IN RE FORFEITURE OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED PROPERTY: ONE 1976 DODGE VAN, V.I.N. B21BE7K121343. CITY OF CLEARWATER, APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID R. MALICK, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1983-03-11
No. 82-1793
HOBSON, A.C.J., and RYDER, J., concur.
429 So. 2d 718 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1983) Negative Treatment
Cited by 18 cases

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Synopsis

The City of Clearwater sought forfeiture of a vehicle used to conceal and possess cocaine. The trial court denied forfeiture based on proportionality concerns, but the appellate court reversed, holding that under the amended Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, a vehicle must be forfeited when contraband is concealed or possessed in it and such possession constitutes a felony.


Holding

The vehicle must be forfeited under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. When a vehicle is titled in the alternative to multiple owners and one co-owner uses it to conceal contraband constituting a felony, the guilty knowledge of that owner is sufficient to justify forfeiture regardless of the innocent co-owner's lack of knowledge.


Headnotes

[1] A vehicle used to facilitate the concealment or possession of contraband, where such possession constitutes a felony, is subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraban…

[2] The guilty knowledge of one co-owner of a vehicle is sufficient to justify forfeiture when the vehicle is titled in the alternative.

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Key Quotes

“any vehicle which has been used in aiding or abetting in the commission of any felony shall be a contraband vehicle”

Establishes the statutory basis for vehicle forfeiture under Florida's Contraband Forfeiture Act

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Facts & Procedural History

Police seized a 1976 Dodge van on January 16, 1982, after finding cocaine inside. The defendant Malick, a co-owner of the van titled in his and his fa…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHEB, Judge.

SCHEB, Judge.

The City of Clearwater petitioned for forfeiture of appellee’s vehicle on the ground that it was used to facilitate concealment and possession of contraband. The trial court denied the petition and the City filed this appeal. We reverse.

Clearwater police seized appellee’s 1976 Dodge van on January 16, 1982, after their search revealed that it contained cocaine. At the hearing on the City’s petition for forfeiture, appellee, David R. Malick, acknowledged that the cocaine was in the van and admitted that he and a friend were preparing to snort it when the police approached the vehicle. The City stipulated that Malick’s father, co-owner of the vehicle, had no knowledge that the contraband was in the vehicle.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the City’s petition noting that “there has to be some balancing of the penalties opposed to the offense and it was not the intent of the Legislature to have constituted a forfeiture of this van on this particular set of facts.”

The City contends that the court erred in failing to direct forfeiture of the van since Malick used it to unlawfully conceal or possess cocaine. It argues that section 932.701(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1981), specifically provides that any vehicle which has been used in aiding or abetting in the commission of any felony shall be a contraband vehicle. Appellee recognizes this statute but points to Griffis v. State, 356 So. 2d 297 (Fla.1978), as a basis to uphold the trial court’s judgment. There, the supreme court held that the state must show a nexus between the illegal drugs found in the vehicle and the furtherance of an illegal drug operation before the state could forfeit the vehicle. Appellee correctly points out that no such nexus was established here. Griffis, however, is no longer a controlling precedent as it was based on the predecessor forfeiture statute. This law was amended in 1980, and the current law, known as the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, sections 932.701-704, Florida Statutes (1981), provides for seizure and forfeiture of a vehicle when contraband is transported, concealed or possessed in it, if possession of the contraband constitutes a felony. State v. Peters, 401 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); In re 1973 Buick, 72 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).

Here, David Malick, co-owner, acknowledged that he was preparing to snort the cocaine in the van titled in his and his father’s name. While the courts have held that property may not be forfeited where the owner has no knowledge of illegal activities conducted without his consent, In re 86’ Uniflite, “Pioneer I,”398 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), nevertheless where, as here, the vehicle is titled, in the alternative, the guilty knowledge of one co-owner is a sufficient basis to justify a forfeiture. In re 1979 Lincoln Continental, 405 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The City properly proceeded against the vehicle and established that it was used in violation of the law for concealment of contraband. Therefore, it was entitled to have the van forfeited for the use and benefit of its police department. See In re 1973 Buick.

We vacate the trial court’s order and direct it to enter an order forfeiting the 1976 Dodge van to appellant.

HOBSON, A.C.J., and RYDER, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Crenshaw, 548 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1989)
    …onflicts with Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Pollack, 462 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); In re Forfeiture of a 1977 Datsun 280Z, 448 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied 453 So. 2d 43 (Fla.1984); City of Clearwater v. Malick, 429 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), and Naples Police Department v. Small, 426 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). We have jurisdiction.1 We hold that the legislature intended for forfeiture to be an appropriate penalty where an individual possesses a felony amount of dr…
    1 / 2
  • Weisz v. Miami Shores Vill., 461 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
    …ontinuing vitality of the holding in Griffis is uncertain. Several cases of the Second District Court of Appeal interpreted a 1980 legislative amendment to the forfeiture statute as an overruling of the Griffis holding. City of Clearwater v. Malick, 429 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); State v. Peters, 401 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Since it is not necessary to the disposition of this case, we do not resolve that question here, nor will we consider the constitutional implications of such a holding.…
  • Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Pollack, 462 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
    …ession of contraband constitutes a felony. In re Forfeiture of a 1977 Datsun 280Z Automobile, 448 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 453 So. 2d 43 (Fla.1984); Williams v. Miller, 433 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); City of Clearwater v. Malick, 429 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Naples Police Department v. Small, 426 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); State v. Peters, 401 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). But see Smith v. Hindery, 454 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (statute authorizing forfeiture is discretionar…

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