Grillea v. United States, 2 Cir., 232 F. 2d 919. The sole difference here is that the hazard was short-lived; yet Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S.Ct. 926, 4 L.Ed.2d 941, teaches us that a hazard may be of short duration and recent vintage and nevertheless constitute'unseaworthiness. And we have held that the trier of facts must determine in each case whether the duration of a hazard is such as to render the ship unseaworthy. Pinto v. States Marine Corp. of Delaware, 2 Cir., 296 F. 2d 1, certiorari denied 82 S.Ct.

874. Yet no such consideration was made here. In the light of the present summary disposition of the ease I am wondering why in banc consideration was ever granted.

So, too, the decision seems inconsistent with the rationale of the doctrine of unseaworthiness as laid down by the Supreme Court in, e. g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099, and Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., supra, 362 U.S. 539, 80 S.Ct. 926, 4 L.Ed.2d 941. The Court has indicated that unseaworthiness is a form of enterprise liability, “a species of liability without fault, analogous to other well known instances in our law.” Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, supra, 328 U.S. 85, 94, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed.

1099. It is imposed because of the hazardous nature of the tasks, in order to encourage care by the shipowner and ultimately to cause the shipowner to bear those losses which are incidental to the enterprise. The shipowner is best situated to distribute the loss broadly amongst the beneficiaries of the industry. And, on the other hand, to make the burden fall on seamen or longshoremen is to require them to subsidize the shipping business. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961).

Because this is the rationale of the doctrine, it would seem that the shipowner should be liable for losses caused by all foreseeable hazards, avoidable or not, which are normally incident to the shipping trade. See 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts 1376-1378 (1956); 3 Restatement, Torts § 519 (1938).

See generally Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault (1951).

At the very least it should be liable for injuries caused by hazards within the scope of its responsibility which could be avoided by greater care or supervision. This is such a case; and the burden is not a harsh one, for even if liable the shipowner may well recover indemnification from the plaintiff’s employer. E. g., Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 79 S.Ct. 445, 3 L.Ed.2d 413.

For these reasons, and for those advanced in my original dissent, I believe-this hazard rendered the ship unseaworthy. But as Judge KAUFMAN points out in his dissent, a question remains under the doctrine of the Pinto-case as to the duration of the dangerous condition and whether the hazard' was so short-lived that the ship would still remain reasonably fit for its intended use. I disagreed with the conclusion-in the Pinto case; but, while it stands, it does make sense to return the ease for findings on this time factor, as Judge-KAUFMAN holds. So I join him in voting to reverse and remand for further proceedings.

KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge

(dissenting).

I would remand for further findings on the duration of the dangerous condition ; and a redetermination by the trial court, in light of Pinto v. States Marine Corp. of Delaware, 296 F. 2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 82 S.Ct. 874 (1962), whether the high lining existed for sufficient time to render the ship unseaworthy.